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1 Introduction 1 
1 Introduction 
The three essays in this dissertation are concerned with cognitive and noncognitive 
skills as a part of human capital, their importance for long-run socio-economic success 
and the possibility of improving skills and long-term outcomes by allowing more 
parental freedom in school choice. 
The importance of skills over and above formal educational degrees as a major factor 
to secure individual improvements in income and country-level economic growth is 
widely recognised today, both among scientists1 as well as among politicians. The 
European Union has placed improving education and skills at the heart of its EU 2020 
growth strategy. In 2012, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has launched a “Skills Strategy” in order to “[..] help 
governments build economic resilience, boost employment and reinforce social 
cohesion [..]” (OECD 2012). Moreover, studies that measure competencies of children 
and adolescents in a comparative way across countries2 have received wide public 
attention in recent years and have fuelled discussions on how to best design the 
education system. It is thus of high policy relevance to provide evidence on which 
specific skills play a role in economic success and which education policies are most 
efficient in fostering the development of these skills. 
While the majority of studies focus on assessing cognitive achievements such as 
literacy or numeracy skills, there is an increasing number of research papers also in the 
economic literature that acknowledge the multi-dimensionality of skills as a part of 
human capital. They show that not only cognitive skills, but also noncognitive, social or 
interpersonal skills are important predictors for economic and social outcomes3. 
Moreover, there is a large body of evidence that points to the importance of (early) 
                                                 
1 See for example Hanushek & Woessmann (2008). 
2 Examples of such studies are the OECD Programme of International Student Assessment (PISA), which measures 
competencies in the areas of reading, math and science among 15-year-olds, the Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study (TIMMS), which focuses on measuring math and science achievements of 4th and 8th graders, and 
the “Progress in International Reading Literacy Study” (PIRLS), which focuses on reading achievement of 4th 
graders. 
3  See for example Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) and Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001). 
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childhood as the optimal period for investments in human capital4. Cunha and Heckman 
(2007) summarise the evidence and present a model that stresses the value of dynamic 
complementarities between early and late investments in skills and between different 
facets of skills.  
Against this background, this thesis provides empirical evidence on, first, whether 
cognitive and social skills in childhood factor into socio-economic success later in life, 
and second, whether changes in the degree of school choice improve these same 
outcomes and skills. All three essays use microeconometric methods that allow 
distinguishing among different factors that influence children’s outcomes, such as the 
family and schooling background, and different skills. Moreover, in order to estimate 
not only short- but also long-term returns, this thesis uses rich longitudinal data that 
follows individuals throughout their childhood and into young adulthood.  
The second chapter studies whether both cognitive and social skills, measured 
already in childhood, are related to the duration of unemployment in early adulthood. 
By estimating a proportional hazard rate model, I analyse the probability of making a 
transition from unemployment to employment during an individual’s first 
unemployment spell. The study is based on British cohort data from the National Child 
Development Study, which contains information on children and their family and 
schooling environment from birth to adulthood. The estimates show that higher 
cognitive and social skills at the age of seven are associated with an increased 
probability of finding employment, resulting in a shorter duration of unemployment. 
This result holds also when controlling for individuals’ educational attainment, which 
means that skills measured at the age of seven are important over and above their effect 
via increasing education. What is more, also holding a broad set of variables on the 
family background, parenting activities and school characteristics constant does not 
change the results qualitatively. Lastly, I find that for men, these effects are mostly 
driven by individuals with low social skills. 
The third and fourth chapter are based on joint work with Karin Edmark and Markus 
Frölich. We evaluate the effects of a major school choice reform in the compulsory 
                                                 
4  See Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov (2006) for an overview. 
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schooling system in Sweden in 1992 on student outcomes. The reform increased school 
choice and competition among public schools and lead to a large-scale introduction of 
publicly funded but privately run schools. While proponents of free school choice argue 
that more choice and the resulting competition among schools may lead to increases in 
the overall quality of the education system, opponents are concerned about possible 
adverse effects, both on the overall quality, but also on equality of opportunity within 
the schooling system.  
In order to assess this reform, we make use of detailed Swedish register data 
containing information on several cohorts of the entire Swedish population. Some of 
them had already left compulsory education before the enactment of the reform and 
were therefore not affected, while others were affected at different stages in their 
educational career. Besides information on the family background, schooling and socio-
economic outcomes later in life, we observe geographical locations of school buildings 
and children’s homes. Using this geographical information, we construct measures of 
the degree of potential choice by counting the number of schools within reach of 
children’s homes. This allows us to capture the effects of choice opportunities and 
competition also among public schools, whereas previous studies have focused on 
newly opened private schools. Moreover, since the reform was enacted 20 years ago, we 
can now measure its long-term effects and look at education and employment outcomes 
up to age 25. 
In the third chapter, we focus on evaluating the average effects of the reform on the 
entire population. We find that increased school choice had very small but positive 
effects on marks at the end of compulsory schooling, but virtually zero effects on 
longer-term outcomes such as university education, employment, criminal activity and 
health. Moreover, we see that the effects are largest for the youngest cohorts in our 
dataset, indicating that it took some time for the reform to unfold.  
In the fourth chapter, we focus on equity concerns relating to the 1992 Swedish 
school choice reform and analyse whether it had different effects for students from 
different socio-economic backgrounds. In addition, we explore effects on the 
distribution of marks at the end of compulsory schooling. Our results show that students 
from a socio-economically disadvantaged or immigrant background did not benefit less 
4 1 Introduction 
from more school choice than those from more advantaged backgrounds. The 
differences between the subgroups are small, but, if anything, students from low-income 
families benefited slightly more than those from higher-income families. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Understanding which individual factors influence the duration of an unemployment 
spell is important for designing policy measures that help individuals to find 
employment. Recent research indicates that noncognitive skills, such as social skills or 
personality traits, as well as cognitive skills influence wages, employment, educational 
and social outcomes (see for example Heckman, Stixrud and (2006), Bowles, Gintis and 
Osborne (2001), Blomeyer, Coneus, Laucht and Pfeiffer et al. (2009)). However, only 
little is known about the influence of cognitive and noncognitive skills on the duration 
of an unemployment spell. Existing studies show that certain noncognitive skills are 
related to the probability of making a transition from unemployment to employment 
(see Uhlendorff	 ሺ2004), Uysal and Pohlmeier (2011), Lindqvist and Vestman (2011), 
DellaVigna and Paserman (2005)). Yet, only Lindqvist and Vestman (2011) and 
DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) include both cognitive and noncognitive skills in the 
estimation, finding different results on the effect of cognitive skills. If both dimensions 
of skills are correlated, not controlling for cognitive skills might overestimate the effect 
of noncognitive skills.  
Concerning the optimal timing of social policy measures, Cunha, Heckman, Lochner 
and Masterov (2006) summarise evidence showing that interventions targeting human 
capital early in life are more efficient in ameliorating outcomes of disadvantaged 
individuals than later attempts to do so. Correspondingly, many papers have pointed out 
that already early skills predict socio-economic outcomes later in life (see for example 
Currie and Thomas (2001), Carneiro, Crawford and Goodman (2007)). In particular, 
                                                 
5 This chapter was published in a very similar version as discussion paper in the ZEW and IFN discussion paper 
series (Niepel (2010) and Niepel (2011)). 
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some studies show that cognitive and noncognitive skills measured in childhood are 
related to different measures of time spend in unemployment in adolescence and early 
adulthood. For example, Gregg (2001) and Gregg and Machin (2000) show that social 
skills at the age of 7 are associated with the over- all number of months spent 
unemployed in early adulthood. However, by aggregating all unemployment episodes 
into one measure, the authors do not distinguish between the relevance of skills in 
childhood for the probability of becoming unemployed and the probability of finding a 
job. 
The present paper contributes by studying the importance of human capital in 
childhood for the duration of an unemployment spell in early adulthood for men and 
women. In particular, it analyses not only the relevance of cognitive skills, but also 
explores the importance of social skills, being a further dimension of human capital that 
might be targeted with policy measures. I estimate a proportional hazard rate model for 
the probability of making a transition from unemployment to employment during an 
individual’s first unemployment spell experienced before the age of 23. This approach 
has three main advantages. First, it disentangles how skills in childhood are associated 
with the probability of leaving unemployment from how they relate to the probability of 
becoming unemployed. Second, I specifically look at the probability of being successful 
at finding a job, which should be distinguished from other reasons for leaving 
unemployment, such as leaving the labour force. Third, since experiencing 
unemployment might influence noncognitive skills (see e.g. Goldsmith, Veum and 
Darity (1995)), analysing skills measured before individuals have entered the labour 
market circumvents reverse causality issues. 
The empirical analysis builds on data from the National Child Development Study 
(NCDS), a cohort study based on all individuals born in Great Britain in a single week 
in March 1958. As a measure for social skills I rely on teacher ratings of children’s 
behaviour using the Bristol Social Adjustment Guides (BSAG). In addition, four tests 
administered to the children in school are used to measure cognitive skills at the age of 
7. 
The results show that higher cognitive and social skills at the age of 7 are associated 
with an increased probability of making a transition from unemployment to employment 
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during an individual’s first unemployment spell. For men, there is a significant negative 
interaction effect between cognitive and social skills. Therefore, only those in the lower 
part of the cognitive skill distribution benefit from an increase in social skills and vice 
versa. For women, this inverse interaction effect is less pronounced. Furthermore, 
concerning men, the positive effect of an increase in social skills seems to be driven 
mostly by individuals with low social skills. Including educational attainment in the 
estimation slightly reduces the estimated hazard ratios but leaves the qualitative results 
unchanged. The estimates are robust to controlling for parenting activities, family 
background and school characteristics at the age of 7. Moreover, I find that also skills 
measured at the age of 11 are related to the probability of finding employment. 
However, the point estimates for age 11 social skills are smaller and of lower statistical 
significance than those for age 7 social skills. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2.2 briefly surveys previous findings in 
the literature. Section 2.3 introduces the dataset and skill measures used in this study 
and presents descriptive statistics. Possible effects of skills in childhood on the duration 
of unemployment are discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the econometric 
model, followed by estimation results in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 summarizes the main 
findings and concludes. 
2.2  Existing evidence 
Recent studies on the relation between noncognitive skills and the duration of an 
unemployment spell have used German, Swedish and US datasets, measuring skills in 
late adolescence and adulthood. Uhlendorff (2004) uses the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP) to analyse the effect of an individual’s locus of control and membership 
in political associations or clubs on the duration of an unemployment spell for men. He 
estimates a non-proportional Cox model and uses unemployment spells that occurred 
after measuring locus of control, thereby avoiding reverse causality issues. His results 
show that locus of control has a large effect on the duration of an unemployment spell 
for men living in the western part of Germany, while there is no significant association 
for those living in the eastern part. Uysal and Pohlmeier (2011) also use the SOEP to 
investigate the relation between noncognitive skills as measured by the Big Five and the 
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duration of employment and unemployment. They analyse all unemployment spells that 
occurred between the years 1983 and 2006 for both men and women and show that the 
personality factors conscientiousness and openness to experience increase the chances 
of finding a job, while neuroticism decreases them. However, the statistical significance 
of these results differs for men and women. In contrast to these two studies using 
German data, Lindqvist and Vestman (2011) jointly include cognitive and noncognitive 
skills in estimating the duration of unemployment. They use Swedish register data on 
wages and employment biographies of men in 2006, thereby observing individuals at 
different stages in their working life. Skills are measured via tests and interviews 
conducted in the course of the military enlistment process around the age of 18. 
Lindqvist and Vestman find that higher noncognitive skills significantly decrease the 
duration of unemployment while cognitive skills have no statistically significant 
influence. DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) use the National Longitudinal Study of 
Youth and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to show that several indicators of 
impatient behaviour, such as smoking and the interviewer’s rating of an individual’s 
impatience, are associated with a decreased exit rate from unemployment. They report 
that also higher cognitive skills are related to an increased probability of leaving 
unemployment.  
In addition, several studies have investigated the relationship between noncognitive 
skills and other measures of unemployment, in particular the probability of being 
unemployed at a certain point in time and cumulative work experience6, the probability 
of experiencing unemployment of a certain duration up to a certain age7 or the overall 
amount of time spent unemployed in a certain period8. Most of these studies do not 
measure the duration of a single unemployment spell but aggregate an individuals’ 
unemployment experience over a longer time period or, on the other hand, take a 
snapshot perspective by analysing the employment status at a given day. Thereby, they 
do not separate between the underlying economic mechanisms of individual 
unemployment experience, namely between the probability of becoming unemployed 
                                                 
6 See for example Carneiro et al. (2007) and Heckman et al. (2006). 
7 See for example Feinstein (2000) and Hobcraft (2000). 
8 See for example Gregg and Machin (2000), Gregg (2001) and Caspi et al. (1998). 
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and the duration of the resulting unemployment spell. Carneiro et al. (2007) use the 
NCDS and find that the probability of being unemployed at the age of 42 and 
cumulative work experience between the age of 23 and 42 are influenced by cognitive 
and social skills in childhood. They show that this effect persists even after controlling 
for educational attainment. Heckman et al. (2006) use data from the USA and find 
similar results for cognitive and noncognitive skills measured in adolescence and early 
adulthood. 
Gregg (2001) analyses the scarring effect of the number of months spent unemployed 
between the age of 16 and 23 for experiencing unemployment later in life using the 
NCDS. In doing so, he also estimates a Tobit model on the number of months spent 
unemployed between the age of 16 and 23 and finds that social skills at the age of 7 
increase the number of months spent unemployed, while cognitive skills are not a 
significant predictor. Similarly, Caspi, Wright, Moffitt and Silva (1998) find that 
intelligence tests and behavioural indicators in childhood are predictors for the number 
of months spent unemployed between the age of 15 and 21, using a dataset from New 
Zealand. These studies do not distinguish between the importance of skills in childhood 
for the probability of becoming unemployed and their relevance for the duration of an 
unemployment spell, which is what the present paper aims at explaining. 
Focusing on the duration of a single unemployment spell, Feinstein (2000) analyses 
the probability of having an unemployment spell that lasts for more than 4 months 
before the age of 26 and, for individuals for which this is the case, the probability that 
their longest spell lasts for more than one year using the 1970 British Cohort Study. The 
first outcome is thus comprised of the probability of becoming unemployed and the 
probability of experiencing an unemployment spell of at least 4 months. He finds that 
the math score and certain noncognitive skills at the age of 10 are related to the 
probability of being unemployed for more than 4 months. However, for the conditional 
probability of experiencing a spell of more than 12 months, he finds no predictive power 
of early skills for men and reports that a different set of noncognitive skills than in the 
first estimation are significant for women. These mixed results point out that early skills 
might be of different importance for the probability of becoming unemployed and for 
the probability of finding new employment. They thus emphasise the relevance of 
10 2.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
modelling the probability of making a transition from unemployment to employment in 
a duration model framework in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the effect of 
early skills. 
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
2.3.1 Data 
This analysis uses data from the National Child Development Study9. The NCDS 
builds upon the Perinatal Mortality Survey (PMS) which includes all women who gave 
birth in Great Britain in a single week in March 1958, resulting in a dataset with 
information on 17.414 individuals. These form the basis for the following waves of the 
NCDS that have been carried out when the study members were aged 7, 11, 16, 23, 33, 
42, 46 and 50. Across the different waves, information was provided by the children’s 
parents, teachers, the schools’ health service and the cohort members themselves. The 
dataset includes detailed information on the family background of the individuals, skills 
in childhood, educational attainment, family status and on the employment history. 
At the age of 23, individuals were asked to report their main activity since May 1974 
in a monthly diary. The diary contains information on periods in unemployment, 
employment and time spent out of the labour force, including education10. Using this 
information, I construct individual unemployment spells to be used in the analysis. Note 
that unemployment is defined as a time period in which the individual did not have a job 
but was willing to start work or was registered as unemployed. It is thus clearly 
distinguished from being out of the labour force. Furthermore, holidays or vacations 
during full-time education are not included in this definition. In months with more than 
one labour market status the dominant one is recorded. Therefore, only periods of 
unemployment that lasted for more than two weeks show up in the data. 
                                                 
9 University of London. Institute of Education. Centre for Longitudinal Studies (2008a,b) 
10 The survey was designed in a way to help respondents remember these facts more easily and eliminate recall bias. 
Interviewers handed out a calendar in which they marked other important dates together with the respondent in order 
to provide orientation over the years. Nevertheless, when interpreting the results it should be kept in mind that recall 
bias might still have occurred such that especially short spells might not be recorded. However, by construction of the 
survey, spells shorter than two weeks are never recorded. Hence, missing such short spells is not correlated to any 
characteristics of individuals. 
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The measures for cognitive and social skills in childhood were obtained at the cohort 
members’ schools when they were 7 years old. Cognitive skills were assessed using the 
following four tests. In the Southgate Group Reading Test (see Southgate (1962)), 
children were asked to pick one out of five words on a list to describe a drawing or a 
word that the teacher read out to them. The Copying Designs Test assesses children’s 
perceptuo-motor ability by letting them copy geometric figures and taking a writing 
sample. In order to assess the children’s general perceptual ability, they were asked to 
draw a man in the Drawing-A-Man Test (see Goodenough (1926)). Lastly, the Problem 
Arithmetic Test consisted of ten arithmetic exercises (see Pringle, Butler and Davie 
(1966)). I construct a total score for cognitive skills by summing up the normalized 
scores on each of the tests and then normalizing the total to have mean zero and 
variance one. 
Social skills are measured using the Bristol Social Adjustment Guides. This 
instrument assesses children’s behaviour in school and is supposed to capture 
behavioural disturbances in responding to different social situations (see Stott (1974))11. 
For example, a child might act aggressively or rather withdrawn and inhibited when 
confronted with new situations. The BSAG was measured by handing out a list of 146 
phrases that describe behaviour of children to the teachers of the cohort members12. 
They were asked to underline the phrases that best describe the child. The different 
aspects of behaviour are grouped into twelve syndromes: unforthcomingness, 
withdrawal, depression, anxiety for acceptance by children, anxiety for acceptance by 
adults, hostility towards adults, hostility towards children, writing-off adults and adult 
standards, restlessness, inconsequential behaviour, miscellaneous symptoms and 
miscellaneous nervous symptoms. By adding up the respective number of underlined 
phrases, twelve syndrome scores have been constructed by the data providers. 
Following Carneiro et al. (2007), I use the overall BSAG score, defined as the sum of 
the syndrome scores, as my measure for social skills and reverse the sign such that a 
                                                 
11 For further reading on the BSAG see for example Davie (1973) or Ghodsian (1977). 
12 Achenbach, McConaughy and Howell (1987) investigate correlations between assessments of behavioural 
problems in children that were performed by different informants, such as teachers, parents, health visitors or the 
children themselves. They carry out a meta-analysis and find that, within the group of informants other than the 
children themselves, the correlation between the ratings is highest among teachers. 
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higher value indicates more skills. In addition, I normalize it to have mean zero and 
variance one in the sample. Figure 1 shows kernel density estimates of the resulting 
measures for cognitive and social skills. One can see that the density of social skills is 
strongly skewed to the left, that is many individuals have a high social skills score, 
while the density of cognitive skills more closely resembles a bell-shape. 
The estimation sample includes the first unemployment spell of all individuals that 
provided sufficient information on their employment history in NCDS 413 and for whom 
there is information on cognitive and social skills at the age of 7. Individuals in the 
highest and lowest percentile of cognitive skills are dropped from the sample in order to 
avoid results being driven by outliers. Concerning social skills, only the lowest 
percentile is dropped since 10% of the sample have zero points on the original BSAG 
score, which is the highest possible score for social skills. This leaves me with 10,130 
cohort members. 4,287 of these had at least one unemployment spell before the age of 
23 and form the sample used for the estimations14. Unemployment spells lasting longer 
than 24 months, which is the case for about 2% of all spells, are censored at 24 months. 
Details on the derivation of covariates are given in Section 2.8.1 in the appendix. 
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics on the first unemployment spell, cognitive and 
social skills and background covariates. The statistics on the covariates refer to the 
values at the beginning of the spell. One can see that, on average, women have higher 
age 7 cognitive and social skills than men. Education is measured as highest 
qualification achieved until the beginning of the unemployment spell: 44 per cent of 
men and 38 per cent of women have a qualification below O-Levels or the equivalent 
National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) level 2 while 10 per cent of men and 14 per 
cent of women are in the highest education category and have achieved a higher 
qualification or degree, equivalent to NVQ levels 4, 5 and 6. Moreover, 31 per cent of 
men and 35 per cent of women have not been employed between leaving full-time 
                                                 
13 Those that did not provide information for more than 6 months of their employment history are dropped from the 
sample. 
14 Section 2.8.3 in the appendix discusses the probability of experiencing at least one unemployment spell before the 
age of 23 and thus being in the sample used for the estimations. 
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education and the beginning of their first unemployment spell. About half of all 
unemployment spells start between 1974 and 1976, which is when the cohort members 
who have obtained A-Levels or a lower degree usually leave school. 
The mean duration of unemployment is 4.37 months for men and 4.76 for women, 
the median is 3 months for both. However, not all spells end in a transition to 
employment: 8 per cent of all male and 6 per cent of all female spells are censored by 
the interview at the age of 23. Furthermore, one per cent of male and two per cent of 
female spells are artificially censored after 24 months. The activity following the 
unemployment spell is unknown for another per cent of spells. Lastly, 7 per cent of 
male and 12 per cent of female unemployment spells are followed by a period out of the 
labour force. Thereof, 5 and 4 per cent, respectively, are transitions to education. 
Overall, 17 per cent of male and 21 per cent of female spells do not end with a transition 
to employment. Hence, it is important to use an econometric model that allows treating 
incomplete spells such as transitions into states other than employment differently from 
unemployment spells that end with a successful transition into a new job. The 
proportional hazard rate model used in this study is well suited for this. 
Figure 2 shows Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions for individuals with 
above and below average cognitive and social skills. One can see that most individuals 
leave unemployment within the first 12 months. Of all unemployment spells, 93 per cent 
end in the first year. Furthermore, the estimated survival function for individuals with 
above average cognitive skills lies slightly to the left of the one for those with lower 
cognitive skills. This shows that individuals with above average cognitive skills at the 
age of 7 leave unemployment slightly faster than those with lower cognitive skills. The 
corresponding graph for social skills is similar; however, the difference between the two 
survival functions is smaller. Nevertheless, a log-rank test rejects the null hypothesis of 
equality of the survival functions of individuals with below and above average skills at 
the 99% significance level for both cognitive and social skills15. 
 
                                                 
15 The test statistic is 19.04 for cognitive skills and 9.21 for social skills. 
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2.4 Hypotheses 
This section discusses potential mechanisms through which cognitive and social 
skills at the age of 7 may influence the duration of unemployment. 
Cognitive and social skills at the age of 7 are likely to influence the duration of 
unemployment mainly via two channels: First, higher cognitive and social skills at the 
age of 7 are associated with higher skills in adolescence and adulthood16, which may 
affect the length of an unemployment spell. Second, higher skills in childhood are 
positively related to the likelihood of achieving a higher education17, which in turn 
might have an impact on the duration of unemployment (see e.g. Nickell (1979) and 
Kiefer (1985)). Thus, deriving hypotheses on the influence of early cognitive and social 
skills on the probability of finding a job requires a discussion of the effects of education 
and skills in adulthood on this probability. In the following, this is done by making use 
of predictions from job search theory (see e.g. Mortensen (1986) and Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (2004)) and evidence from the empirical literature on unemployment 
duration.  
Two important objects in standard job search theory are the wage offer distribution, 
capturing the size of the wage an individual might earn, and the job offer arrival rate. 
Adult cognitive and social skills are likely to positively affect both of them by 
increasing an individual’s productivity. The evidence on the association of cognitive 
and social skills with wages points in this direction18. Cognitive skills, such as the 
capacity to process information, language skills and general reasoning skills, are likely 
to be important for performance in most tasks in working life. At the same time, social 
skills may enable individuals to adjust to a new work environment more easily and 
thereby start focusing on the specific tasks of a job more quickly. Moreover, individuals 
                                                 
16 See for example Heckman (2008), Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman and ter Weel (2008), Cunha and Heckman 
(2007), Caspi et al. (2003) and Dennissen, Asendorpf and van Aken (2008). The latter two studies analyse the 
correlation between behaviour and personality assessed in childhood and in adulthood. Dennissen et al. (2008) report 
positive correlations between being assessed as undercontroller or overcontroller as opposed to resilient at the age of 
4 to 6 and scores in shyness and aggressiveness in early adulthood. Caspi et al. (2003) report correlations between the 
temperamental types undercontrolled and inhibited, assessed at the age of 3, and the Big Five personality dimensions 
(see e.g. Costa and McCrae (1992)) assessed at the age of 26. The scale neuroticism is positively related while 
openness to experience is negatively related to both temperamental types mentioned. Moreover, the scales 
agreeableness and conscientiousness are negatively related to the type undercontrolled and the type inhibited is 
negatively related to extraversion. 
17 See for example Heckman et al. (2006) and Carneiro, Crawford and Goodman (2008). 
2 The Importance of Cognitive and Social Skills for the Duration of Unemployment 15 
with higher social skills might be more productive in working in teams and interacting 
with colleagues. Besides being more productive, individuals with higher social skills are 
likely to have a larger social network, which they can use when searching for 
employment19. They might also incur a lower disutility from working, if they are more 
able to cope with stressful situations that involve dealing with other people or complex 
problems. 
For these reasons, higher adult cognitive and social skills are likely to increase the 
number of jobs and the average wage offered to an individual. Holding search effort 
constant and not considering the indirect effect on the reservation wage, higher 
cognitive and social skills therefore increase the probability of finding a job. However, 
both a higher number of job offers and higher wage offers increase an individual’s 
reservation wage. This has a negative effect on the exit rate to employment, rendering 
the overall effect ambiguous. Yet, findings in the theoretical and empirical literature 
suggest that the direct positive effects dominate the indirect negative effect in many 
cases20. Higher cognitive and social skills at the beginning of an unemployment spell 
are thus likely to exert a positive effect on the probability of making a transition from 
unemployment to employment. 
A higher educational degree may increase the number of employment possibilities 
since individuals can apply also for jobs requiring a lower level of education. Moreover, 
education may serve as a productivity signal to employers. Assuming that the job search 
activity stays constant, these factors increase the job offer arrival rate. At the same time, 
higher educational degrees transfer into higher wages. This leads to an increase in the 
reservation wage, which is why the effect of a higher educational attainment on the exit 
rate is ambiguous, too. Previous studies on the duration of unemployment in the UK 
found mostly positive effects of education on the probability of leaving unemployment, 
                                                                                                                                               
18 See for example Osborne (2000), Heckman et al. (2006), Carneiro et al. (2007). 
19 See literature on the importance of social networks for job search, for example Ioannides and Loury (2004) and 
Cappellari and Tatsiramos (2010). 
20 Van den Berg (1994) showed in the framework of a basic job search model that a large class of wage offer 
distributions satisfy conditions such that the effect of a higher offer arrival rate outweighs that of a higher reservation 
wage. That is, an increasing job offer arrival rate leads to an increase in the exit rate from unemployment. Devine and 
Kiefer (1991) conclude in their review of the literature that the job offer arrival rate seems to be at least as important 
as the reservation wage for empirically observed durations of unemployment spells. 
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although they were not always statistically significant (Kiefer (1985), Nickell (1979), 
Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) and Arulampalam and Stewart (1995)). Taking this 
into account and following the argument laid out in the last paragraph, a higher 
education is likely to increase the probability of leaving unemployment. 
Summarising this section, the direction and relevance of the effect of cognitive and 
social skills in childhood remain an empirical question. Nevertheless, higher skills in 
childhood are likely to increase the probability of leaving unemployment both via 
increasing later skills and via increasing the probability of achieving a higher education. 
2.5 Econometric model 
The empirical analysis uses a proportional hazard rate model for grouped duration 
data as proposed by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978). This method models the probability 
of making a transition from unemployment to employment for each point during the 
unemployment spell in a continuous time framework and adjusts for the monthly 
structure of the observed data. 
Unemployment spells end either in transitions to employment or in transitions to 
another state, being out of the labour force21 or an activity for which the state is 
unknown. The observed duration corresponds to the minimum of the two. In addition, 
spells may be right censored if the individual is unemployed at the time of the 
interview. This paper focuses on the duration until an individual finds a job and thus 
does not aim at modelling transitions into other states. Assuming that, conditional on 
covariates, the duration until the spell ends with a transition to employment is 
independent of the duration until a transition into another state takes place, 
unemployment spells that are not followed by an employment spell are treated as right 
censored in the estimation22. The large vector of covariates in this study, including often 
unobserved variables like social and cognitive skills and detailed information on the 
family background, renders this assumption less strict. 
                                                 
21 Participation in active labour market policy programmes are grouped into this category as well. 
22 Right censored spells can be used to estimate the parameters of interest in the same manner as completed spells: 
For each observed point in time, they contain the information that no transition into the state of interest occurred. 
They are, however, not informative on when such a transition takes place. 
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The continuous time hazard function for individual i , that  is the probability of 
making a transition to employment at time t , is modelled as the product of the baseline 
hazard )(t , capturing the duration dependence, and a term that captures the effect of 
covariates: 
(1)    'exp)(),( itit ZtZth   
The covariate vector itZ  includes time-varying and time-constant variables and a 
constant as its first element. The corresponding coefficient vector is denoted by   and 
the complete time path of covariates until time t  by  itZ . The baseline hazard is 
modeled as a piecewise constant function in order to avoid imposing strong functional 
form assumptions: 
(2)    
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Each  tIl , for Ll ,...,2 , denotes an indicator variable equal to one if t  lies in the 
time period l  and zero otherwise. l  are the corresponding coefficients. I include 
indicator variables for every month in the first year in unemployment and one indicator 
for the second year in the estimation23. 
In the data, durations are observed in monthly intervals  gg tt ,1  for 24,...,1g . In 
order to adjust for the grouping structure, the covariate vector itZ  is assumed to be 
constant within each month g  and denoted by igZ . The grouped hazard function 
),( ig
d Zgh  denotes the probability of making a transition to employment in the thg  
interval, that is in the interval  gg tt ,1 , given survival until the beginning of the  
thg  interval: 
(3)    iggggigd ZtTttTobZgh ,1  ,1 Pr),(   
The grouped survival function denotes the probability of surviving through the thg  
interval: 
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Following Jenkins (1995), the grouped survival and hazard functions can be 
expressed in terms of the parameters of the continuous time model in the following 
way: 
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Letting 1i  denote a transition to employment and 0i  a censored spell, the 
log-likelihood reads 
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where   denotes the vector containing all g . 
As derived in Jenkins (1995), this log-likelihood may also be written and estimated 
in the form of a sequential binary choice model. To see this, define 1igy  if there is a 
transition to employment in interval g  and zero otherwise: 
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Given the formula for the grouped hazard in equation (5), this corresponds to the log- 
likelihood in a generalized linear model with a binary dependent variable and 
complementary log-log link function (Jenkins, 1995). I estimate the parameter vectors 
  and   using maximum likelihood estimation. 
                                                                                                                                               
23 The indicator for the first month is left out of the estimation and used as reference category. Allowing for a more 
flexible shape for the second year of the spell does not change the results, which may be due to the small number of 
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2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Main specifications  
Table 2 presents the estimation results, displaying hazard ratios24 and corresponding 
standard errors in parentheses. I estimate the model separately for men and women, as 
the determinants of the duration of unemployment may differ by gender. The first and 
third column present results from estimations not controlling for education. The skill 
variables will therefore capture the overall effect of skills at the age of 7 on the hazard, 
including the effect that goes through the channel of achieving a higher education. 
Column 2 and 4 show results controlling for educational attainment. 
In all estimations, I control for whether the individual is married or has children at 
the beginning of the spell, has had a job since leaving full time education and for the 
socio-economic status (SES) of the father or male head of household when the child 
was 7 years old. Furthermore, I include the monthly claimant count rate of Great 
Britain, whether it is autumn or winter as opposed to spring or summer, region of 
residence at the age of 1625 , year dummies in order to control for macroeconomic 
changes in the economy and changes in the social security system26 and indicator 
variables capturing the duration dependence. 
The first and third column of Table 2 show that social skills at the age of 7 have a 
significant association with the probability of leaving unemployment both for men and 
women. An increase in social skills of one standard deviation increases the probability 
of finding a job at each point during the spell by 6.6 per cent for men and 11.8 per cent 
for women at the sample mean of cognitive skills. Higher age 7 cognitive skills have a 
similar effect on the hazard. A one standard deviation increase raises the probability of 
leaving unemployment by 6.1 per cent for men and 12.7 per cent for women at the 
                                                                                                                                               
spells that last longer than 12 months. 
24 The hazard ratio measures the change in the hazard rate associated with a change in the corresponding variable by 
one unit, holding all other variables fixed. It is calculated by exponentiating the estimated coefficient. 
25 If this is not available because the individual did not respond in the corresponding interview, I use the region of 
residence at the age of 11. 
26 See Clasen (1994) and Mittelstädt and Veil (1975) for a detailed description of the British social security system in 
the 1970’s and 80’s. Clasen (1994) reports that there were no changes in the eligibility or entitlement period of 
unemployment benefits between 1973 and 1981, which is the relevant period for this analysis. However, there were 
changes in the level of benefits and the benefit rates, which basically eroded the real value of unemployment 
insurance benefits and the earnings-related supplement over time. 
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sample mean of social skills. The interaction term of cognitive and social skills at the 
age of 7 is significantly smaller than one for men, indicating that the two skills are 
substitutes and can compensate each other to some degree. However, the interaction 
effect is not significantly different from one for women. 
In order to test whether the positive effect of age 7 skills on the hazard is solely due 
to an increase in the probability of obtaining a higher education, the second and fourth 
column of Table 2 report results controlling for the level of education. I include 
indicator variables on having O-Levels/NVQ 2, A-Levels/NVQ 3 or a degree/NVQ 4-6 
in the estimation, with having less than O-Levels/NVQ 2 being the reference category. 
One can see that the hazard ratios for social skills are still highly significant, showing 
that higher social skills at the age of 7 reduce the duration of unemployment not only 
via the channel of a higher level of education. Likewise, age 7 cognitive skills increase 
the probability of finding a job even when controlling for the educational degree. Due to 
the interaction effect, the hazard ratios presented in the table correspond to the effect of 
cognitive and social skills at the sample mean of the respective other skill, which is zero 
by construction. In order to see whether the effect of a one standard deviation increase 
in skills is relevant at other points of the distribution of the respective other skill, Figure 
3 depicts the hazard ratios along the support of the other skill27. Moreover, an estimate 
of the density of the respective other skill gives an impression of the share of 
individuals that is located at a given point in the support. The graph in the upper right 
hand corner of Figure 3 shows that cognitive skills significantly increase the hazard rate 
for men with lower values of social skills, but that the effect is not statistically different 
from one when social skills are zero or larger. The two lower graphs show the 
corresponding hazard ratios for women. However, since the interaction term is not 
statistically different from one, the effect of cognitive and social skills does not differ 
significantly along the support of the respective other skill28. Furthermore, the results 
                                                 
27 The depicted hazard ratio for cognitive skills, and correspondingly for social skills, is calculated as follows:  socialcognitivecognitive     exp   skillsocialratiohazard cognitive  
28 The proportional hazard rate model assumes that the baseline hazard and the covariates act proportionally on the 
hazard. This might be violated if some covariates are more important at certain points during the spell than at others. 
Additional analyses including interaction terms of the duration and cognitive and social skills in the estimation 
indicated that cognitive skills might be more relevant in the second half of the first year in unemployment, especially 
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show that having an educational degree of O-levels/NVQ 2 or more increases the 
probability of finding a job by 25 to 58 per cent for women. For men, only having O-
levels/NVQ 2 significantly increases the hazard while the higher qualification levels 
show positive but insignificant associations with the probability of making a transition 
to employment. 
In duration models, unobserved heterogeneity may lead to biased coefficients even if 
it is uncorrelated with the covariates at the beginning of the spell (see for example van 
den Berg (2001) and Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2010) for a discussion). In order to 
explore whether the results are subject to this bias, I also estimated the model with a 
normally distributed unobserved heterogeneity term, but found almost no change in the 
estimated coefficients29. 
Results across all specifications show that the relation between being married at the 
beginning of the unemployment spell and the duration of the spell differs for men and 
women. Being married is associated with a significant increase in the hazard rate by 
about 40 per cent for men. Married women, however, have an about 30 per cent lower 
probability of leaving unemployment at any point during the spell. Having children at 
the beginning of the spell reduces the probability of finding a job for men by about 33 
per cent and for women by about 62 per cent. The father’s socio-economic status at the 
age of 7 is of different relevance for men and women. It is significantly associated with 
the hazard of leaving unemployment only for men. Having a father of medium as 
opposed to low SES relates to an increase in the hazard rate by about 13 per cent, while 
the effect of a father of high SES is also positive but not significantly different from 
zero. In addition, labour market characteristics play a role in explaining the hazard of 
leaving unemployment: both for men and for women, a one percentage point increase in 
                                                                                                                                               
for women. However, as the results on a time-varying effect of skills were not very robust, the model without the 
interaction is being used. 
29 Estimating the model with a Gamma distribution also does not indicate the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, 
the coefficients converge to almost the same values as in the estimation without frailty. However, the algorithm runs 
into numerical problems as the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity tends to zero. For men, I find some evidence 
for unobserved heterogeneity when estimating the model with a discrete frailty distribution with two mass points, but 
compared to a model without frailty, the estimated coefficients for cognitive and social skills do not change 
qualitatively. Yet, the estimated coefficients for the baseline hazard differ, pointing out that they should not be 
interpreted as true duration dependence in the models omitting unobserved heterogeneity. For women, the estimation 
of the model with a discrete frailty distribution exhibits numerical problems. 
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the claimant count rate is associated with a decrease in the probability of leaving 
unemployment by about 20 per cent. Results on the other variables that are included in 
the estimation are reported in Table 3. 
In order to interpret the economic significance of the effects of cognitive and social 
skills one can compare them to the estimated effects of other variables influencing the 
duration of unemployment. For example, a decrease in the national claimant count rate 
by one percentage point is associated with an increase in the probability of leaving 
unemployment by 21 per cent for women. This corresponds to a shift of the claimant 
count rate from the 25th to the 75th percentile in its distribution during the observation 
period of this study. In order to achieve an equally large increase in the hazard rate by 
changing social or cognitive skills, one would have to increase a woman’s skills by 1.71 
standard deviations. This corresponds to moving a woman from the 20th to the 75th 
percentile in the distribution of social skills. Thus, even though this would imply a 
sizable shift, the effect of cognitive and social skills in childhood is not to be 
disregarded for women. For men, the economic conditions are more important for the 
probability of finding employment than skills in childhood. Achieving the same effect as 
is associated with a decrease in the claimant count rate by one percentage point would 
require social skills to increase by more than three standard deviations, which spans 
almost the entire support of the distribution of social skills. However, due to the 
significant interaction effect, the required shift decreases for lower values of cognitive 
skills. Moreover, the importance of early skills relative to educational degrees is not as 
low for men as when compared to macroeconomic conditions. Yet, comparing the effect 
of skills to that of educational degrees is problematic. Keeping the latter fixed 
underestimates the relative importance of early skills since they also increase the 
probability of achieving a higher education (see e.g. Carneiro et al. (2007)). In addition, 
measuring a latent concept such as cognitive and social skills is likely to be less precise 
than measuring the national claimant count rate or an educational degree. The 
coefficients on cognitive and social skills may therefore underestimate the influence of 
skills in childhood. 
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2.6.2 Robustness 
2.6.2.1 Confounding factors 
This section explores whether the results on the importance of skills in childhood are 
driven solely by the family or school environment of the child. School characteristics 
and the family background likely affect both early and later skills. Moreover, the family 
background might have a direct effect on the probability of finding employment. An 
association between early skills and the duration of unemployment might therefore arise 
from a correlation between the school and family background and early and later skills. 
I address this issue in the previous estimations by controlling for the socio-economic 
status of the father or male head of household at the age of 7. Indeed, having a father 
with a higher SES is positively related to the probability of leaving unemployment, even 
though this is only significant for men. Yet, this measure might not capture all 
confounding factors. For this reason, I repeat the estimations including several further 
control variables measured at the age of 7 and grouped into the categories family back- 
ground, parenting activities and school characteristics30. The results are shown in Table 
4. The first column repeats the baseline results from the first and third column in Table 
2. Columns 2 to 4 show results from separately adding the different groups of control 
variables. In the last column, all variables are included at the same time. 
The inclusion of further control variables has no large impact on the hazard ratios 
and significance levels of cognitive and social skills31. Therefore, the findings in this 
section provide some evidence against concerns that the effect of cognitive and social 
skills at the age of 7 on the duration of unemployment is solely due to confounding 
factors such as the family background or schooling characteristics. 
 
2.6.2.2 Heterogeneous effects with respect to education 
Until now, the proportional effect of skills at the age of 7 on the hazard of finding a 
job is restricted to be the same for all individuals. However, the importance of skills 
                                                 
30 See Section 2.8.2 in the appendix for a list of these variables. 
31 When further including control variables that are measured at the age of 11 and 16, the hazard ratios and 
corresponding significance levels change only slightly and the qualitative results stay robust. 
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with respect to the probability of leaving unemployment might differ for individuals 
with different levels of education. They may search for different kinds of jobs for which 
cognitive and social skills are more or less relevant. Furthermore, it is possible that 
employers trust higher education to be a signal for higher cognitive and social skills, 
while putting more effort into evaluating skills of individuals that have a low 
educational degree. This effect would increase the importance of skills for low educated 
individuals. In order to explore whether the effect of skills on the probability of finding 
a job is heterogeneous with respect to education, I estimate the model including 
interaction terms of skills and the education variables. 
The baseline estimation that restricts skills to have a homogeneous effect is reported 
in the first and the third column of Table 5 for men and women, respectively. Columns 
2 and 4 report the hazard ratios of age 7 skills for the different levels of education from 
the model with interaction terms. Concerning men, cognitive and social skills only have 
a significant influence on the probability of leaving unemployment for those with an 
education below O-levels/ NVQ 2. For women, the same result emerges for cognitive 
skills, while social skills are significant only for those with A-levels or O-levels 
respectively NVQ 2-3. However, the standard errors of these effects are large and, in 
most cases, the effects of skills do not vary statistically significantly across educational 
degrees. In the estimation for women, the effect of cognitive skills slightly differs 
between those with a degree/ NVQ 4-6 and those with less than O-levels/ NVQ 2 but 
does not significantly differ between other education levels. In the estimation for men, 
the effect of social skills differs significantly only between those with O-levels and those 
with less than O-levels. The hazard ratio on cognitive skills is marginally significantly 
different only between those with less than O-levels and those who have A-levels or a 
degree. Given the small sample size in the higher education categories, this exercise can 
only point to possibly heterogeneous effects of early skills, suggesting that they might 
be more important for low than for highly educated men in reducing the duration of 
unemployment. However, a larger sample would be necessary in order to achieve robust 
statistical evidence on this issue. 
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2.6.2.3 Investigating the measure for social skills 
Results until now are based on one specific way of aggregating the information 
contained in the BSAG, namely defining an overall score. This section presents 
estimations using two alternative measures for social skills that are also derived from 
the BSAG. The first alternative disentangles the BSAG into two facets, the second uses 
the overall score to construct indicators for different categories of social skills. 
For the first alternative, following Ghodsian (1977), and similar to Stott (1974) and 
Osborne (2000), I construct two scores from the BSAG syndrome scores, labelled 
“over- react” and “underreact”. The score on overreact is the sum of the scores on the 
syndromes anxiety for acceptance by adults, hostility towards adults, anxiety for 
acceptance by children, hostility towards children, restlessness and inconsequential 
behaviour. According to Ghodsian (1977), this factor captures rather aggressive, restless 
and anxious behaviour. The score on underreact is generated by summing the syndrome 
scores for unforthcomingness, withdrawal, depression and miscellaneous nervous 
symptoms and represents rather withdrawn and inhibited behaviour32 33. 
In order to be consistent with the main measure for social skills and to facilitate 
comparability, I reverse the sign of the resulting scores such that a higher value of 
overreact and underreact symbolizes higher skills in the respective dimension. 
Moreover, the scores are normalized to have mean zero and variance one in the sample 
of all unemployed individuals. The means and standard deviations of the resulting 
scores are displayed in the upper panel of Table 6 for men and women separately. In 
both dimensions, girls’ social skills at the age of 7 are higher than those of boys. 
For the second alternative, I follow Stott (1974) and Davie (1973) in defining three 
categories for individual’s social skills. Those that have an overall BSAG-score of less 
than 10 are termed stable, those that have a score between 10 and 19 are termed un- 
                                                 
32 The grouping of syndromes emerges from a principal component analysis using the varimax rotation method. 
When using other rotation methods or when not rotating the factor loadings, other factors might emerge even though 
they are often similar to the ones used here. 
33 Several studies have related concepts of behaviour and temperament in childhood to the dimensions of the five-
factor model in adulthood (see for example Caspi et al. (2003) and John and Srivastava (1999)). Caspi et al. (2003) 
find that inhibited behaviour at the age of 3, which might be related to the factor underreact measured here, is 
negatively related to the Big Five factors extraversion and openness to experience and slightly positively related to 
neuroticism at the age of 26. Undercontrolled behaviour at the age of 3, which captures rather impulsive, restless and 
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settled, and those with a score of 20 or higher are termed maladjusted. The lower panel 
in Table 6 shows the proportion of individuals in each of the categories for men and 
women separately. This measure also reflects that, in this sample, women have higher 
social skills at the age of 7 than men. 71% of women but only 55% of men belong to the 
category stable. 
Table 7 shows the hazard ratios from estimations that include the alternative 
measures for social skills but are otherwise equivalent to the main model as presented in 
the second and fourth column of Table 2. One can see in the upper panel that less 
withdrawn behaviour at the age of 7 significantly increases the probability of leaving 
unemployment by 8.2 per cent for men at the mean of cognitive skills. The significant 
interaction term of cognitive skills and overreact implies that more aggressive behaviour 
is more harmful for men with low levels of cognitive skills. It also means that higher 
cognitive skills significantly increase the probability of finding employment for those 
who have a lower overreact score, that is those who are more aggressive. For women, a 
one standard deviation increase in underreact, meaning being less inhibited, is 
associated with a 7.1 per cent higher probability of finding employment. In addition, 
less aggressive behaviour is associated with a modestly significant increase in the 
hazard rate by 5.7%34. 
The lower panel of Table 7 presents results from estimating the model using the 
indicator variables for social skills described above. Being stable at the age of 7 is used 
as the reference category. For men, being unsettled as opposed to stable at the age of 7 
has no significant effect on the hazard rate. However, being maladjusted as opposed to 
stable decreases the hazard rate by 16% at the overall mean of cognitive skills. This is 
comparable in magnitude to the effect of having O-levels in contrast to having a lower 
education. However, the hazard ratio increases and is no longer significantly different 
from one for high levels of cognitive skills. A one standard deviation increase in 
cognitive skills significantly increases the probability of finding employment by almost 
                                                                                                                                               
negative behaviour, and might thus be comparable to ”overreact”, is found to be negatively related to the scales 
agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness to experience and positively to neuroticism. 
34 Together with the findings on the relation between childhood behaviour and the Big Five, this is in line with the 
results in Uysal and Pohlmeier (2011), who report a positive association between the probability of finding 
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20% for individuals that are in the category maladjusted, but is not significantly 
different for individuals with higher social skills. The results for women follow a similar 
pattern, but in addition, being unsettled as opposed to stable also significantly decreases 
the probability of leaving unemployment. These findings suggest that, especially for 
men, the results on the importance of cognitive and social skills at the age of 7 are 
driven to a large extent by individuals that are in the lower distribution of childhood 
social skills. 
 
2.6.2.4 Do the results change when using skills measured at the age of 11? 
According to the hypothesis, when controlling for educational attainment, skills at 
the age of 7 are important for the duration of the first unemployment spell because they 
are positively correlated with skills later in life, which in turn influence the duration of 
an unemployment spell. As a further robustness check I therefore explore whether skills 
measured after the age of 7 are related to the probability of finding a job. 
The NCDS also provides measures of cognitive and social skills at the age of 11. 
Again, social skills are measured by asking the children’s teachers to fill out the BSAG 
questionnaire. Cognitive skills at the age of 11 are assessed with a math, reading, 
copying designs and general ability test. In order to be able to compare the results, I use 
only individuals for whom information on skills at the age of 7 and 11 is available and 
estimate the model for this sample, once including age 7 skills and once including age 
11 skills. The number of observations reduces to 1,893 for men and 1,788 for women, 
with the mean of cognitive and social skills at the age of 7 being slightly larger in the 
reduced sample35. That is, disproportionately many individuals with lower skills are 
excluded from the sample, which may attenuate the estimated hazard ratios. 
Table 8 presents Pearson correlation coefficients between cognitive and social skills 
measured at the age of 7 and 11 for women and men separately. The correlation 
between cognitive skills measured at the age of 7 and 11 is 0.69 both for men and 
women, which is in line with the finding of a high rank-order stability of cognitive skills 
                                                                                                                                               
employment and the scales conscientiousness for men and openness to experience for women and a negative effect of 
neuroticism for men. 
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early in life (see e.g. Borghans et al. (2008)). Social skills are less correlated between 
the age of 7 and 11 with a correlation coefficient of 0.34 for men and 0.36 for women. 
This correlation is somewhat lower than estimates found for various other measures of 
personality in other studies, but given the time span between the measurements and the 
assessed measure it is still in a similar range as estimates reported in Roberts and 
DelVecchio (2000). The reason for the correlation of social skills being lower than that 
of cognitive skills in this study may be attributed to two factors: First, personality traits 
are in general found to be less rank-order stable in childhood than cognitive skills 
(Borghans et al., 2008). Second, the measurement of cognitive skills via tests is less 
subjective and might therefore be less prone to measurement error than teacher 
assessments of children’s social skills (Borghans et al., 2008). 
Table 10 presents estimation results for men in the upper and results for women in 
the lower panel. Comparing the first and second column, one can see that also social 
skills at the age of 11 have a positive influence on the probability of finding a job, even 
though they are no longer statistically significant in the estimation for women. An 
increase in cognitive skills at the age of 11 is associated with a significant increase in 
the probability of making a transition to employment for women and, for lower values 
of social skills, also for men. Moreover, the hazard ratios for cognitive skills at the age 
of 11 are larger than those for skills at the age of 7. This is reasonable if age 11 
cognitive skills are a better proxy for cognitive skills at the beginning of the 
unemployment spell than age 7 cognitive skills and, at the same time, cognitive skills in 
adulthood reduce the duration of unemployment. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 10 report results using the categories stable, unsettled and 
maladjusted as measures of social skills36. For men in the lower part of the age 11 
cognitive skills distribution, both being unsettled and being maladjusted as opposed to 
stable at the age of 11 significantly decreases the probability of finding employment (see 
Figure 4). In addition, as found for age 7 cognitive skills, an increase in cognitive skills 
                                                                                                                                               
35 Note that skills at the age of 7 are standardized in the smaller sample for the estimations. 
36 Table 9 displays the share of individuals in the different categories of social skills measured at the age of 7 and 11. 
25% of girls that were maladjusted at the age of 7 are still termed maladjusted at the age of 11, while 42% of them are 
in the category stable. Concerning boys, a larger share, namely 38%, of those who were in the category maladjusted 
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at the age of 11 significantly increases the hazard rate for individuals that have low 
social skills. For women, the lower panel of Table 10 and Figure 4 show that being 
unsettled or maladjusted as opposed to stable at the age of 11 is negatively associated 
with the hazard rate. Yet, only the coefficient on being unsettled is significantly different 
from zero at the 90% confidence level. An increase in cognitive skills significantly 
increases the hazard rate for women that are in the categories stable or unsettled at the 
age of 11, but does not seem to have an effect for women in the lowest social skills 
category. 
Summarizing, also higher cognitive and social skills at the age of 11 positively 
influence the probability of making a transition from unemployment to employment. 
However, especially for women, the results on social skills are not as statistically 
significant as those found using measures taken at the age of 7 which points at the need 
for further research on the channels via which social skills at the age of 7 influence the 
duration of unemployment37. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper studies how social and cognitive skills in childhood are related to the 
duration of an individual’s first unemployment spell in adolescence and early adulthood 
by estimating a flexible proportional hazard rate model. 
The results show that higher cognitive and social skills at the age of 7 are associated 
with an increased probability of finding employment. For men, cognitive and social 
skills are only relevant for individuals in the lower part of the distribution of the 
respective other skill. That is, those with below average social skills benefit from an 
increase in cognitive skills and vice versa. Correspondingly, the effect of social skills 
seems to be driven by those in the lowest social skills category at the age of 7 for men. 
For women, the negative interaction effect is less pronounced. Adding education to the 
estimation slightly reduces the estimated hazard ratios but leaves the qualitative results 
unchanged. Moreover, the estimates are robust to controlling for parenting activities, 
                                                                                                                                               
at the age of 7 are still in the category maladjusted at the age of 11. Moreover, only 142 women are termed 
maladjusted at the age of 11. 
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family background and school characteristics at the age of 7. In addition, also skills 
measured at the age of 11 are related to the probability of finding employment. 
However, the point estimates for social skills are smaller and of lower statistical 
significance when using skills measured at the later age. These results speak in favour of 
the hypothesis that the importance of cognitive skills at the age of 7 for the probability 
of finding employment is due to the importance of later skills. However, at the same 
time they point at the need for more evidence on the channels via which early social 
skills are related to the duration of an unemployment spell. 
The estimates suggest that the economic significance of the effect of cognitive and 
social skills at the age of 7 is comparable to that of the national claimant count rate at 
the beginning of the unemployment spell for women. For men, the relative importance 
seems to be considerably smaller. However, since measuring skills is likely to be less 
precise than measuring a conventional economic variable such as the claimant count 
rate, the relative importance of skills may be underestimated. 
The results of this study offer more insights into the finding of Gregg (2001) by 
showing that the reduced number of months spent in unemployment that is associated 
with higher social skills is also explained by shorter individual unemployment spells 
and not purely driven by the propensity to become unemployed. Moreover, the results 
add to the literature on the relation between the duration of unemployment spells and 
cognitive and noncognitive skills by providing evidence on the importance of skills in 
childhood, jointly analysing both dimensions of skills and examining the effect both for 
men and women. Even though the positive association between early skills and the 
length of an unemployment spell is not established using exogenous variation, 
controlling for a large range of background factors does not change the results. This 
suggests that policy measures aiming at increasing early cognitive and social skills 
contribute also to reducing the risk of long unemployment episodes. Moreover, in light 
of recent debates on achievements in international pupil tests that often focus on 
cognitive skills, this study provides additional evidence showing that one should not 
                                                                                                                                               
37 It could be that social skills at the age of 7 mostly work through increasing later cognitive skills, and once these are 
controlled for, age 7 social skills are no longer relevant. However, when including skills measured at the age of 7 and 
at the age of 11 at the same time in the estimation, social skills at the age of 7 are still highly significant. 
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neglect investing in children’s social skills since they are related to later outcomes in a 
similar way as cognitive skills. 
A limitation of this study is that the evidence builds on the experience of one specific 
cohort in their early years on the labour market. Future research should therefore gather 
more evidence on the relationship between cognitive and social skills and the duration 
of unemployment, using different cohorts and measuring skills at different points in the 
lifecycle. 
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2.8.1 Construction of dataset 
Using the information on education provided in NCDS 4, I derive an individual’s 
qualification at the beginning of the unemployment spell. There are several questions 
asking the individuals about qualifications obtained during training courses, 
apprenticeships, or any other education since leaving school. I aggregate the different 
qualifications according to the description provided by John Bynner in the guide 
accompanying the documentation for NCDS 5 ”NCDS5 - Derived Variables 1” (Smith 
2000). Following this, qualifications are grouped into 6 categories: no qualifications, 
CSE 2-5/ equivalent NVQ 138, O-Level/ equivalent NVQ 2, A-Level/ equivalent NVQ 
3, higher qualification/ equivalent NVQ 4 and degree/ higher NVQ 5 and NVQ 6. In the 
empirical analysis I further aggregate these categories and form the following groups of 
highest achieved qualifications: below O-Levels/ NVQ 0-1, O-Levels/ NVQ 2, A-
Levels/ NVQ 3 and higher qualification or degree/ NVQ 4-6. I construct the complete 
qualification biography for each individual by recording at which point in time she 
received a qualification. Whenever it is not possible to determine the exact date, I assign 
the lower qualification level until the higher one is certainly obtained. I include a 
dummy in the estimation, indicating whether or not the complete qualification history 
could be constructed in this way in order to control for a potential structural pattern of 
incompleteness. The coefficients on this dummy are almost never significantly different 
from zero. 
In order to control for family status, I record for each cohort member whether she is 
married or not and has children or not at each point in time, using information on 
marital status and biological children which was collected in NCDS 4. Additionally, I 
control for the cohort member’s family background during her own childhood. The 
social class of the father or male head of the household is reported in the form of an 
                                                 
38 NVQ stands for National Vocational Qualification level. 
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index in NCDS 139. In order to generate a measure of socio-economic background I 
group the social class categories according to the following rule: I assign a high socio-
economic status (SES) if the father belongs to social class I or II, a medium SES if the 
father belongs to social class III and a low SES if the father belongs to social class IV or 
V. I also create a category for not having a male head of household. 
In case information on a variable is missing, I assign a value and create a dummy 
variable that indicates this. This indicator is included in the estimation in order to 
control for potential selectivity in missings. This makes it unnecessary to drop an 
individual because of missing information on one control variable40. In case of missing 
information in a dummy variable I replace the missing with zero. Missings in 
continuous variables are replaced with the mean and missings in discrete variables are 
replaced with the median. 
In order to control for regional variation in macroeconomic conditions, I include the 
latest information on the region of residence. This is the region that the cohort members 
report in NCDS 3, which is at the age of 16. If this is unknown, I use the information 
provided in NCDS 2. The monthly claimant count rates for Great Britain are taken from 
the website of the Office for National Statistics. 
2.8.2 List of covariates 
The following control variables, reported at the age of 7, are additionally included in 
the estimation in Table 4. 
 family background: 
socio-economic status of father or male head of household; whether the 
child was an only child; number of household members; birth order; 
whether mother stayed on at school after the minimum school leaving age; 
father’s years of education; mother’s and her husband’s age at childbirth; 
whether the father reads a lot of books; whether the mother reads a lot of 
                                                 
39 Information on the employment and occupational status according to the General Register Office (GRO) 1960 
classification was used to construct this index. 
40 For a discussion of the treatment of missing information in a linear estimation framework see Jones (1996). 
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books; whether the mother speaks mostly English with the child; whether 
the family has any difficulties as assessed by the health visitor41 
 parenting activities: 
whether the parents would like the child to stay on at school after the 
minimum school leaving age; whether the mother reads to/ with the child; 
whether the father reads to/ with the child; whether the father takes the 
child outside; whether the father takes an active role in raising the child as 
seen by the mother; whether the mother started working before the child 
started school; whether the mother started working after the child started 
school; whether the mother shows interest in the child’s education as seen 
by the teacher; whether the father shows interest in the child’s education as 
seen by the teacher; whether the parents have actively sought to discuss the 
child with the teacher in school 
 school characteristics: 
whether the child is at an infant as opposed to a junior school or other type 
of school; number of pupils in the child’s class; whether the school has a 
parent/teacher association; whether the school arranges meetings with the 
parents on educational matters; whether the school organizes any social 
functions for parents; whether parents provide substantial help in money, 
kind or labour to the school  
2.8.3 Who experiences unemployment before the age of 23? 
This paper analyses the duration of an unemployment spell for individuals who 
became unemployed for more than two weeks at least once between the age of 16 and 
23. Those who did not become unemployed during this time have no observations on 
the outcome variable and are therefore not included in the sample used in the 
estimations. Nevertheless, it is likely that the probability of becoming unemployed and 
being in the sample is not random. This section therefore explores which factors 
increase the likelihood of being in the sample used for the duration analysis. 
                                                 
41 Including difficulties in the following areas: housing, financial, physical illness or disability, mental illness or 
neurosis, mental subnormality, death of child’s father, death of child’s mother, divorce, separation or desertion, 
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Table 11 contrasts the mean and standard deviation of explanatory variables for those 
who have experienced unemployment and those who have not. Average skills at the age 
of 7 are higher among those who were not unemployed before the age of 23 than among 
those who experienced unemployment. The latter have an average score of cognitive 
skills of -0.09 and average social skills of -0.11. The corresponding figures for those 
who were not unemployed are 0.07 for cognitive skills and 0.08 for social skills. Hence, 
there is a difference of about 16 to 19 per cent of a standard deviation between the two 
groups, indicating that these skills are related to an increased probability of becoming 
unemployed before the age of 23. Furthermore, among those who were not unemployed 
before the age of 23, the percentage of individuals who stayed on at school after the age 
of 16 is slightly higher, with 29% as opposed to 26%. 
Table 12 presents results from a probit estimation of the probability of experiencing 
unemployment until the age of 2342. This exercise further explores the composition of 
individuals that are in the sample for the analysis of the duration of the first 
unemployment spell. Columns 1 and 2 refer to estimations for men, 3 and 4 to those for 
women. Specification (a) includes skills at the age of 7, whether the individual stayed 
on at school after the age of 16, father’s socioeconomic status and region of residence at 
the age of 16 as right-hand side variables. The impression from the descriptive statistics 
is partly confirmed in this estimation. Higher cognitive and social skills are significantly 
associated with a reduced probability of becoming unemployed. Having stayed on at 
school after the age of 16, which serves as a proxy for educational attainment, is 
positively but not significantly correlated with the probability of becoming unemployed. 
However, the effect of having stayed on at school is hard to interpret. Staying on at 
school after the age of 16 also reduces the time at risk of becoming unemployed until 
the age of 23 and implies that individuals entered the labour market in a different year 
and possibly different economic environment43. A higher SES of the father is only 
significantly negatively related to the probability of becoming unemployed for men. 
                                                                                                                                               
domestic tension, ”in-law” conflicts, unemployment and alcoholism. 
42 Note that Hobcraft (1998) has done a similar analysis with the NCDS, examining the probability of ever becoming 
unemployed until the age of 33 for men. He finds that cognitive and social skills in childhood are related to 
educational achievement, but not directly to the probability of experiencing unemployment until the age of 33. 
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Specification (b) additionally controls for information on the family background, 
parenting activities and school characteristics44. This decreases the average partial effect 
of cognitive skills, which is no longer significantly different from zero. However, a one 
standard deviation increase in social skills is still associated with a significant decrease 
of 3.4 (2.0) percentage points in the probability of becoming unemployed, and thus in 
the probability of being in the sample for the duration analysis, for men (women). 
                                                                                                                                               
43 The claimant count rate in Great Britain slightly increased from 1974 onwards, which is the year when cohort 
members turned 16 and finished compulsory education. 
44 A detailed list of the included variables can be found in Section 2.8.2 in the appendix. 
2 The Importance of Cognitive and Social Skills for the Duration of Unemployment 37 
2.8.4 Tables and figures 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  MEN   WOMEN 
mean std. dev.  mean std. dev.  
duration of unemployment spell  4.37 4.59   4.76 4.83 
spell censored 0.17 0.21 
- by interview 0.08 0.06 
- at 24 months 0.01 0.02 
- following activity unknown 0.01 0.01 
- by transition out of the labour force 0.07 0.12 
-- thereof: transition into education 0.05 0.04 
cognitive skills -0.05 1.02   0.05 0.98 
social skills -0.17 1.05 0.18 0.91 
less than O-Levels/ NVQ 0-1 0.44     0.38   
O-Levels/ NVQ 2 0.28 0.38 
A-Levels/ NVQ 3 0.18 0.11 
degree/ NVQ 4-6 0.10 0.14 
no exact education biography 0.03 0.02 
married 0.08 0.15 
parent 0.05 0.06 
socio-economic status of father at the age of 7         
low SES 0.26 0.24 
high SES 0.16 0.17 
medium  SES 0.50 0.52 
no male head  of household 0.03 0.02 
SES missing 0.05 0.05 
no previous  employment 0.31     0.35   
autumn or winter 0.36 0.36 
claimant count rate 4.78 1.77 4.65 1.6 
year spell started in           
1974 0.17 0.15 
1975 0.14 0.18 
1976 0.16 0.2 
1977 0.11 0.11 
1978 0.07 0.08 
1979 0.11 0.10 
1980 0.14 0.12 
1981 0.10 0.07 
region of residence at the age of 16         
Wales 0.07 0.07 
North 0.09 0.10 
North West 0.15 0.15 
E & W.Riding 0.09 0.09 
North Midlands 0.07 0.07 
Midlands 0.10 0.11 
East 0.08 0.06 
South  East 0.13 0.12 
South 0.05 0.06 
South  West 0.06 0.06 
Scotland 0.11 0.11 
number of observations 2223 2223   2064 2064 
Notes: The descriptive statistics of time-varying variables, that is the season dummy, year dummies and the claimant 
count rate, correspond to the values at the beginning of the unemployment spell. 
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Table 2: Estimation results of duration model 
MEN WOMEN 
   without     with without              with 
   education education education          education
social skills 1.066** 1.060** 1.118*** 1.105*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.036) (0.036)
cognitive skills 1.061** 1.042 1.127*** 1.078**
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.034)
cognitive skills 0.948** 0.948** 0.971 0.967 
× social skills (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027)
O-Levels/ NVQ 2  1.149**  1.247*** 
  (0.072)  (0.080)
A-Levels/ NVQ 3  1.096  1.577***
  (0.093)  (0.167)
degree/ NVQ 4-6  1.190  1.498***
  (0.140)  (0.167)
married 1.384*** 1.419*** 0.676*** 0.693*** 
 (0.161) (0.167) (0.061) (0.063)
parent 0.665*** 0.670*** 0.358*** 0.380***
 (0.103) (0.104) (0.059) (0.063)
high SES 1.129 1.110 1.099 1.033 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.094) (0.089)
medium SES 1.141** 1.139** 1.059 1.047 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
no previous employment 0.932 0.898* 1.221*** 1.090 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.074) (0.071)
claimant  count rate 0.788*** 0.783*** 0.826*** 0.811***
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.044)
autumn  or winter 0.898** 0.898** 1.048 1.050 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.055) (0.055)
number of observations 2,223 2,223 2,064               2,064 
Notes: The table displays hazard ratios and corresponding standard errors in parentheses. Having a father of low 
SES or not having a male head of household is the base category for father’s SES. Missings in the variable on 
SES were replaced by a zero. A dummy variable indicating this was included in the estimation. Another dummy 
variable indicating whether there were missings in the information on the qualification level was also included. 
None of these was significant in the estimations. Further control variables in the estimation are the region of 
residence, year dummies and the piecewise constant time specification. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99% level, 
∗∗ at the 95% level and ∗ at the 90% level. 
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Table 3: Estimation results of duration model - variables not presented in Table 2 
  MEN WOMEN 
without 
education with education 
without 
education with education 
constant  0.673∗∗ 0.684∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 
(0.112) (0.114) (0.067) (0.071) 
piecewise constant baseline specification     
month  2 1.090 1.093 1.191** 1.200** 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.087) (0.087) 
month  3 1.225*** 1.231*** 1.250*** 1.268*** 
(0.091) (0.091) (0.1) (0.102) 
month  4 0.916 0.922 0.968 0.990 
(0.085) (0.086) (0.095) (0.097) 
month  5 1.010 1.019 0.88 0.908 
(0.102) (0.103) (0.099) (0.102 
month  6 1.027 1.038 1.005 1.048 
(0.117) (0.118) (0.121) (0.127) 
month  7 0.765* 0.774* 0.787 0.824 
(0.111) (0.112) (0.116) (0.122) 
month  8 0.839 0.851 0.761∗ 0.800 
(0.128) (0.130) (0.125) (0.132) 
month  9 0.622** 0.632** 0.663∗∗ 0.701* 
(0.118) (0.120) (0.127) (0.134) 
month  10 0.529*** 0.539*** 0.802 0.851 
(0.116) (0.118) (0.153) (0.163) 
month  11 0.457*** 0.466*** 0.540∗∗ 0.581** 
(0.117) (0.119) (0.135) (0.145) 
month  12 0.834 0.852 1.026 1.114 
(0.176) (0.181) (0.206) (0.225) 
months  13-24 0.414*** 0.427*** 0.500∗∗∗ 0.546*** 
(0.057) (0.059) (0.07) (0.077) 
year dummies         
1975 0.933 0.901 0.813* 0.770** 
(0.104) (0.101) (0.097) (0.092) 
1976 1.079 1.044 0.941 0.855 
(0.176) (0.172) (0.163) (0.150) 
1977 1.208 1.168 0.948 0.841 
(0.22) (0.216) (0.188) (0.168) 
1978 1.180 1.126 0.924 0.824 
(0.215) (0.208) (0.182) (0.164) 
1979 1.065 0.986 0.691** 0.591*** 
(0.166) (0.161) (0.117) (0.104) 
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  MEN WOMEN 
without 
education with education 
without 
education with education 
1980 0.895 0.833 0.92 0.780 
(0.186) (0.178) (0.204) (0.178) 
1981 1.155 1.086 1.269 1.138 
(0.39) (0.369) (0.468) (0.423) 
region at the age of 16 dummies       
North 0.920 0.912 1.137 1.152 
(0.110) (0.109) (0.146) (0.148) 
North  West 1.006 0.996 1.579*** 1.569*** 
(0.110) (0.110) (0.187) (0.186) 
E &  W.Riding 1.127 1.114 1.407*** 1.436*** 
(0.138) (0.136) (0.183) (0.187) 
North  Midlands 1.367** 1.340** 1.908*** 1.883*** 
(0.175) (0.173) (0.258) (0.255) 
Midlands 1.086 1.072 1.291** 1.278* 
(0.128) (0.126) (0.163) (0.162) 
East 1.284** 1.274** 1.788*** 1.808*** 
(0.158) (0.157) (0.247) (0.250) 
South  East 1.312** 1.299** 1.701*** 1.655*** 
(0.146) (0.145) (0.211) (0.205) 
South 1.441*** 1.433*** 1.724*** 1.718*** 
(0.200) (0.20) (0.243) (0.243) 
South  West 0.986 0.968 1.606*** 1.599∗∗∗ 
(0.130) (0.128) (0.229) (0.229) 
Scotland 0.930 0.911 1.255∗ 1.188 
(0.107) (0.105) (0.157) (0.150) 
missing indicator         
info on region at 0.963 0.964 0.822** 0.812*** 
the age of  16 missing (0.087) (0.087) (0.077) (0.077) 
SES missing 0.856 0.855 0.951 0.946 
(0.095) (0.096) (0.118) (0.117) 
no exact education 1.125 1.261 
history (0.173) (0.198) 
number of  observations 2223 2223 2064 2064 
Notes: The table displays hazard ratios and corresponding standard errors in parentheses. The first month 
in unemployment, living in Wales and the year 1974 are the base categories for the respective groups of 
variables. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99% level, ∗∗ at the 95% level and ∗ at the 90% level. 
Table 3 continued 
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Table 4: Controlling for different sets of covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
men (N=2223)      
social skills 1.060∗∗ 1.053∗ 1.050∗ 1.061∗∗ 1.049∗ 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
cognitive skills 1.042 1.045 1.038 1.045 1.047 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
cognitive skills 0.948∗∗ 0.947∗∗ 0.954∗∗ 0.947∗∗ 0.949∗∗ 
× social skills (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
O-Levels/  NVQ 2 1.149∗∗ 1.106 1.119∗ 1.147∗∗ 1.093 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) 
A-Levels/  NVQ 3 1.096 1.083 1.076 1.093 1.076 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.095) 
degree/ NVQ 4-6 1.190 1.162 1.196 1.184 1.176 
 (0.140) (0.139) (0.143) (0.140) (0.143) 
women (N=2064)      
social skills 1.105∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗ 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
cognitive skills 1.078∗∗ 1.074∗∗ 1.071∗∗ 1.079∗∗ 1.074∗∗ 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
cognitive skills 0.967 0.972 0.966 0.966 0.964 
× social skills (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
O-Levels/  NVQ 2 1.247∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗ 1.244∗∗∗ 1.246∗∗∗ 1.227∗∗∗ 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.082) 
A-Levels/  NVQ 3 1.577∗∗∗ 1.514∗∗∗ 1.575∗∗∗ 1.571∗∗∗ 1.551∗∗∗ 
 (0.167) (0.165) (0.169) (0.167) (0.171) 
degree/ NVQ 4-6 1.498∗∗∗ 1.436∗∗∗ 1.508∗∗∗ 1.492∗∗∗ 1.457∗∗∗ 
 (0.167) (0.162) (0.170) (0.167) (0.167) 
included control variables     
family  background ✓ ✓ 
parenting ✓ ✓ 
school characteristics ✓ ✓ 
baseline  covariates ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Notes: The table displays hazard ratios and corresponding standard errors in parentheses. A list of included control 
variables can be found in Section 2.8.2 in the appendix. Missings in the variable on SES were replaced by a zero. 
A dummy variable indicating this was included in the estimation. Another dummy variable indicating whether 
there were missings in the information on the qualification level was also included. Further control variables in 
the estimation are the region of residence, year dummies and the piecewise constant time specification. ∗∗∗ 
indicates significance at the 99% level, ∗∗ at the 95% level and ∗ at the 90% level. 
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Table 5: Heterogeneity with respect to education 
         MEN      WOMEN 
 without 
interaction 
with 
interaction 
without 
interaction 
with 
interaction 
social skills 
 
if less than O-levels 
1.060** 
(0.028) 
- 
- 
 
1.121*** 
1.105*** 
(0.036) 
- 
- 
 
1.074 
  (0.043)  (0.053) 
if O-levels - 0.990‡ 
(0.046)
- 1.104∗ 
(0.058) 
if A-levels - 1.039 - 1.251∗∗ 
  (0.077)  (0.140) 
if degree - 1.098 - 1.148 
  (0.114)  (0.137) 
cognitive skills 1.042 - 1.078** - 
 
if less than O-levels 
(0.030) 
-
 
1.111***
(0.034) 
-
 
1.126*** 
  (0.044)  (0.052) 
if O-levels - 1.020 - 1.075 
  (0.053)  (0.056) 
if A-levels - 0.955† - 1.050 
  (0.074)  (0.109) 
if degree - 0.886† 
(0.099) 
- 0.930† 
(0.091) 
education at the mean of  skills 
O-levels 1.149*** 1.089 1.247*** 1.224*** 
 (0.072) (0.069) (0.080) (0.081) 
A-levels 1.096 1.080 1.577*** 1.488*** 
 (0.093) (0.097) (0.167) (0.192) 
degree 1.190 1.238 1.498*** 1.587*** 
 (0.140) (0.165) (0.167) (0.210) 
number of observations 2223 2223 2064 2064 
Notes: The table displays hazard ratios and corresponding standard errors in parentheses. The effect of cognitive 
(social) skills is assessed at the mean of social (cognitive) skills, which is zero by construction. The same set of 
control variables as used in the main model presented in Table 2 is included. A dummy variable indicating whether 
there were missings in the information on the qualification level was included but never significantly different from 
zero. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99% level, ∗∗	at the 95% level and ∗ at the 90% level. † indicates that the 
hazard ratios are different from the hazard ratios for the education level ”less than O-levels” at the 90% significance 
level. ‡ denotes the corresponding significance at the 95% level. 
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Table 6: Means for different measures of social skills 
 men women 
two scores for social skills   
overreact -0.147 0.159 
(standard deviation - overreact) (1.079) (0.881) 
underreact -0.094 0.102 
(standard deviation - underreact) (1.026) (0.962) 
categories of social skills (in per cent) 
stable at the age of 7 55.24 70.59 
unsettled at the age of 7 28.34 19.82 
maladjusted at the age of 7 16.42 9.59 
number of observations 2223 2064 
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Table 7: Investigating the measure for social skills 
 MEN WOMEN 
using 2 scores for social skills   
overreact 1.002 1.057∗ 
 (0.025) (0.035) 
underreact 1.082*** 1.071** 
 (0.029) (0.032) 
cognitive skills 1.045 1.081** 
 (0.030) (0.034) 
cognitive skills × overreact 0.949** 0.971 
 (0.021) (0.029) 
cognitive skills × underreact 0.986 0.992 
 (0.023) (0.026) 
using categories of social skills 
unsettled 0.971 0.863** 
 (0.056) (0.058) 
maladjusted 0.839** 0.795** 
 (0.067) (0.083) 
cognitive skills if stable 1.014 1.065* 
 (0.038) (0.040) 
cognitive skills if unsettled 1.064 1.040 
 (0.048) (0.058) 
cognitive skills if maladjusted 1.191*** 1.256*** 
 (0.072) (0.101) 
number of observations 2223 2064 
Notes: The table displays hazard ratios and corresponding standard errors in parentheses. The same set of control 
variables as used in the main model presented in Table 2 is included. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99% level, 
∗∗ at the 95% level and ∗ at the 90% level. 
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Table 8: Pearson correlation coefficients between skills at the age of 7 and 11 
 cognitive 7 social 7 cognitive 11 social 11 
men     
cognitive skills 7 1.00 0.41 0.69 0.32 
     
social skills 7 (BSAG) 0.41 1.00 0.38 0.34 
women     
cognitive skills 7 1.00 0.37 0.69 0.31 
     
social skills 7 (BSAG) 0.37 1.00 0.36 0.36 
 
Table 9: Transition matrix of social skills at the age of 7 and 11 
 stable 11        unsettled 11             maladjusted 11               total 
men  (N=1893)  
stable 7 67.48 22.80   9.72 56.52 
unsettled 7 47.77 28.81 23.42 28.42 
maladjusted 7 31.58 30.18 38.25 15.06 
total 56.47 25.62 17.91  100 
women (N=1788) 
stable 7 79.84 15.84   4.31 71.31 
unsettled 7 57.14 29.71 13.14 19.57 
maladjusted 7 42.94 31.90 25.15 9.12 
total 72.04 20.02   7.94  100 
Reading example for the table, upper panel: 56.52% of all men were in the category stable at the age of 7. Of 
these, 67.48% were also in the category stable at the age of 11, 22.8% were in the category unsettled at the age 
of 11 and 9.72% were in the category maladjusted at the age of 11. At the age of 11, 56.47% of men were in the 
category stable, 25.62% were in the category unsettled and 17.91% in the category maladjusted. 
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Table 10: Comparing results for skills at the age of 7 and 11 
 skills at the age 
of 7 
skills at the age 
of 11 
skills at the age 
of 7 
skills at the age 
of 11 
men (N=1893) 
social skills 1.076*** 1.054* - - 
 (0.031) (0.030)   
cognitive skills 1.009 1.049 - - 
 (0.031) (0.034)  - 
cognitive skills 0.946** 0.968 - - 
× social skills (0.023) (0.025)   
unsettled - - 0.952 0.889* 
   (0.060) (0.056) 
maladjusted - - 0.817** 0.906 
   (0.073) (0.078) 
cognitive skills - - 0.974 1.001 
if stable   (0.039) (0.040) 
cognitive skills - - 1.029 1.096* 
if unsettled   (0.050) (0.057) 
cognitive skills - - 1.199*** 1.179** 
if maladjusted   (0.082) (0.084) 
women (N=1788) 
social skills 1.099*** 1.042 - - 
 (0.038) (0.036)   
cognitive skills 1.062* 1.137*** - - 
 (0.035) (0.043)   
cognitive skills 0.956 0.984 - - 
× social skills (0.028) (0.032)   
unsettled - - 0.902 0.879* 
   (0.065) (0.064) 
maladjusted - - 0.789** 0.835 
   (0.090) (0.106) 
cognitive skills - - 1.046 1.091** 
if stable   (0.042) (0.046) 
cognitive skills - - 1.003 1.319*** 
if unsettled   (0.060) (0.089) 
cognitive skills - - 1.307*** 0.996 
if maladjusted   (0.115) (0.108) 
Notes: The table displays hazard ratios and corresponding standard errors in parentheses. Further control 
variables in the estimation are education, the father’s SES at the age of 7 and 11, whether the individual 
is married at the beginning of the spell, has children, was employed before, the season of the year, the 
claimant count rate, the region of residence, year dummies and the piecewise constant time specification. 
∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 99% level, ∗∗ at the 95% level and ∗ at the 90% level. 
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Table 11: Mean of variables by whether an individual was unemployed before the age of 
23 or not 
  NEVER UNEMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED 
       mean 
  standard 
deviation       mean 
standard 
deviation 
female 0.52   0.48   
cognitive skills 0.07 0.97 -0.09 1.03 
social skills 0.08 0.96 -0.11 1.05 
stayed on at school after age 
16 0.29  0.26  
socio-economic status of father at the age of 7  
low 0.20 0.25 
medium 0.53 0.51 
high 0.20 0.17 
no male head of household 0.02 0.03 
missing 0.04 0.05 
region of residence at the age of 16   
Wales 0.05 0.07 
North 0.06 0.10 
North  West 0.11 0.15 
E & W.Riding 0.08 0.09 
North Midlands 0.09 0.07 
Midlands 0.10 0.10 
East 0.10 0.07 
South East 0.16 0.13 
South 0.07 0.06 
South West 0.07 0.06 
Scotland 0.10 0.11 
number of observations 5843     4287 
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Table 12: Probit estimations: Probability of experiencing unemployment of at least two 
weeks until the age of 23 
  MEN WOMEN 
Specification (a) (b) (a) (b) 
cognitive skills -0.020** -0.009 -0.020** -0.013 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
social skills -0.040*** -0.034*** -0.026*** -0.020*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
stayed on at school 0.014 0.034* 0.005 0.008 
after age 16 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
socio-economic status of father at the  age  of 7 
high SES -0.081*** -0.039 -0.024 -0.038 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) 
medium SES -0.056*** -0.031* -0.021 -0.022 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
number of observations 5,024 5,024 5,106 5,106 
included control variables        
region at the age of 16  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
family background ✓ ✓ 
parenting ✓ ✓ 
school characteristics   ✓   ✓ 
Notes: The table displays average partial effects, calculated using the Stata command “margeff” written by Tamás 
Bartus. Standard errors obtained from the same command are reported in parentheses, they are derived using the delta 
method. Significance levels correspond to those of the coefficients. Having a father of low SES or not having a male 
head of household is the base category for father’s SES. See Section 2.8.2 in the appendix for a detailed list of control 
variables. Missings in covariates were replaced by values, as explained in Section 2.8.1 in the appendix, and dummy 
variables indicating this were included in the estimation. These were partly significant in the estimation. ***  
indicates significance at the 99% level, ** at the 95% level and * at the 90% level. 
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of the distribution of skills at the age of 7 
 
 
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival functions for above and below average 
cognitive, respectively social, skills 
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Figure 3: Effect of a one standard deviation increase in cognitive and social skills on the 
hazard ratio, controlling for education 
 
Notes: The depicted hazard ratio for cognitive skills is calculated using the estimated coefficients in the 
following way (correspondingly for social skills):  socialcognitivecognitivecognitive skillsocialratiohazard       exp  
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Figure 4: Effect of being unsettled or maladjusted as opposed to stable at the age of 7 and 
11 on the hazard ratio, using the smaller sample 
 
Notes: The depicted hazard ratio for being  in the category maladjusted as opposed to stable is calculated 
using the estimated coefficients  in the following way (correspondingly for being in category  unsettled):  dmaladjustedmaladjustedmaladjuste skillcognitiveratiohazard  cognitive    exp   
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3 The Short- and Long-term Effects of School 
Choice on Student Outcomes - 
Evidence from a School Choice Reform in 
Sweden45 
3.1 Introduction 
Whether or not students should be allowed to choose their school of attendance is a 
highly controversial topic in many countries. Whereas some see school choice as a 
means to improve students’ results, others fear that choice and competition will have 
adverse effects on the school system. Economic theory has no clear predictions on this 
matter: the aggregate expected effects of school choice and competition on students’ 
outcomes are ambiguous. Empirical evaluations of existing school choice reforms are 
therefore important as they provide information on the actual effects of school choice 
policies. 
In this paper we evaluate the effects on short-term and long-term student outcomes of 
a large-scale school choice reform in Sweden. The reform was implemented in 1992 and 
has significantly increased the amount of school choice in compulsory education. It 
affected the entire country and profoundly changed the workings of the Swedish school 
sector. Before the reform, students were assigned to the school in their catchment area. 
Now, 20 years after the reform, choosing school is a normal phenomenon, especially in 
more urban communities, and many municipalities encourage active school choice and 
provide information about the schools available. The reform essentially contained two 
elements: first, it allowed publicly funded but privately run schools46 to set up and 
compete on basically equal terms with the publicly run schools; second, it encouraged 
choice among the already existing public schools. We believe that this reform, together 
with the detailed data that we have access to, provides a good opportunity for obtaining 
empirical evidence of the effects of school choice. Moreover, since the reform was 
                                                 
45 This chaper is based on joint work with Karin Edmark and Markus Frölich. 
46 The Swedish term is friskolor, i .e. “independent schools”, but we will refer to them as private schools throughout 
the paper. 
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introduced 20 years ago, we can now assess not only its short- but also the long-term 
effects. 
The first part of the reform, the introduction of privately run, but publicly funded, 
schools, has been extensively studied (see Ahlin (2003), Sandström and Bergström 
(2005), Björklund, Edin, Fredriksson and Krueger (2004), Böhlmark and Lindahl 
(2007) and (2012), and Hensvik (2012)). The overall evidence of the previous studies 
suggests that competition and choice, in terms of a higher share of students in the 
municipality attending private schools, has had fairly modest effects on short term 
school results and basically no effect on long-term results. 
Our study differs from those in several ways. First, while previous studies focussed 
on the effects of private schools, we study the overall effects of the choice reform, 
including in particular the choice among public schools. We examine the effects of 
school choice via permitting more private schools as well as via choice between the 
existing public schools. The latter could be particularly important since choice between 
public schools could be exerted immediately after the reform, whereas choice among 
private schools naturally requires that such new schools be founded, something that may 
take time and may not happen in all parts of the country. In fact, even in school year 
2004/05, private schools existed only in 166 out of the 290 municipalities (National 
Board of Education, 2005, p.29). Also, a survey conducted by the National Board of 
Education revealed that, in school year 2000/01, choosing another public school than 
the nearest one was more common than choosing a private school (National Board of 
Education, 2003, pp. 48f.). Hence, private schools represent only one facet of the choice 
options, and the establishment of new private schools might in fact be an endogenous 
outcome of what is offered by the existing public schools. 
Second, whereas the previous studies evaluate the effects of private schools 
measured by their share of students within the municipality, we use detailed 
geographical information on the locations of schools and student residences to construct 
measures of choice and competition that are specific for each student and each school. 
In particular, we calculate student-specific measures of the number of schools available, 
and school-specific measures for the competition they face from other schools. Our 
evaluation method then consists of comparing the outcomes of students with different 
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degrees of school choice and competition, before and after the reform. The idea is that 
students with few schools nearby will in practice be unaffected by the introduction of 
the choice reforms (i.e. they will only have one school to choose from anyway), while 
for students with many schools nearby, the choice reforms will have a large impact on 
the actual choice opportunities.  
Using identifying variation at the student-level, instead of at the level of the 
municipality, is potentially important since municipalities vary a lot in size, both in 
terms of population and area,47 which means that variation only across municipalities 
may be too crude to capture the essential variation in choice and competition. Our 
approach also has the advantage of estimating the effects of choice opportunities, 
whereas the share of students in private schools only measures the degree to which 
students exercised choice to private schools. This is a possibly important distinction, as 
(potential) choice and competition could affect school quality, even if we only observe 
few people to actually change their school of attendance. A further advantage of having 
access to detailed geographical data is that we can construct different measures for the 
degree of competition facing each school, and the degree of choice facing each student. 
In supplementary analyses, we will thus distinguish between general effects caused by 
an increased competition among schools, and individual effects caused by students’ 
possibility of choosing a school that best matches their preferences. 
An important methodological issue that we need to deal with is the fact that the 
location of schools after the reform, in particular of the private schools, is likely to be 
endogenous with respect to student and community factors (such as student ability and 
background, or population density), or with respect to the performance of existing 
schools in the area (demand for private schools could for example be higher where 
public schools are bad). Moreover, if school choice and competition leads to improved 
school quality, it might also be that parents who are very concerned about education 
                                                 
47 The largest municipality in terms of population, Stockholm, had 864,324 inhabitants in 2011, while the smallest, 
Bjurholm, had 2,431. The largest municipality in terms of area, Kiruna, is 20715 km2 and the smallest, Sundbyberg, 
is 9 km2. (Source: www.scb.se) 
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may move to regions with many schools.48 If we knew which factors were important, 
we could control for them; yet, several factors may be unobserved.  
Our empirical strategy is to use the pre-reform locations of schools and students’ 
homes to measure choice and competition. That is, for students choosing a school in or 
after autumn 1992, we will measure choice as present right before the reform, in 1991. 
As we argue later, the school choice reform came largely as a surprise because of an 
unexpected federal election outcome. Hence, the location of schools and families was 
pre-determined to the reform. For students choosing a school under the old system, i.e. 
before 1992, we will therefore measure choice in the year they make their decision 
without risking endogeneity with respect to the reform. Using this strategy, we also 
permit that the establishment of new (private) schools or the closure of schools may be 
an endogenous outcome of the school choice reform. In our main specification we will 
thereby estimate the effects of school choice and competition as introduced by the 1992 
reform. Our estimates will thus include all effects resulting from the dynamic processes 
that were triggered by choice and competition as it was present at the outset of the 
reform, like the opening or closing of schools and parents moving in response to the 
new options. In additional analyses we will also examine these processes. 
Obviously, the location of schools even before 1992 was not random and also school 
choice was possible to some extent before by moving residence (i.e. Tiebout choice49). 
To deal with this, we control for many observable background characteristics at the 
individual and regional level and include municipality fixed effects. Moreover, as 
mentioned before, we also observe unaffected cohorts in our dataset which allows us to 
control for all time-constant relationships between having many schools nearby and 
student outcomes. Further, we make use of these unaffected cohorts to test whether 
pseudo treatment effects are indeed zero and control for pre-reform trends. The intuition 
for our identification strategy can thus be summarised as follows: The reform of 1992 
came as a surprise to the population. Until then, parents had to move homes to exercise 
choice; afterwards, school choice was much easier. The number of schools available in 
                                                 
48 Before the reform, we would see parents move as close as possible to a good school, which does not imply that 
there are many schools in the area. 
49 The term stems from the work of Tiebout (1956). 
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1992 is pre-determined for those cohorts entering school then. While differences in 
contextual factors between many-schools and few-schools areas have already existed 
before, we can control for many observed covariates and make use of the many pre-
reform cohorts to additionally control for time-constant unobserved factors. 
Additionally, we can use unaffected cohorts to test whether pseudo-treatment effects are 
indeed zero. 
We draw on very informative register data on the entire population of students and 
schools in Sweden, including a broad range of short term and long term student 
outcomes, ranging from educational results to labour market outcomes and socio-
economic indicators. We can hence study the effects on a wide array of outcomes. The 
data cover a long period and hence enable us to evaluate the effects both immediately 
after the reform and many years later. This is important since effects on non-cognitive 
skills may not be fully reflected in school test scores but may become visible only later 
in labour market outcomes or criminal activity. 
Our empirical results reveal that the effects of school choice as well as competition 
were very small during the period considered. This finding applies to the short-term 
effects on test scores and grades as well as to the longer-term effects on employment, 
higher education, criminal activity and health, where there is often no effect. The effects 
become larger for younger cohorts, i.e. those affected by the reform earlier in life, yet 
still remain very small. While the effects of choice and competition are hard to 
disentangle because of a high correlation, choice tends to have a positive effect, while 
competition tends to have a negative effect on marks, but almost only for students that 
were already in school as the reform was enacted. The latter could be due to the reform 
causing a disruption to the previously stable school system to which the schools 
eventually adjusted.  
The magnitudes of all effects are very small, though. A potential explanation for this 
is that the previously existing Tiebout choice (i.e. moving homes) may already have 
delivered sufficient choice options for those families who wanted to choose. Moreover, 
according to economic theory, the school choice reform is expected to affect students’ 
outcomes in various ways, and it is possible that the very small estimated effects reflect 
that negative and positive effects in practice cancel each other out. 
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3.2  The Swedish School System 
3.2.1 General information on the Swedish school system 
Sweden has nine years of compulsory schooling, starting the year the student turns 
seven. Throughout these grades, all students follow the same basic curriculum. After the 
compulsory schooling, the great majority of students continue with voluntary secondary 
school.50 
Compulsory education is organised in three stages: grades 1 to 3, grades 4 to 6 and, 
finally, grades 7 to 9. Grades 1 to 6 are referred to as primary school, whereas 
secondary school starts with grade 7. Schools usually offer either only grades 1 to 6, or 
grades 7 to 9, while some offer all grades 1 to 9. Therefore, school choice is particularly 
relevant for entering school (i.e. grade 1) but also for grade 7, where many students 
graduate from elementary schools offering only grades 1 to 6.  
Compulsory education is organised and provided by the municipalities, and the main 
source of finance of compulsory education is municipal tax revenues, followed by 
central government grants. Both the tax base and the grants are adjusted by equalisation 
formulas that are designed to give municipalities with different population structures 
roughly equal economic conditions. 
3.2.2 The school system before the reform in 1992 
The school choice reforms that are studied in this paper took place in the early 1990s. 
Before that, school choice in Sweden was very limited as students were placed in the 
school of their catchment area. Privately run schools existed, but they were few, and 
public funds were restricted to schools with alternative pedagogic profiles.51 There also 
existed a few public schools with special profiles, such as music, which accepted 
students based on their skills in the relevant subject. In general, however, school choice 
was limited to Tiebout choice, i.e. to moving near the desired school.52  
                                                 
50 In 2011, 98 per cent of students entered secondary school. The share of students graduating from secondary school 
in at most 4 years was approximately 75 per cent in years 1999–2011 (see The National Board of Education: 
www.skolverket.se). 
51 In fact, until 1987, in order to receive public funding, schools were in addition required to prove that the use of 
these alternative pedagogical methods also benefited the development of the public schools, see The National Board 
of Education (2003). 
52 The allocation of students to schools was regulated in the compulsory school decree (Grundskoleförordningen 
1988:655 Chapter 2 § 23), where it was stated that the allocation shall be based on what is appropriate in terms of 
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Politically, there were however heated debates on choice and competition in the 
public sector, including the education system. The right-wing opposition, especially the 
party Moderaterna, argued in favour of increased school choice and competition 
throughout the 1980s, but the Social democrats, who were in power for most of the 
decade, had a much more restrictive attitude. This reluctance started to soften during the 
late years of the 1980s, but, even then, the idea of the Social Democrats was first and 
foremost to increase choice and flexibility by increasing the local influence within 
schools, for example in terms of allowing schools to profile in terms of pedagogical 
style or special subjects.53 It can be noted that school choice was tentatively discussed 
also by the Social Democrats in the late 80s and early 90s, but then mainly in terms of 
making it easier to choose schools with special profiles, should these become more 
common.54 Apart from the few existing private schools and schools with special 
profiles, school choice only existed at the idea stage. This was however soon to change. 
3.2.3 The 1990s school choice reforms 
The regime shift in terms of school choice began in the fall of 1991, after a very tight 
parliamentary election brought a right wing coalition to power.55 The newly elected 
government took a series of steps to increase choice and competition in the education 
sector: 
In March 1992, the government proclaimed, in proposition 1991/92:95, that the aim 
was to “achieve the largest possible freedom for children and parents to choose school”. 
It furthermore stated that “This freedom should apply both to choice between the 
existing public municipal schools, and to private schools.”56  
                                                                                                                                               
transportation, efficient usage of facilities and other educational resources, and on parents’ and students’ wishes. 
While the regulation hence specified parents’ and students’ wishes as one (out of many) factor(s) to be considered, 
the general rule was that students were allocated to the nearest school. 
53 See for example Proposition 1988/89:4. 
54 See pp. 56–57 Proposition 1988/89:4. 
55 The right wing coalition (Moderaterna; Folkpartiet; Centerpartiet; and Kristdemokraterna) obtained 46.6% of votes, 
the socialist block (The Social Democrats and the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet)) 42.2%, and a populist party, New 
Democracy, which has since then disappeared from politics, obtained 6.7% and hence acquired a power balancing 
position. The greens, Miljöpartiet, received 3.7% of the votes and were hence only 0.3% away from parliamentary 
representation. In 1994 the Social Democrats came back to power, but by then the school choice reform was largely 
accepted, and no attempts were made to reverse it. 
56 See proposition 1991/92:95: ”Målet är att åstadkomma största möjliga frihet för barn och föräldrar 
att välja skola. Denna frihet bör innebära möjlighet att välja mellan det offentliga skolväsendet och fristående skolor 
men också att välja skola inom det kommunala skolväsendet och att välja också en skola i annan kommun.” 
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In June 1992, the parliament voted in favour of the proposition, and thus opened up 
for more choice between the existing public schools as well as for publicly funded but 
privately run compulsory schools to operate under basically the same conditions as the 
public schools. This new type of privately run school was to receive funding, through a 
voucher system, from the enrolled students’ home municipalities, at a minimum of 85% 
of the average cost per student in the home municipality. 57 The schools were to be open 
to all students, and could only charge very limited additional student fees. 
In 1994, another change in the school law, following proposition 1992/93:230, 
opened up for choosing a public school in another municipality than that of residence, 
something that was previously only allowed for independent schools, or in special cases 
such as bullying.58 
In summary, propositions 1991/92:95 and 1992/93:230 established private schools as 
a publicly funded alternative, and made a strong statement that the central government 
viewed school choice as important. While the main law changes implemented in these 
reforms treated the opening up for independent schools, it is clear from the propositions 
that the aim was to increase overall school choice, both by facilitating for privately run 
schools to enter, and by encouraging choice between existing publicly run schools. 
Evidence by the National Board of Education suggests that school choice, both to 
private and public schools, has increased a lot during the 20 years that the reform has 
been in place, in particular in more urban areas.59 
3.2.4 Other education-related reforms 
The school choice reforms in the early 1990s were not the only education-related 
changes taking place in the 1990s, but they were part of a broad decentralisation and 
choice-enhancing trend in the organisation of the educational sector, as well as in the 
                                                 
57 The reason for setting the minimum compensation level to less than 100% of the public schools’ average cost 
reflected that the public schools were still ultimately responsible for granting all students in the municipality 
compulsory education. This, it was argued, could give rise to higher costs for example for administrative costs for 
ensuring that all students in the municipality attend school and costs from having to offer schooling to children from 
private schools that stop operating. In addition, public schools have to cater to all students, and cannot select students 
by, for example, offering only certain profiles (see prop 1991/92:95.) In1994, following the return of the Social 
Democrats to power, the minimum voucher level was lowered to 75% of the average cost. 
58 Following this proposition, the independent school reform was also expanded to secondary school level (grades 10-
12). 
59 See Section 3.8.1.1 in the appendix. 
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public sector in general. The main changes consisted of making the municipalities, 
instead of the central government, responsible for the provision and organisation of 
compulsory education, and of replacing the system of ear-marked central government 
grants with a system of general central government grants.60 Since these other reforms 
increased the municipalities’ influence over compulsory education, it is reassuring that 
our analysis is, in contrast to most other studies of the Swedish choice reform, not 
conducted at the level of the municipality, which would risk to pick up effects of these 
other reforms. 
3.3 Mechanisms of School Choice and Competition 
In pre-reform Sweden, students were in general allocated to schools according to the 
proximity principle (i.e. to the nearest school), and the only way to change school was 
by moving. With the reform, choice could be exercised without moving. These 
enhanced choice options could affect student outcomes through various channels. 
First, school choice can improve the matching of students and schools, e.g. regarding 
the desired pedagogical tools or any other aspect of the student-school match that 
improves the productivity of education. This should have an unambiguously positive 
effect on student and school results. In addition, students may increase their effort if 
they are allowed to attend the school of their liking. 
Second, school choice may affect the allocation of students, which in turn gives rise 
to different peer effects.61 Theoretically, it is not clear how school choice should affect 
the composition of students between schools: On the one hand, loosening the link 
between residential address and school of attendance could in principle decrease 
segregation62 with respect to parental background (income, immigrant background etc.) 
as students are no longer required to attend the school nearest to their home. That is, 
students from poorer areas can gain access to schools in rich areas, even though they 
                                                 
60 For a more detailed overview of these reforms, see Section 3.8.1.2 in the appendix. 
61 See for example Epple and Romano (1998) for a theoretical model on school choice where students sort according 
to ability and where peer effects are modelled. For empirical evidence on peer effects, see for example Zimmerman 
(2003), Sacerdote (2001), Lefgren (2004), Hanushek, Kain, Markman and Rivkin (2002), Angrist and Lang (2004), 
Ammermueller and Pischke (2009), Lavy and Schlosser (2007) and Hoxby (2000a). 
62 Segregation may refer to different aspects of student and parental characteristics. Here we deliberately use the term 
loosely, in the sense of “less mixing” with respect to any characteristic that may be of importance for peer effects and 
so to the productivity of education. 
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cannot afford to live there. On the other hand, however, school choice can also lead to 
more segregation, if parents/students increasingly choose to attend schools with similar 
peers63.  
It is also a priori unclear how being surrounded by more or less similar peers (with 
respect to academic ability, parental background etc.) may affect students’ educational 
outcomes. On the one hand, more homogenous classes are easier to teach. On the other 
hand, weaker students may benefit disproportionally from stronger students, which are 
only available in more heterogeneous classes. The overall effects are ambiguous. 
Third, school choice can put competitive pressure on schools to improve quality in 
order to attract students.64 That more competition leads to higher quality, however, 
hinges on a couple of assumptions: i) that school quality is a determining factor for the 
choice of school; ii) that parents can observe school quality; iii) that schools have an 
incentive to attract students. The fact that funding for Swedish schools is, at least partly, 
based on the number of students,65 suggests that there is an incentive for schools to at 
least attract enough students to fill the classes in order to cover the fixed costs for 
facilities and teachers. Having many applicants may in addition be desirable as it signals 
high reputation and status, and teachers and headmasters have a clear incentive to avoid 
a situation where the number of students is so low that the school is forced to shut 
down. 
                                                 
63 In a Chapter 4, we show that we do not find evidence for a change in overall segregation at schools in terms of the 
socio-economic background of the parents, characterised by income, educational level and being born outside of 
Sweden, after the reform. Our measure of segregation, which is the yearly average of the standard deviation in the 
share of students with different characteristics across schools in Sweden, does however not take into account changes 
in residential sorting, i.e. it does not imply that school choice did not change sorting into schools on the local level. 
64 See Hoxby (2003) on school choice and school quality. See also Hanushek (1986) for an early overview of 
education production functions. 
65 There exists little information on the different resource allocation models used by the municipalities: the first 
country-wide survey, covering all municipalities, refers to the situation in 2007 (The National Board of Education 
(2009)). The survey suggests that the vast majority of municipalities base the resource allocation on the number of 
students (although part of the budget is not per-student-based, but based on, for example, special needs). Only 9 per 
cent of the municipalities responded that none of the budget was directly volume based, and that the allocation was 
instead made through an application-procedure (the Swedish term is: äskanden), and through dialogue with the school 
units. According to the authors of the report, it is however likely that volume was indirectly considered also in these 
municipalities, although not necessarily through an exact amount per student (p. 39). The survey furthermore 
suggests that the budget allocation procedures have often been in place for a long time: 52 per cent of the 
municipalities respond that they have used the same model for the last six budget years or more. 22 per cent respond 
that the current model has been used for 4–5 budget years, and the remaining 26 per cent respond that the current 
model has been used for less than four budget years. 
62 3.3 Mechanisms of School Choice and Competition 
The first assumption – that school choice is based on the quality of the school – is 
complicated by the fact that school quality can be difficult to observe. This means that, 
even though parents, all else equal, may want to choose the better school, they may in 
practise not be able to observe this. In the Swedish case, this is a relevant aspect since 
the only school level results that are publicly available are the final average grades, i.e. 
grades when students exit compulsory school in grade 9. In addition, if school choice is 
determined by student grades, schools have an incentive to inflate grades, which 
naturally devaluates their value as quality indicators.66 
In addition, there are a number of factors – apart from school results – that 
potentially influence the choice of school, such as proximity, facilities, peers, extra-
curricular activities etc.67 These factors may or may not be correlated with students’ 
learning. The competitive pressure on schools to attract students can hence in principle 
even give rise to negative effects on student outcomes by shifting focus from factors 
that improve teaching and learning to factors that are unrelated to students’ learning, but 
potentially more easily observable, such as peer quality. 
In sum, school choice can in theory give rise to various mechanisms, and it is hence a 
priori unclear which effects we should expect on students’ outcomes. This makes an 
empirical evaluation of school choice reforms all the more important.  
It is also worth mentioning that the Swedish school choice reforms are likely to give 
rise to a process of changing incentives. For example, even if competition between 
schools eventually gives rise to over-all higher quality, this is a process that is likely to 
take time, and that may in the meantime cause disruptions, as bad schools downsize and 
better performing schools expand. The effects of the school choice reform may hence 
take time, and may also look different over time. This is important to take into account 
in the empirical analysis. 
                                                 
66 Vlachos (2010) suggests that the competition stemming from the introduction of independent schools has given rise 
to some, but very modest, grade inflation. His estimations suggest that a ten percentage point increase in the private 
school share would give rise to a 1–2 unit increase in the average student credit values (which is a measure of 
students GPA). This is a small effect, considering that student credit values are given at a 0–320 scale, with mean 
value at 206. We examine grade inflation in Section 3.8.1.5 in the appendix. 
67 For example, Burgess, Greaves, Vignoles and Wilson (2009) suggest that British families choosing school care 
both about the academic performance and the student composition. 
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3.4 Data  
The study uses Swedish register data for the full population born in the years 1972 to 
1990 and contains data from Statistics Sweden, the Swedish National Council for Crime 
Prevention, the Military Archives and the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency. 
First, as previously mentioned, we have access to detailed information on the 
geographical location of schools (for years 1988–2006) and students’ residences (for 
1985–2006), which enable us to construct student- and school-level indicators of choice 
and competition.68 How these are constructed will be explained in the following section. 
Second, our data contain information on a broad set of short-term and long-term 
student outcomes: First, we can observe the educational attainment at age 16 in the form 
of average final grades from compulsory school, i.e. by the end of grade 9 and, for the 
last 4 cohorts in our sample, the 9th grade test scores in English, Swedish and Maths. 
Since the latter are only available for a subsample of students, we will note make use of 
the information on the 9th grade test scores in the main analysis, but only in order to test 
for grade inflation in Section 3.8.1.5 in the appendix. In addition, for the male students, 
we have access to cognitive ability test scores from the military draft. These test scores, 
which are also used in for example Grönqvist, Öckert and Vlachos (2010) and Lindqvist 
and Vestman (2011), contain the overall scores from four subtests that measure the 
draftees’ verbal, logical, spatial and technical ability, and are used to sort draftees to 
different assignments in the military service. The draft test scores are available for all 
cohorts, although for the later cohorts, the share of draftees drops significantly.69 In 
terms of longer-term outcomes, we observe whether the individual was employed at the 
age of 25, as well as the highest educational degree the individual had completed at that 
age. We choose this age since it allows us to include many cohorts in the analysis – 
choosing a later age would have the benefits of capturing also older graduates, but 
would on the other hand decrease the number of cohorts for which we observe the 
                                                 
68 Specifically, we have access to the midpoint coordinate of 100*100 m squares for student residence and school 
location, i.e. the coordinates measure the residential location with a maximum error of approximately 70 meters. 
69 Until the late 90s, virtually all 18–year-old males were required to take the test. After that, although the universal 
draft remains on paper, in practice only a minority of each cohort goes through the military service, see Figure 9 in 
the appendix. According to anecdotal evidence, the drafting decision can now in practice be influenced by the 
draftees, which leads to potential selection problems in this variable. We have analysed whether the selection is 
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outcome. We also observe whether individuals had health problems, indicated by 
receiving sickness benefits70, at age 22, and whether the individual had ever been 
convicted for crime (including all crimes, from pilfering and petty traffic- and drug 
related crimes, to more serious types of crime, but excluding civil penalty) 71 at the same 
age. 
An important task will be to control for all covariates that could potentially influence 
the outcomes, while also being correlated with the choice/competition variables. We 
therefore use a broad set of background covariates at the level of the student (including 
parental background information) as well as at the level of the local area (parish and/or 
municipality)72. The list of control variables is given in the note to Table 16 and further 
descriptive statistics are given in Table 15 73. 
Table 13 shows descriptive statistics of students’ outcomes for affected and non-
affected cohorts. Non-affected cohorts are those that have left 9th grade before autumn 
1992, i.e. before the reform was implemented. These are all students born in the years 
1972 to 1976. Summary statistics of variables measuring choice and competition will be 
given in Section 3.5.2. 
Comparing the development of outcomes for the two different cohort groups, we see 
an increase in the share of individuals with a university degree at age 25 from 35% to 
41% and a decrease in share of those employed at the same from 71% to 69%. It has to 
be taken into account, of course, that there are also still students who have not yet 
finished their studies at this age, which might thus reduce the share of employed 
individuals. The percentile rank in the grade point average at grade 9, which ranges 
from 0 to 100, has a mean of 48.21 for the non-treated and 49.40 for the treated cohorts 
                                                                                                                                               
related to the choice reform (see Section 3.8.1.6 in appendix) but find only a very small association, which we do not 
believe to have important effects for our results. 
70 This variable is based on the sum of the yearly benefits received as sickness benefits and as benefits for early 
retirement due to bad health. We define an individual as having health problems if she/he received an amount 
exceeding the price base amount, which is an amount used in the social welfare legislation, and which varies with the 
aggregate price level. During the data period of our study, this amount was approximately €4,000. 
71 The Swedish term is ”ordningsböter”. 
72 The municipality level covariates were downloaded from the webpage of Statistics Sweden (www.scb.se), except 
for the indicator for urban municipality, which was constructed based on the 2005 year municipality classification by 
the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and regions (SKL). The parish level covariates were generated from 
individual level data generously made available from the Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU). 
These data, as well as our individual-level covariates, come from the national registers held by Statistics Sweden. 
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and a standard deviation of 28.6 for both.74 The cognitive score is a standardised 
measure that ranges between one and nine, with median value 5, and has a mean of 
around 5 and a standard deviation of about 1.9 in both cohort groups. The share of those 
having committed any criminal offense up until age 22 is 16 per cent for the untreated 
and 14 per cent for the treated cohorts. Note that this also includes small offences, like 
speeding or petty crimes, which explains why the share is not smaller. Since school 
choice may affect a student’s peer group and the degree of segregation, which in turn 
could affect the social adjustment of students, we believe that it is important to also 
include these less serious types of offences. 
3.5 Empirical Strategy 
3.5.1 Identification 
In order to estimate the effect of school choice as introduced by the 1992 reform, we 
need to address two main empirical challenges. The first is to separate the effect of 
having more school choice due to the reform from effects of other factors that are 
related to our choice measure, i.e. the number of schools close-by, also in the absence of 
a free school choice regime. The second is the potential endogeneity of schools’ choice 
of location and parents’ choice of residence after the reform. To deal with the first, i.e. 
to separate the effect of school choice from background factors that are correlated with 
living in an area with many schools, we include many regional- and individual-level 
covariates and municipality fixed effects in our estimation. Moreover, we control for the 
effect of our school choice measure on student outcomes in a situation without free 
school choice by including the unaffected cohorts in our dataset. Thus, we estimate the 
additional effect of having more schools nearby for cohorts that chose a school after the 
reform was implemented, compared to cohorts that chose a school before reform. We 
thereby control for time-invariant influences of unobserved factors that are correlated 
with both the choice measure and the outcome variable, conditional on many control 
variables. Our identifying assumption is that the effect of having many schools nearby 
                                                                                                                                               
73 All monetary variables have been deflated to year 2006 monetary value, using the consumer price index (source: 
Statistics Sweden, www.scb.se). 
74 The reason for the mean rank value not being exactly 50 is that ties in the data were given the same rank. 
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in the counterfactual situation, i.e. if the 1992-reform had never been enacted, can be 
estimated by the effect of having many schools nearby for cohorts that left education 
before the reform was enacted. This is similar to the assumption of common trends in a 
difference-in-differences design as we assume that the effect of having more schools 
nearby would have been the same as it was before the reform if there had been no 
reform. 
This assumption is not directly testable, but we can make it more plausible by 
including a large set of control variables on the individual, municipal and parish level. 
Whatever is not controlled for is thus assumed to be constant over time. Importantly, we 
can assess the credibility of the assumption by performing placebo tests on the five pre-
reform student cohorts. That is, we pretend the reform had happened two years earlier 
and estimate the effect of this “placebo”-reform. If our control variables successfully 
capture all correlation between our choice-index and other factors that affect student 
outcomes, and there is no additional time-varying influence of other factors, we expect 
the resulting placebo-effects to be zero. Furthermore, we can test for time trends in the 
effect of having more schools nearby in the pre-reform cohorts. Not finding any such 
trends can be seen as an indication that the results of our analysis are not due to time 
trends that are unrelated to the choice reform. Finally, even in cases where we do find 
evidence of time trends before the reform, we can use the five non-affected cohorts of 
students to estimate and control for such pre-reform time-trends when we estimate the 
choice-effect of the reform. 
The second empirical challenge stems from the location of new schools, and the 
residential choice of parents, after the reform. Many new private schools opened up and 
their chosen locations are certainly not random. Some of them operate as for-profit 
schools and would base their location decision on expected profits. The many new 
private not-for-profit schools follow a social mission and would also not choose 
geographical location randomly. Ignoring such deliberate location choices in a 
regression analysis would lead to biased results, where the direction of the bias is 
uncertain. It could be positive if schools locate in areas where students perform well, 
e.g. in order to cream skim the best students, or to meet a demand for good schools in 
areas where parents and students are eager to learn and willing to invest time in actively 
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choosing a school. On the other hand, the bias could be negative if schools locate in 
areas where the educational quality was previously low. 
To deal with these problems, our main empirical strategy is to base our measures of 
choice and competition on the pre-reform location of schools and students. Since the 
school reform should have come as a surprise to the population, due to the tight race in 
the 1991 national election, we can consider them as pre-determined and thus not 
endogenously affected by the reform itself. Hence, for cohorts that chose a school after 
1991, we will approximate the amount of choice they faced by measuring the amount of 
schools they had nearby in 1991, just before the reform. For cohorts that chose school 
before the reform, we use students’ actual location of residence in the year they enter 7th 
grade, or, depending on data restrictions, the information that is closest to that year.75 
By measuring choice and competition via the pre-reform location of schools and 
students, we will measure the overall effect of the reform that goes through having more 
schools nearby at the beginning of the process. This effect will comprise all dynamic 
processes happening after the reform, such as new schools opening up or schools 
closing down. In later sections we will also examine how the school choice reform 
affected the number of public and private schools, that is how our pre-reform measures 
of school choice are related to school choice measured after the reform. We believe that 
our approach captures the policy-relevant parameter, particularly for a school reform 
that encourages and supports non-public schools, such that the exact placement of these 
schools is more market-driven and less centrally determined. (In many countries, 
Tiebout choice with only few private schools is still the status quo.)  
Our estimates of the school choice effects are to be interpreted relative to the Tiebout 
choice that already existed before the reform: Families had always been able to choose 
schools via changing their place of residence and moving into the catchment area of 
their preferred school. We imagine that Tiebout-type migration was more frequent in 
areas with many schools, where merely a short move was sufficient in order to switch 
                                                 
75 We have information on individuals’ residential coordinates starting from year 1985. However, when for example 
constructing a measure for choice on the grade level 1-3 for cohort 1972, we would need to know their coordinates in 
the year 1979. In cases like this, we use their coordinates in 1985 instead. For schools, we only have information on 
coordinates starting from 1988. Therefore, when merging the competition measure to individuals who started a 
certain grade level before 1988, we merge the school competition measure from 1988 instead. 
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catchment area. In addition to Tiebout choice, also another potential mechanism existed 
before the reform through which the number of schools might have affected student 
outcomes: Having had many schools nearby may have given parents the possibility to 
compare different schools and thus increase their ability to judge the quality of the 
school their children go to. This would have enabled them to complain and put pressure 
on the local education authorities to increase quality. Our estimates will thus reflect the 
additional effect due to being able to choose without moving homes. 
One can imagine that the new choice possibilities after the reform may reduce 
Tiebout-type choice as the reform weakened the link between location of residence and 
school of attendance. While we cannot thoroughly test that hypothesis, a descriptive 
analysis in Section 3.8.1.3 in the appendix, however, shows no evidence for it.76  
 
3.5.2 Measuring the degree of choice among schools 
The degree to which students can exercise school choice crucially depends on the 
availability of alternative schools in the vicinity of students’ homes. Thus, we measure 
the degree of school choice by exploring the distance between a student’s home and the 
schools a student could potentially choose from.77 Specifically, we count the number of 
schools within a given radius around a student’s home in order to measure her choice 
possibilities.78 As Sweden is a geographically diverse country with very rural but also 
urban areas, our preferred radius is the median commuting distance within each 
municipality in 1992.79 This radius takes different local settings into account in a very 
flexible way and, in our opinion, can be used to approximate the area within which 
parents might consider different schools for their children. The average median 
commuting distance across all municipalities is about 5km. In addition to this flexible 
                                                 
76 It can be added, however, that our graphs only show descriptive statistics starting from 1991. They do hence not 
rule out that Tiebout choice existed before then. If the degree of Tiebout choice, for some reason, was changing 
during the years before that, i.e. in the pre-reform period, then this could give rise to pre-reform trends in the 
outcomes and cause our placebo-test to fail. 
77 See Section 3.2.3 for details on which schools a child could in principle attend. 
78 See also Gibbons, Machin and Silva. (2008), Himmler (2009) and Noailly, Vujic and Aouragh (2009) for other 
studies using the distance between a student’s home and schools. 
79 We are grateful to John Östh for providing information on municipality commuting distances. The distances are 
measured “as the crow flies”, and do not take into account the directions of roads etcetera. 
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radius, we will also estimate the effects using a 2km radius as a test of the robustness of 
the results.80  
Another issue refers to the point in time in a child’s schooling career when one 
should measure the degree of available school choice. In the Swedish compulsory 
schooling system, it is common not only to choose a school when starting first grade, 
but to also potentially change school at the beginning of 7th, and sometimes also 4th, 
grade. For this reason, there are three points in time in the schooling career at which the 
degree of school choice might potentially be important. We found however, that these 
measures are very highly correlated, i.e. having more schools in the neighbourhood that 
offer grades 1-3 is highly correlated with also having more schools that offer grades 7-9. 
Because of the high correlations we were unable to include these different measures in 
the same regression. Hence, we will only include choice measured at one grade level at 
a time in the estimations, and following the previous Swedish studies, which all analyse 
choice and competition in grade 9, we focus on choice opportunities when choosing a 
school that offers grades 7-9. Note also that this is a point in a child’s educational career 
at which parents might pay special attention to choosing a school, as the marks at the 
end of 9th  grade are important for admission into high school. In our main specification, 
we thus measure among how many schools offering grades 7-9 a child may choose from 
at the age of 13, which is when children enter 7th grade, or, as explained in the last 
section, in 1991, if the child started seventh grade after the reform.81  
Table 14 shows descriptive statistics for our choice measures separately for affected 
and non-affected cohorts. The average number and the standard deviation of the 
distribution of schools offering grades 7-9 within median commuting distance around a 
student’s home are 3.45 and 4.66 for the non-affected cohorts82. With a mean of 5.91, 
students born after 1976 have on average more schools within their median commuting 
distance, measured at their place of residence in 1991 and taking into account schools 
existing in 1991. The reason for this increase is that our choice-measures are computed 
                                                 
80 We also explored several different other radii and obtained similar empirical results. 
81 We only have geographical information on schools starting from year 1988. Students born in the years 1972-1974, 
who should be matched to schools’ location in the years 1985-87, will be matched to schools’ location in the year 
1988 instead. 
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taking into account the 1994 law change (see Section 3.2.3) that enabled students to 
attend public schools also in other municipalities, something which was previously 
restricted to special cases or private schools. For the smaller radius of 2 km, this change 
has less impact, and the average number of schools within 2km around a student’s home 
only increases from 1.24 to 1.35 schools for affected versus non-affected cohorts.  
Another fact to note is that the median number of schools within 2 km from students’ 
homes is only one, meaning that for at least 50% of the sample, this measure implies no 
choice close to home. When using the radius that is endogenous to local circumstances, 
namely the median commuting distance, the median number of schools is two, thus 
already capturing some choice also for those in the lower part of the distribution. The 
measures will thus compare different groups of people and will have a different power 
in measuring choice in different regions.  
3.5.3 Estimation 
In a first step, we estimate the effect of choice on student outcomes separately for 
each cohort and graphically inspect whether we can see a pattern in how the effect 
evolves over time. This approach has the advantage of being very flexible in identifying 
how the effect changes over time but comes at the price of not using between-cohort 
variation to control for time-constant effects, which might help with the identification. 
In all estimations we use least squares for continuous outcome variables and probit 
estimation for binary outcome variables and report marginal effects in all tables. We 
allow for clustering of the error term on the school level83 as it is likely that error terms 
of students at the same school will not be independent. 
Our first analysis is used mainly to obtain a graphical representation of the 
correlation between choice and outcomes over time, shown in Figure 6. The following 
regression (10) is estimated separately for each cohort born in {1972,...,1990}: 
(10)    estimated separately for each cohorti i i municipality iY c X u         
                                                                                                                                               
82 The average median commuting distance over all municipalities is 5.8km, with a standard deviation of 4.2km, 
minimum of almost 1km and a maximum of 26km. 
83 Since we cannot link schools over time in our dataset, the clustering will not be on the school level over time but 
just within cohorts. 
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where ic  is the choice measure, iX  is a vector of control variables, municipality  are 
municipality fixed effects, and iu  is an error term. The list of control variables X is 
given below Table 16. Descriptive statistics on these variables are given in Table 15. 
In our main analysis we instead pool the observations from all cohorts and estimate 
the differential effect of choice before and after the reform. In principle, we could 
permit the effect of choice to vary from year to year, i.e. one cohort happened to be in 
grade five when the reform was enacted, the next cohort was in grade six etc. For 
statistical precision and also because choice is usually exercised only at grades 1, 4 or 7 
and only very rarely at grades 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 or 9, in our main specification we will 
however define treatment windows of three years length instead. Therefore, we define 
the five dummy variables: 
(11) 
1
2
3
4
5
1 1977 1978;
1 1979 1980 1981;
1 1982 1983 1984;
1 1985 1986 1987;
1 1988 1989 1990;
i
i
i
i
i
D if born in or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero




 otherwise
         
 
and note that all these treatment dummies are zero for the pre-reform cohorts.  
The choice of these windows is motivated by considering which cohorts are affected 
by school choice and competition at which stage in their educational career. Figure 5 
displays this, together with the different treatment groups 1D  to 5D  that we define. One 
can see that the first cohort to be possibly affected by competition at grade level 7–9 is 
the cohort born in 1977. They went to grade nine in the school year 1992/1993 and 
could therefore potentially have been affected from an increased competitive pressure. 
However, they are unlikely to change school one year before graduation and are 
therefore unlikely to benefit from choice. The first cohort of students to be really 
affected by choice is born in 1979, as they started grade 7 in fall 1992. Starting with this 
birth cohort, we could imagine measurable effects of choice on academic outcomes. We 
nevertheless place cohorts 1977 and 1978 into treatment group 1D since they are not a 
clean control group: Even though these two cohorts could not choose the school at 
which they started grade 7-9, they were still in grades 8-9 as the reform was enacted and 
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could thus potentially have been affected by increased competitive pressure. Only 
students born before 1977 were not affected at all by the reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using these treatment windows, we estimate 
(12) 1 2 3 4 51 2 3 4 5i i i i i i i i i i i i cohort municipality i iY D c D c D c D c D c c X u                     
where cohort  and municipality  are cohort and municipality fixed effects. We use OLS for 
continuous outcomes and Probit for binary outcomes, and cluster standard errors at the 
school level as before. 
The coefficient   measures the relationship between (Tiebout) school choice and 
outcomes for the pre-reform cohorts (we do not assume a causal interpretation for  ), 
whereas the   coefficients measure the differential effects of free choice after the 
reform, i.e. without the need to move residence. Including ic  in the regression nets out 
all effects our choice-measure might have had also on non-affected cohorts.  
In addition to allowing the effect of choice to differ for groups of cohorts after the 
reform, compared to a constant effect before the reform, as we do in Equation (12), we 
also run a specification that includes a parametric time trend in the effect of choice on 
student outcomes. The time trend is defined as it = year of birth – 1972. As shown in 
Equation (13), where the coefficients t  and t  refer to the time trends, we allow the 
year of birth 
1973               1977     1979            1982           1985           1988 
start grade 7 after reform 
start grade 4 after reform
start grade 1 after reform 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D
5
Figure 5: Treated cohorts 
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effect of choice to exhibit a linear time trend both before the reform (captured by the 
term t i ic t   ) and, with a different slope in each treatment window group, after the 
reform. With this specification, we can test whether the effect of having many schools 
nearby already changed over time before the reform and can control for such a pre-
reform trend. In this case, t  would be significantly different from zero. 
 
(13) 
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
i i i i i i i i i i i
t t t t t
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
t
i i i cohort municipality i i
Y D c D c D c D c D c
D c t D c t D c t D c t D c t
c c t X u
    
    
    
    
    
        
 
 
where it = year of birth – 1972 and coefficients 
t  and t  refer to the time trends. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.5.1, we will use students’ residential location and schools’ 
location from right before the reform, that is from year 1991, if the student started grade 
7 after the reform. This will exclude endogenous relocation with respect to the choice-
reform from the estimation. For the same reason, we will also measure all municipal- 
and parish-level covariates in 1991 if the choice for grade 7 was taken after 1991. For 
students who started grade 7 before the reform, we measure all variables at the time 
when they started grade 7 or, if we do not have data from that year, the most current 
information. 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Main specifications  
We start by analysing the effect of having more schools to choose from close to 
home by regressing different student outcomes on the number of schools within the 
median commuting distance of the home municipality for each cohort separately, in 
accordance with Equation (10).  
Figure 6 displays the estimation coefficient for the outcome percentile rank in GPA 
9, using the choice measure based on the number of schools offering grade 1–3 and 7–9, 
respectively. For the cohorts that were completely unaffected by the reform, that is 
those who left primary education before autumn 1992, having more schools close to 
their home has no significant effect on the percentile rank of their grade point average in 
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grade 9 (cohorts 1972-1976). This supports the hypothesis that having more schools 
nearby without being able to choose from them should not have any effect on student 
outcomes. For cohorts born after 1977, one can see a slight positive trend in the effect 
of choice, but this effect is statistically significant only for the youngest cohorts. 
Economically, the effect is very small, with an increase of 0.05-0.08 (0.02 to 0.05) 
percentile ranks in the GPA 9 for every additional school that offers classes on the level 
7-9 (1-3) within the median commuting distance of the municipality. 
Figure 6: Estimation coefficients of percentile rank in marks in grade 9 on choice 
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In order to quantify the difference between the importance of having more schools 
nearby for the GPA in grade 9 before and after the reform, and to test whether there is a 
statistically significant difference, Table 16 shows regression results from estimating 
Equation (12) for grade level 7-9. These estimates denote the overall effects of the 
choice reform that work through having more schools nearby at the place of residence 
right before the reform.  
Column 1 shows results from a specification where a constant treatment effect of the 
reform is assumed, that is we compare the average effect of having more schools nearby 
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for cohorts that left primary education before and after 1992. To that end, we interact 
the number of schools within the median commuting distance of the municipality, 
denoted “Choice” in the table, with a treatment window indicator that captures all 
cohorts that were potentially affected by the reform, i.e. all individuals born in or after 
1977. The resulting point estimate shows that having one more school within the 
median commuting distance increases the percentile rank in GPA of cohorts that are 
affected by the reform by 0.06. Taking into account the observed variation in the 
sample84, a one standard deviation increase in the choice measure, that is 9.35 more 
schools, leads to an increase in the percentile rank by about 0.56. The effect is thus very 
small. 
However, as the reform was enacted only gradually over time, allowing for a time-
varying effect is potentially important. The second column of Table 16 therefore shows 
results from estimating Equation (12), with treatment windows as specified in Equation 
system (11). The estimated effect of choice is not significantly different from zero for 
students born between and in the years 1977 and 1984, but is positive and significant for 
cohorts 1985–1990, which started first grade after the choice reform was enacted. 
Moreover, with an increase in the percentile rank of 0.13 for each additional school 
within the commuting distance, the effect is largest for the youngest cohorts. It is, 
however, not increasing in a linear way, which is why we prefer modelling the effect in 
the piecewise constant fashion rather than with a time trend. In terms of a standard 
deviation increase in the number of schools within the median commuting distance, the 
percentile rank in GPA increases on average by 1.2 for cohorts born between 1988 and 
1990, and by 0.7 for cohorts born between 1985 and 1987. Thus, the effect of having 
more schools nearby on the marks in 9th grade is modest also for these later cohorts. 
We now turn to analysing the effects of school choice on later outcomes in order to 
see whether the small effects on marks at the end of 9th grade fade out over time or 
transform into long-lasting effects on students’ adult outcomes. Table 1785 shows the 
corresponding results, again using the treatment window specification displayed in 
                                                 
84 We use the standard deviation for the post-reform cohorts here. 
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Equation (12). The table shows coefficients and clustered standard errors for the 
cognitive score, and marginal effects at the mean and corresponding standard errors for 
all other outcomes86.  
The point estimates for the effect of having more choice among schools on the 
cognitive score are very small for all cohorts and none of them is significantly different 
from zero. As mentioned before, although the draft is still mandatory, in practice it has 
become more voluntary over time, and among the younger cohorts, there is an 
increasing share of men who did not take the test, which raises issues of selection 
problems for this variable. Section 3.8.1.6 in the appendix shows that the selection into 
taking the test is slightly related to our choice measure, but the correlation is very small. 
Column three shows marginal effects at the mean for the probability of having a 
university degree at age 25. For the youngest cohorts, which is the only one for which 
we find a marginal effect that is significantly different from zero, we estimate an 
increase of 0.14 percentage points in the probability of having a university degree for 
each extra school within the commuting distance. This is again a very small effect. 
However, it shall be noted that the placebo-test for this outcome fails; students born in 
years 1975-1976 had a disadvantage from having more schools nearby, compared to 
those born between 1972-197487. This cannot be attributed to the reform as the reform 
had not been enacted yet while cohorts 1975-1976 where in compulsory education. 
Since this violates our identifying assumption, the marginal effects for this outcome 
cannot easily be interpreted, even though the negative placebo effect suggests that the 
found effect may be a lower bound. Also for the outcome “being employed at age 25”, 
the estimates indicate a placebo effect, although again very small. With a marginal 
effect of 0.12, it is positive and in the range of the marginal effects we find for the 
youngest cohorts; that is an increase in the probability of being employed by 0.07 
                                                                                                                                               
85 Column one repeats the results for the percentile rank in order to ease comparability. The military test score in 
column two is a continuous outcome that varies between one and nine. All other outcomes are binary and denote the 
probability of a certain outcome being true. 
86 See Table 30-Table 32 for coefficient estimates of the Probit models, and coefficients and marginal effects for the 
placebo-specifications and specifications allowing for a pre-reform trend. 
87 The estimated marginal effect for cohorts 1975-1976 is -0.12 percentage points for each additional school, so 
again, a very small effect. See Table 31 for detailed results. 
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percentage points. Even though the placebo test fails, we see that both estimates are 
very small, which indicates that there is no notable effect on employment at age 25. 
We find nearly zero effects for the probability of ever having been convicted for a 
criminal offence (largest estimate is -0.07 percentage points per extra school, see 
column five) or having serious health problems at age 22 (only significant above the 95 
per cent level for the youngest cohort, with a marginal effect of 0.026 percentage points 
per extra school, see column six).  
Summing up, our main results, using the number of schools within the median 
commuting distance of the home municipality in 1991, show that more choice leads to 
marginally higher grades at the end of 9th grade but does not seem to have affected our 
long-term outcomes in an economically significant way (keeping in mind the 
identification problems for some of the long-term outcomes).88 Although we cannot 
exclude possible grade inflation, additional empirical analysis suggests that it cannot be 
the main explanation.89 Hence, choice seems to have (very) small effects on grades, but 
these fade out as the children grow older. 
3.6.2 Alternative measure of choice opportunities 
Which radius to take into account, when assessing choice opportunities for students 
is, as previously discussed, not a priori obvious. This section presents how the 
magnitude of the results differs with respect to the chosen radius. 
 Using the median commuting distance of a municipality as the relevant choice area 
has the advantage of automatically adjusting the radius to the local situation, but it is 
less transparent and harder to understand than a fixed radius. As an alternative measure, 
we use a radius of 2 km which is easier to relate to and always within close reach of 
students’ home. The disadvantage of this constant radius is that it does not even 
comprise the nearest school for many children who live in rather rural areas and may 
                                                 
88 Additional empirical analysis suggests that the positive and small effects of the choice index on the short term 
outcomes are limited to more urban regions, and to municipalities that have been more active in promoting school 
choice. See Section 3.8.1.4 in the appendix for details. 
89 Available data on 9th grade standardised test scores in English, Swedish and Maths, taken in years 2005–2008, have 
enabled us to partially test for different degrees of grade inflation between high and low choice areas. The results 
reported in Section 3.8.1.5 in the appendix suggest that there is some grade inflation related to having more schools to 
choose from, but that its effect on our estimates is probably small. 
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therefore give a too crude picture of the degree of choice in these areas.90 At the same 
time, the 2 km radius might still be too large to distinguish between choice and no-
choice areas in larger cities. Nevertheless, it illustrates how the size of the estimated 
effect varies with the chosen measure91. 
Table 18 presents the results from this exercise, showing only the preferred 
specification that models the treatment effect as a piecewise constant function of cohorts 
of Equation (12)92. Starting with the effect on the percentile rank in GPA 9, the point 
estimate on having one more school to choose from within 2 km is now negative but 
insignificant, or marginally insignificant, for all cohorts that were already in compulsory 
school when the reform was enacted. For the youngest cohorts, i.e. those born between 
1988 and 1990, having one more school within a 2 km radius of their place of residence 
in 1991 significantly increases the percentile rank by 0.298. This effect is larger than the 
increase caused by an additional school in the median commuting distance. However, 
taking the observed variation into account, an increase in this choice measure by one 
standard deviation, that is 1.69 schools, amounts to a 0.5 percentile rank improvement 
in the GPA, i.e. rather close to what we find using the median commuting distance as 
radius.  
Turning to the effect on cognitive skills as measured by the military draft test score, 
we can see that one more school within 2 km distance raises the cognitive score by 
about 0.01 to 0.02 points for the younger cohorts. With a standard deviation in the 
outcome of 1.9, this amounts to a very small effect of 0.5-1% of a standard deviation. 
So again, even though we now find a significant effect, economically, the effect is 
small. The pattern is similar for the other outcomes: the point estimates are larger when 
using this measure, but economically, they are still small.  
As in Table 17, we find that for the outcomes “university degree at 25” and 
“employed at 25” there are some unresolved identification problems, as indicated by the 
                                                 
90 In terms of the exogenous pre-reform measures, 68% of the individuals in the sample have no or only one school 
offering grades 7-9 within 2 kilometres around their home. This share reduces to 45% when using the median 
commuting distance of the municipality instead. 
91 Results using a radius of 3km, 4km or 5km lie within the region spanned by results using 2 kilometres and the 
commuting distance (which is about 5km on average). 
92 See Table 33-Table 35 for coefficient estimates of the Probit models, and coefficients and marginal effects for the 
placebo-specifications and specifications allowing for a pre-reform trend. 
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significant placebo tests93, which is why the results for these variables shall be 
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, estimated marginal effects are below 0.6 
percentage points for each additional school within 2km for both outcomes, and thus, 
again, economically very small. We do not find any significant effects on the 
probability of having been convicted for a criminal offence until age 22 or having health 
problems at that age. 
Summing up, we find that, qualitatively, the results are robust to using a different 
radius to approximate the area in which parents may consider choosing schools. 
3.6.3 Disentangling the effects of choice and competition 
As discussed in Section 3.3, the school choice reform might have affected student 
outcomes through various channels. On the one hand, students have more choice, and 
on the other hand, schools may compete to attract students. In this section, we try to 
distinguish these two mechanisms – competition and choice – by adding a competition 
regressor to the estimations. 
In order to measure possible effects of competition, we calculate, for each school, the 
competitive pressure it experiences by taking into account the number of nearby schools 
as well as the size of their student bodies. The exact formula for the competition 
measure comp  of school j  is: 
(14) 
1 ,
1K
j k
k k j
comp size
dist
   , 
where Kk ,...,1  indexes potential competitors within a radius of 100 km, ,k jdist is 
the distance between school j and school k and ksize is the number of students visiting 
school k. We will also use alternative measures of competition where we simply count 
the number of schools within a certain distance around the school. As our analysis is on 
the individual and not on the school level, we assign each student the competition 
measure of the school she attends in 9th grade, or, for post-reform cohorts, of the closest 
                                                 
93 When estimating the probability of having received a university degree until the age of 25, we left out household 
income and its squared term to achieve convergence. The results are qualitatively the same when leaving the 
variables in and stopping the estimation after 25 iterations, and when comparing OLS results including the variables 
to those that do not. The only difference is that the placebo test for the outcome “university degree at age 25” is not 
 
80 3.6 Results 
school offering grades 7–9 measured in year 199194. We note that the appropriate 
geographical range for the definition of competition is clearly ambiguous since 
competitive pressure might be felt at different levels. At first sight, it appears that the 
headmaster should mostly be concerned about being compared to her immediate 
neighbours. In addition, though, there is a competition for good teachers, particularly 
when larger numbers of new private schools opened up who need to hire teachers. Yet, 
teacher labour markets certainly pass beyond the immediate vicinity. We therefore also 
examined various other definitions of competition in our robustness analyses. 
The measures for school competition and school choice are related but still have a 
number of distinct features. First, a student’s choice options are not directly influenced 
by the relative size of the schools she might attend, while the competitive pressure a 
school (director) faces from a neighbouring school is strongly influenced by the 
capacity of the competing school to take up a significant share of its own students. 
Second, only schools that offer the grade level a student plans to attend in the following 
school year are relevant for her choice, while schools will also feel competitive pressure 
from schools that offer other common grade levels. Nevertheless, the measures for 
school competition and school choice capture similar phenomena and are therefore 
highly correlated.95Since it is not obvious which is the appropriate radius for measuring 
choice and competition, we will present results for different definitions of choice and 
competition in order to gauge the sensitivity of the results.96 Table 20 shows the effect 
of choice and competition at grade level 7-9 on the percentile rank in GPA in grade 9 
for different combinations of our choice and competition measures, when including 
both measures in the regression. The first two rows of the table display which measure 
was used for choice and which one for competition. In column one, choice is defined as 
the number of schools within the median commuting distance and competition as the 
                                                                                                                                               
significant when excluding household income and its squared term. We are therefore careful in our interpretation of 
these results. 
94 The mean and standard deviation for this measure for cohorts that were not affected by the reform are 7.13 and 
11.24 respectively. For affected cohorts, i.e. those born between 1977 and 1990, the mean is 14.6 and the standard 
deviation 17.44, and thus a lot higher than for pre-reform cohorts. This difference is however mostly explained by the 
1994 law changed that allowed to choose also among public schools in municipalities other than the one of residence,  
95See Table 19. 
96 It should also be kept in mind that assigning a competition measure to a student is less accurate than assigning a 
choice measure as we cannot use the actual school the student went to for affected cohorts. 
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number of schools within a 100km radius, weighted by their distance and student body 
size (see Equation (14) for the mathematical formula). Columns two to five show the 
results for all combinations of choice and competition measures that count the number 
of schools within a 2km and the median commuting distance radius97.  
The overall pattern that emerges from this exercise is that the positive but small 
effect of choice that was found in the baseline analysis is in most specifications robust 
to adding our measures of competition. The size of the choice effects is fairly similar to 
the baseline result: whereas they vary between the specifications in the table, they are 
always small, and are often positive and statistically significant. 
On the contrary, the effect of the nearest school facing a lot of competitive pressure 
is negative and significant for the older cohorts. However, it gets more positive for the 
youngest cohorts and, depending on the choice measure used, even reaches positive 
significance for the youngest cohorts. Again, all effects are economically small. One 
interpretation of these results is that the competitive pressure might at first have shaken 
up the system and caused disruptions98, resulting in a lower school quality, but that this 
effect faded out as schools learned to adjust to the new situation. However, as the results 
on the competition effect depend on the combination of choice and competition 
measures included in the estimation, and as both measures are highly correlated, it 
seems difficult to reliably separate between the two effects. 
3.6.4 Effects of time-varying post-reform measures of choice 
In our empirical analysis so far, we examined the impacts of choice and competition 
based on the pre-determined location of schools and individuals since these were 
plausibly not affected by the choice reform.  
It is likely that the reform itself started an endogenous process of school 
development, where some schools, particularly non-public schools, started up, and 
others were closed. This process may also have affected families’ choices of where to 
live. In order to shed light on these processes, we will study the relation between the 
pre-determined and the actual availability of schools in this section. Moreover, we will 
                                                 
97 We do not show the combination: choice 2km with competition 100km since the geographical reach of these 
measures is too different. 
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re-run the baseline regression equation using the actual locations of residence and 
schools to measure choice and competition instead of the pre-reform measures. This 
allows us to specifically take into account choice opportunities among public and 
private schools separately. Even though these results will be only suggestive due to the 
endogenous location choices, they are still interesting since we can already control for 
many individual- and region-level covariates.  
We will label definitions of choice based on the location of schools and individuals 
before the reform as pre-reform measures, whereas the post-reform measures (also 
called actual measures in the below sections) will refer to the location at the time when 
a student potentially chooses school, i.e. when starting grade 7, in our analysis. For 
example, for students entering first grade in 1995, the post-reform measure will be 
calculated based on the locations in 1995, for those entering in 1996, the locations in 
1996 will be used, etcetera.  
3.6.4.1 Number of schools before and after the reform 
We start by exploring how the pre-reform and post-reform choice measures differ. 
The aim is to achieve a better understanding of how the pre-reform situation is related to 
the choice situation that evolves after the reform. Specifically, we will test if the change 
over time in the number of available schools as measured by our choice-index is 
correlated with the choice-index at the time the reform was implemented.  
In order to do so, we take the difference between the post-reform and the pre-reform 
choice measures, and regress this difference on the pre-reform choice measure and on a 
linear trend that is interacted with the pre-reform choice measure.99 This specification 
will show how the change in the number of available schools over time is correlated 
with the initial choice situation that a student faced in 1991. In a second specification, 
we add all control variables used in the main estimations and, additionally, the parish-
average 9th grade percentile rank of cohort 1972, i.e. of the first cohort for which we 
have information on educational outcomes and who finished 9th grade in 1988, four 
                                                                                                                                               
98 See Waslander, Pater and van der Weide (2010) for a related case study on Stockholm. 
99 The estimations include only data on individuals that started grade seven in or after the year 1992, i.e. birth cohorts 
1979-1990, as these are the ones for which we use the pre-reform measures in the main estimations. 
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years before the choice reform.100 The idea of controlling for the latter variable is to 
explore whether the difference in the number of schools is correlated with previous 
educational outcomes. Keeping the notation used in Section 3.5, the estimation equation 
for the second specification, including all covariates, reads as follows: 
(15) post reform pre reform pre reform pre reformi i i i i cohort municipality i ic c c c t X u                   
 
where it = year of birth – 1972.  
Table 21 shows the results of the estimations. We focus on the choice measure 
“number of schools within median commuting distance” and run separate regressions 
looking at all schools, only public schools, and only private schools, respectively.101 
Note that the difference between the pre- and post-reform measures is due both to 
schools opening up and closing down, and to students moving. For the private schools, 
the difference between the pre-reform and the post-reform measure reflects the growth 
of the private school sector after the reform as there were almost no private schools in 
Sweden before the reform. 
The upper panel of Table 21 shows the coefficients on the pre-reform choice measure 
and its interaction with a trend. The resulting marginal effects for each treatment 
window cohort group are displayed in the lower panel. Note that these are averages of 
the cohort-specific marginal effects of all cohorts in the respective treatment window. A 
cohort-specific marginal effect is computed by adding the base coefficient to the 
product of the interaction coefficient and the value of the trend variable for the specific 
cohort. Columns two, four and six include additional covariates. 
Focusing first on the marginal effects when no additional covariates are included, 
that is columns one, three and five in the lower panel, we see that having more schools 
around before the reform is associated with a more positive difference between the 
actual and the pre-reform number of overall, public and private schools for all cohorts 
except for those in the first treatment window, cohorts 1979–1981. This holds both 
when we pool the public and private schools, and when we run separate regressions. 
                                                 
100 As in the previous estimations, all control variables are again based on the pre-reform location of residence. 
101 Note that we always use the median commuting distance before the reform, i.e. the range of the geographical area 
considered is not permitted to be endogenously changed by the reform. 
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However, controlling for all covariates and municipality and cohort fixed effects that 
are also included in the main estimation, we estimate negative marginal effects for all 
but the youngest three cohorts when we use only the public schools. The estimates on 
the increase in private schools are mostly unchanged, resulting in somewhat lower 
correlations between the pre-reform and actual measure when we pool both types of 
schools. 
Since these effects are a combination of schools opening and closing, and families 
moving homes, it is hard to interpret this in terms of school openings only, especially 
for the public schools102. However, an important fact to note for the interpretation of our 
results is that the pre-reform measures of choice and competition are positively 
correlated with their post-reform counterparts in levels, and that having a higher pre-
reform choice measure is positively related to the increase in the number of available 
private schools. This means that our pre-reform measure also captures the opening up of 
private schools after the reform, and that this dynamic process is thus included in our 
estimated effects.  
Table 21 also reports the effect of the parish level average of the percentile rank in 
9th grade GPA of students born in 1972 (that is the class finishing 9th grade in 1988) on 
the difference between pre- and post-reform choice measures (see the upper panel). It is 
always negative, though very small and mostly statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that, conditional on parental and parish level characteristics such as income and 
education, on average private schools do not seem to sort into areas based on student 
grades.103  
                                                 
102 To illustrate this, imagine for example a student who will start 7th grade in the year 2000. In 1991, when we 
measure the pre-reform choice value, her parents might not have thought much about schooling yet, and may thus 
live in a region that has relatively few schools. By 2000, they may have moved to a region that allows their child to 
attend a school nearby. So we see an increase between the post- and the pre-reform measure. Another family in the 
same situation may be living in an area with many schools since long, so once their child starts school they do not 
need to move, and the difference between their pre-reform measure and the actual measure is zero if no school has 
opened up or closed. So without any new schools opening up, we see that the difference between the actual measure 
and the pre-reform measure is negatively related to having many schools nearby before the reform. The second 
mechanism is the opening up of new schools. Ignoring any moves by families, having more schools nearby before the 
reform may mean that fewer schools open up in the same area after the reform, and there may even be more potential 
for schools closing down. Again, this results in a negative correlation between the difference in the actual and the pre-
reform choice measure and the number of schools nearby before the reform. 
103 Under the assumption that student grades are a valid indicator of ability, this can be generalised to indicating that 
the choice of location of private schools is not endogenous with respect to student ability. 
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3.6.4.2 Effects of choice when using the actual choice opportunities at 7th grade 
The previous section indicated that, as expected, the choice-index changes somewhat 
over time. In this section we therefore show the results of our main regression 
specification when we, instead of using the pre-reform measures, use the actual 
measures of choice (that is, measured at the time a student starts grade 7). There are a 
few issues that are worth discussing before we turn to the results. Using the actual 
measures instead of the pre-reform counterparts means making a different set of 
assumptions and also gives estimates that have a different interpretation.  
First, under the assumption that schools opened up randomly and parents did not 
move in reaction to the reform, using the actual choice-measure would estimate the pure 
effect of having more schools to choose from when entering grade 7. This is a different 
effect from the one we estimate when we use the pre-reform measures, which includes 
all dynamic processes (including subsequent changes in the number of schools and 
residential location) associated with having many schools nearby at the time of the 
implementation of the reform104. 
Second, however, as discussed in Section 3.5.1, there are reasons to believe that 
those assumptions, i.e. that schools opened up randomly and parents did not move in 
reaction to the reform, might not hold105. By including our extensive set of control 
variables on regional and individual characteristics we may be able to reduce this 
endogeneity problem to some extent, but we cannot be certain that it is fully eliminated.  
Keeping this in mind, it is still interesting to analyse the association between the 
number of public and private schools nearby and student outcomes at the time when a 
choice is made. The first column of Table 22 presents the effect of the actual number of 
schools in the median commuting distance near a student’s home offering grades 7-9 on 
                                                 
104 Another caveat is that, when we measure the number of schools contemporaneously, we do not know at which 
point we are in the equilibrium process of schools opening up and closing in response to parental/student demand. It 
could for example be that having more schools nearby in period t leads to the bad schools closing down or being 
overtaken in period t+1, which leads to having only few schools nearby in period t+2. If the market worked perfectly, 
the schools remaining would be the very good schools, which would lead us to observe a positive association between 
few schools (low measures of choice) and good outcomes. A low choice index in t+2 could hence actually be the 
result of a highly competitive process. Thus, estimating the effect of more choice and competition in a dynamically 
evolving environment poses identification problems of a new nature. 
105 For example, schools that work for profit will probably have chosen the location of business such as to maximise 
profits, and parents who are concerned about their children’s outcomes are more likely to move to areas that will 
increase the chances of educational success. 
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the percentile rank in GPA 9 (estimated according to Equation (12)). Rather 
surprisingly, we see that having more schools nearby at the time of making a decision 
has no significant positive effect for most cohorts, but even a small negative one for 
birth cohorts 1982-1984. Column three shows that using the number of schools within 
2km as a choice measure leads to similar conclusions. 
In order to obtain a better understanding of this result, we calculated the choice 
measures for public and private schools separately. Column two and four show results 
from estimations including these two measures and their interaction terms with 
treatment window dummies. For the radius “median commuting distance”, the 
coefficients on the effect of having more public schools to choose from are always small 
and negative but only statistically significant at the 90% level for cohorts 1982-1984. 
However, using a 2km radius instead, we find small but significant negative effects of 
having more public schools nearby on the percentile rank in marks. At the same time, 
the point estimates on the number of private schools are mostly positive but again very 
small, economically zero, and almost never statistically significant.  
Table 23 shows the results for the outcome “cognitive skills at age 18” which is 
estimated for men only. Also in this case the specifications using the choice measure 
based on the median commuting distance yields very small, basically zero, marginal 
effects. Using instead the 2km-choice radius yields somewhat larger effects, which are 
negative for the private but positive for the public schools.  
In sum, controlling for our broad set of individual and region level covariates, we 
only find small and often insignificant associations between school choice at the time 
the individuals make their choice, both concerning public and private schools, and 
student outcomes.  
3.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyse the effects of choice and competition caused by the 
introduction of the Swedish school choice reform in 1992. We find that more school 
choice, measured by having more schools nearby right before the reform, has small 
positive effects on marks at the end of compulsory schooling, and, depending on the 
choice measure used, very small effects on cognitive skills at age 18. We also analyse 
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longer term outcomes such as university education, employment, criminal activity and 
health, and sometimes find small, but no economically relevant positive effects in these 
dimensions. Additional analyses to disentangle the effects of choice and competition 
suggest that competition, as opposed to choice, may have had small negative effects on 
marks right after the introduction of the reform, though these mostly fade out over time 
and are no longer present for the youngest cohorts in our sample. Even though we use 
different methods and identify a slightly different effect than previous studies on the 
Swedish choice reform, we come to a similar conclusion, namely that the choice 
reforms did not lead to large changes in average student outcomes, especially in the 
long run. 
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3.8 Appendix 
3.8.1 Additional information and analyses 
This section presents more detailed information on the Swedish school choice, other 
education-related reforms and additional analyses. 
3.8.1.1 School choice in practice 
For our study, it is important to know to what extent the reforms actually affected 
school choice as perceived by parents and students. This section aims to shed light on 
this issue. 
The school choice reforms implemented in the early 1990s give quite some leeway 
for interpretation for the municipalities, which are in charge of providing compulsory 
schooling. Sweden’s 290 municipalities vary a lot in size, from the small rural 
municipalities with a few thousand inhabitants and few schools, to the large densely 
populated urban municipalities with several hundred thousand inhabitants and many 
schools. It is hence likely that the practical implementation of the reforms differed 
between municipalities. 
While information on the share of students opting for private schools is readily 
available, there exists relatively little information on the amount of active school choice 
taking place between public schools, especially for the early years after the reforms. 
Two surveys from the National Board of Education however provide information on the 
situation during school years 1994/95 and 2000/01.106 
The 1994/95 survey, which contains information from the local authorities in ten 
large and predominantly urban municipalities107, reports that seven per cent of the 
students switched to another school than the one they were assigned to before the start 
of the school year 1994/95. Out of these seven per cent, two per cent switched to a 
private school and five per cent to a public school, and most of the changes took place 
                                                 
106 See The National Board of Education 1996 and 2003. 
107 The surveyed municipalities are: Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö, Uppsala, Linköping, Helsingborg, Södertälje, 
Botkyrka, Täby and Östersund. The study also contains case studies of 38 schools, out of which eight were private 
schools, in 12 municipalities. 
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between grade 3-4 and grade 6-7. In the country as a whole, only 1.5 per cent of 
students chose another public school than the nearest one, while 1.8 per cent of all 
students attended private schools.108 It hence seems that by the mid-nineties, a fairly 
small share of students chose another school than the one assigned. 
By 2000/01, making an active school choice had become much more common. The 
report by the National Board of Education contains information from a survey to parents 
in six large urban municipalities where the scope for choice is deemed to be large109, 
and in a set of smaller and more rural municipalities.110 In the survey, 67 per cent of 
parents in the “high-choice municipalities” and 34 per cent of parents in the “low-choice 
municipalities” state that they have made an active school choice. About two thirds of 
these, for both sets of municipalities, were, however, choices to the nearest public 
school, to which the student was assigned anyway. For the remaining third of those who 
had made an active choice, again for both sets of municipalities, choosing another 
public school than the nearest one was a bit more common than choosing a private 
school. A small share of parents, 1–3 per cent, furthermore states that they made an 
active choice, but that they were not accepted due to lack of slots. It hence seems that 
the preferences of parents could be satisfied in the majority of cases. These figures 
suggest that by 2001, school choice was relatively common, but that there were large 
differences between municipalities.111 
The 2003 report also collected information from the local authorities in all 
municipalities and town districts.112 According to the estimates of the local authorities, 
reported by the survey, in school year 2000/01, almost a quarter of all students lived in 
municipalities and town districts where five per cent or more students attend another 
public school than the one in their catchment area, and five per cent of students lived in 
                                                 
108 See p. 57 The National Board of Education (1996) for public schools, and, for private schools, the website of The 
National Board of Education: Table 1.1.A on http://www.skolverket.se/statistik_och_analys/. 
109 These municipalities are large and urban, and were also covered in the 1996 report, see The National Board of 
Education (1996). 
110 The high-choice municipalities” are: Botkyrka, Stockholm, Södertälje, Uppsala, Helsingborg and Västerås. The 
survey info for the ”low-choice municipalities” was gathered for a large set of municipalities – and they are not 
reported by name in the report. 
111 Source: The National Board of Education (2003), pp. 48f. 
112 The larger municipalities are in general divided into town districts, which are responsible for some of the 
operations of the public sector. 
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municipalities and town districts where this share was 15 per cent or higher.113 
Regarding the private schools, the National Board of Education (2005) reports that the 
number of private compulsory schools nationwide grew from a bit over 200 in 1995 to 
over 500 in 2005. In 2002 the municipality-wise share of students that attended a private 
school was on average 5 per cent, and was considerably higher, 12 per cent, among the 
large cities.114 
The 2003 survey from the National Board of Education also suggests that, by 
2000/01, a bit less than 30 per cent of all municipalities and town districts115, 
predominantly in urban areas, have a policy to encourage parents/students to make an 
active school choice, and almost 40 per cent provide parents/students with 
comprehensive information about the schools available in the municipality. About a 
quarter of the municipalities and town districts state that they provide school transport 
also to other schools than the nearest one.  
 About half of the parents in the 2003-survey also report that they had enough 
knowledge to make a well-informed choice. 
We conclude that school choice has become increasingly common during the almost 20 
years that have passed since the choice-reforms of the early 90s, and parents/students 
choose both to attend another public school than the nearest one and to attend private 
schools. 
3.8.1.2 Other education-related reforms 
The school choice reforms in the early 1990s were not the only education-related 
changes taking place in the 1990s, but they were part of a broad decentralisation and 
choice-enhancing trend in the organisation of the educational sector, as well as in the 
public sector in general. This section gives an overview of the other reforms that took 
place in the 1990s. This is useful both in order to provide a deeper understanding for the 
                                                 
113 These figures were calculated using the raw data from the survey to the local authorities, which we were 
generously given access to from the National Board of Education. See also Table 3.8, The National Board of 
Education (2003) 
114 See the National Board of Education website for education statistics http://www.jmftal.artisan.se. 
115 The survey was directed to officials of the municipalities, or, in the case of larger municipalities which are divided 
into town districts, officials of the town districts. 
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environment in which the school choice reforms took place, and in order to discuss 
other changes that took place in relation to our evaluation method. 
One of the major education-related reforms of the 1990s, apart from the choice-
reforms, was the 1991 decentralisation of the Swedish compulsory school system.116 
The reform changed the role of the central government from providing detailed 
regulation for the municipalities and schools to follow, to specifying broad goals on 
what the students should know at each completed level of education but by large 
leaving it to the schools and municipalities to decide how to achieve these goals. The 
evaluation of whether the schools meet the goals specified in the Law and National 
curriculum was, until the establishment of the Swedish Schools Inspectorate in 2008, by 
large left to the schools themselves.117 118 
After the reform, municipalities and the individual schools were thus given 
considerable freedom to design the education, as long as they follow the basic 
curriculum.119 The reform also made teachers and headmasters, previously state-
employed, employees of the municipalities.120 
Another part of the decentralisation trend of the early 90s was the replacement of the 
previously earmarked central government grants121 with a system of general grants in 
1991. At first, the grants were sector-specific, but in 1993, the grants were made 
completely general. Through the reform, the local politicians were hence given more 
decision power over the use of central government grants, both in terms of how much to 
allocate to education per se and how much to allocate to different education-related 
items. 
                                                 
116 See Proposition 1990/91:18, SOU (2008) (p. 49f), and von Greiff (2009). 
117 National standardised grade 9 tests were in addition made mandatory in 2003, and in 2009 for grades 3 and 5. 
Previously, standardised tests were available but were up to the schools to use or not. 
118 See Proposition 2008/09:87, SOU (2007a), SOU (2007b), and Björklund et al (2004). 
119 The school law (1985:1100) names the overall goals for the education system, as well as overall guidelines for the 
overall design of the education. It specifies the minimum requirements that the schools need to fulfil, such as how 
much time should be devoted to each subject. 
120 At first, teacher pay negotiations remained centralised, but in 1995, the responsibility for the negotiations was 
transferred to the school level, and many schools adopted partly individualised wage schemes (Björklund, Clark, 
Edin, Fredriksson and Krueger (2005)). 
121 Until 1991, central government grants were earmarked for specific educational expenses. These grants were to 
cover for expenses that were directly related to actual teaching, with teacher salaries being the largest post. According 
to von Greiff (2009), the system for the allocation of the central government grants was very complex and non-
transparent. The municipalities were responsible for financing, through income tax revenues, facilities, school food, 
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In addition to the reforms described above, there are a couple of changes in the 
economic regulations for municipalities that took place during the 90s merit 
mentioning. First, during 1991–1994, municipalities were prevented from raising the 
local income tax, which constitutes their main source of income. Second, the rules for 
municipal budget balance have changed over time; the requirement for local budget 
discipline was relaxed in 1992 in order to become stricter again in 1997.122 
We can conclude that there is a set of other reforms that are related to the education 
sector during the period under study. In which sense are they relevant for our study? 
First, the decentralisation reforms gave the municipalities more say in how to 
organise compulsory education and how to allocate resources, while the tax rate cap and 
the stricter budget discipline are likely to have contributed to making the local education 
budget more sensitive to the local economic development. One can suspect that this 
may have given rise to larger variation in the education policy between the 
municipalities, but there is little guidance available from previous studies on whether 
this actually happened.123 Second, the decentralisation reforms mean that schools have 
more freedom to choose pedagogical style and curriculum, and potentially also over the 
local budget process.124  
3.8.1.3 Moving patterns 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the municipality average for the share of households that 
moved during the year, separately for households in which the oldest child was aged 0–
3, 4–6 etcetera, and in which there were no children aged 0–17125. Moving is defined as 
either moving into the municipality or moving between parishes within the 
                                                                                                                                               
school transport, school medical care and teaching material. In addition, they were free to add to the central 
government transfers for all posts except for the teacher salaries. 
122 In 1992, the previous requirement of yearly balanced municipal budgets was changed to a more general statement 
that the local economy should follow “good economic housekeeping” (the Swedish term is: “god ekonomisk 
hushållning”). In 1997, the municipality law again was made stricter, stating that at the latest in 2000 all 
municipalities should follow a balanced budget over a 3-year period. 
123 In fact, the only evaluation study that we are aware of, Ahlin and Mörk (2008), find some evidence of a less 
disperse distribution of education resources (measured as per student costs and teacher density) between 
municipalities after the decentralisation reform, and find no correlation between the municipal tax base and per 
student school resources (excluding costs for facilities), neither before nor after the reforms. 
124 See p. 21 in The National Board of Education (2009). 
125 This analysis was conducted on data that was generously made available from the Institute for Labour Market 
Policy Evaluation (IFAU). These data contain indicators for number of children living in the household, in the age 
spans 0–3, 4–6, 7–10, 11–15 and 16–17. 
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municipality. If Tiebout migration (in terms of moving in order to get into a good 
school) was affected by the school choice reform, we would expect to see a different 
moving pattern after the reform for households with school aged children, and probably 
especially so for households in which the oldest child is about to enter school. 
Unfortunately, we can only observe the migration patterns for households with and 
without children starting from year 1991, that is only one year before the reform, which 
is why it is hard to draw too much on the pre-reform moving patterns from the figures. 
Still, if Tiebout migration changes in response to the reform, it is likely that the moving 
pattern changes gradually as there is evidence that the impact of the reform was also 
gradual (see Section 3.6.1). Section 3.8.1.4 also suggests that school choice is more 
common in more urban, more densely populated, areas. We therefore show the moving 
patterns separately for urban and small/rural municipalities. While the share that move 
varies a bit over time, there is no clear indication in that the households for whom 
Tiebout migration can be expected to be relevant, i.e. those with children who are just 
about to start school (i.e. children aged 4–6), or children who have just started school 
(children aged 7–10) have changed their moving pattern after the choice reform. The 
figures neither suggest that households with school-aged children in urban 
municipalities have become relatively less likely to move, compared to the small and 
rural municipalities, which would be expected if Tiebout migration decreased as a result 
of increased options to choose school without moving. 
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Figure 7: Share moving to the municipality or between parishes within the municipality, 
average for urban municipalities, for households with the oldest child in different age 
spans 
 
 
Figure 8: Share moving to the municipality or between parishes within the municipality, 
average for smaller/rural municipalities, for households with the oldest child in different 
age spans 
 
 
 
3.8.1.4 Heterogeneity of effects with respect to region 
The analyses in Section 3.6 explored the average effect of choice and competition 
introduced by the choice reform. However, it is possible that different types of 
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municipalities have had different policies on school choice, which means that the effects 
may vary across municipalities. In order to address this issue, in this section, we re-
estimate our specifications for 9th grade GPA and military draft test score, when we 
divide municipalities along the following two dimensions. 
First, we analyse the effects separately for individuals living in urban and non-urban 
municipalities before the reform126. The reason for this division is that school choice is 
likely to be more of an urban phenomenon due to, for example, the higher population 
density and easier transportation in urban areas. 
Second, even for municipalities in the more urban areas, the impact of the school 
choice reform is likely to differ due to differences in local policy. In order to take this 
into account, we focus on the municipalities in the county of Stockholm and divide 
them into municipalities that were early or late adopters of school choice, in terms of 
actively facilitating and encouraging residents to make active school choices.127 The 
early adopters consist of those that actively encouraged school choice in the early or 
mid 1990s, for example through providing information on schools and how to make a 
choice in practice, or by having clear student-based systems for allocating resources 
between schools, whereas the late adopters are those where school choice became more 
of an issue later on in the 2000s.  
Table 24 and Table 25 present separate estimations for the two groups of urban and 
non-urban municipalities, and Table 26 and Table 27 show the corresponding for the 
two groups of early and late school choice adopters within Stockholm county. 
                                                 
126 The classification of municipalities as urban and rural follows the classification of the Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities, see http://www.skl.se/kommuner_och_landsting/om_kommuner/kommungruppsindelning. This 
divides municipalities into nine categories (metropolitan, suburban, large cities, commuter, sparsely populated, 
manufacturing, and other – divided into population >25,000, 12,500-25,000 and <12,500) on the basis of structural 
parameters such as population, commuting patterns and economic structure as of Jan 1 2005. We classify a 
municipality as urban if it is thus defined as a city, suburb or “large town”. This results in 68 municipalities being 
labelled as urban. 
127 In order to make this division of the sample, we contacted the municipalities in the county of Stockholm and asked 
them if they have a policy to actively facilitate and encourage residents to make an active school choice, and if so, 
when this policy was implemented. It shall be noted that, even though school choice is today a normal phenomenon 
in these urban municipalities, it was often not easy to find out exactly when it became common practice. The 
information gathered is therefore often not very detailed. In addition, we failed to receive answers from 11 out of 26 
municipalities, although most of the non-respondents were the smaller municipalities in the county. The respondents 
were the following municipalities: Danderyd, Tyresö, Sollentuna, Haninge, Nacka, Norrtälje, Vallentuna, Upplands-
Bro, Stockholm, Upplands-Väsby, Huddinge, Salem, Ekerö, Botkyrka and Täby. The non-respondents were: Lidingö, 
Solna, Sundbyberg, Södertälje, Järfälla, Österåker, Värmdö, Nykvarn, Vaxholm, Sigtuna and Nynäshamn. The 
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Focusing first on the division of municipalities into urban and non-urban, the overall 
pattern in Table 24 and Table 25 is that school choice is related to more positive 
outcomes in the urban municipalities, while there is some indication of a negative 
relation for the non-urban municipalities. Specifically, the regressions on 9th grade GPA 
(Table 24, Columns 3 and 5) yield positive and statistically significant estimates for the 
treated cohorts in the urban municipalities, which are similar to the estimates from the 
pooled baseline specification (see first Columns in Table 17 and Table 18). In contrast, 
the estimation including only non-urban municipalities yields non-significant effects 
when the median commuting distance is used, see Column 2, although the empirical 
identification is problematic for this outcome128, and negative effects when we use the 
choice-measure based on the 2-km radius (Table 24, Column 4). With around -0.4 to -
0.5 percentile ranks per additional school, the effect is however small, especially when 
taking into account that the standard deviation of this choice measure in non-urban areas 
is only 0.85. We conclude that the positive, albeit small, estimated effect of school 
choice seems to be limited to the urban municipalities, and that there is some, although 
weak, evidence of negative effects in the non-urban municipalities.  
The estimates for the outcome cognitive skills from the military draft test scores in 
Table 25 show, similarly to the main estimations, little evidence of any significant effect 
when using the median commuting distance as radius (Columns 1-2), while the radius 2 
km yields small positive effects of more choice in both urban and non-urban 
municipalities, although the estimates are almost only significant for the former. 
                                                                                                                                               
following of these were classified as being early adopters of school choice: Tyresö, Stockholm, Vallentuna, Nacka, 
Danderyd, Täby and Upplands-Bro. 
128 Note that the result in Column 1 suggests statistically significant estimates for the youngest cohorts and those born 
between 1982 and 1984. However, we also find a significantly negative placebo effect of -0.251 percentile ranks, 
implying that the negative effects were not necessarily caused by the reform but already there before it was enacted. 
When we include a pre-reform trend and interact all our treatment windows with the trend (Equation (13)), this 
placebo-test is no longer significant, though the pre-reform trend also is not. In this specification, shown in the second 
column, the standard errors are much larger and the point estimates are now positive and no longer significantly 
different from zero. However, since the pre-reform trend that is estimated on cohorts 1972-1976 is being extrapolated 
to form a control group as far as 14 years into the future, this specification is very sensitive to the estimated trend. 
Since the pre-reform trend is not even statistically significant from zero, one should be very cautious in interpreting 
this result. 
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Turning to the division between early and late adopters among the municipalities in 
Stockholm county129, Table 26 shows that, when we use the choice measure based on 
median commuting distance (Columns 1–2), students living in the early-choice-
adopting municipalities seem to have benefited slightly more in terms of receiving 
higher grades, while students in the late choice-municipalities sometimes even have a 
negative effect of having more schools nearby. However, this effect disappears when 
looking at the measure using a 2km radius: In Columns 3–4, we see that students in both 
municipalities seem to have benefited from having more schools nearby, even though 
the standard errors are a bit larger in the smaller sample living in the “late-adopting” 
municipalities, thus causing the marginal effects to be less often statistically significant. 
Table 27 presents results for the outcome cognitive skills. They indicate some 
significantly negative effects of having more schools nearby in the “late-adopting” 
municipalities, when we use the larger radius “commuting distance”. However, the 
negative effects and the differences between the two groups vanish when using the 2km 
radius. 
Summarising, we find that having more schools nearby right after the reform seems 
to have had more positive effects on marks and cognitive skills of students living in 
urban areas at that time, even though the size of the effect is still small. Looking at 
Stockholm county only, differences only show up when using the radius “commuting 
distance” to measure choice but mostly vanish when using the 2km-radius. 
 
3.8.1.5 Grade inflation 
It is a major concern that grades have been inflated since competition between 
schools has increased. If parents care about grades, schools have an incentive to give 
slightly better grades in order to attract more students. The grade point average at the 
end of 9th grade determines admission into upper secondary schools in Sweden and will 
thus be an important and observable scholastic output for parents. In addition, 
standardised national tests, which can be used by teachers as a check for the grade 
                                                 
129 Naturally, the sample for this analysis is restricted to students living in municipalities that provided information in 
our survey, in 1991 or the year they make the decision to start 7th grade, if that was before 1991, respectively. 
98 3.8 Appendix 
levels, were not mandatory for schools to use during most of the years we study. The 
schools’ need to be attractive for students should be larger in areas with a lot of 
competition, such that any potential positive effects of more competition on marks 
cannot easily be disentangled from grade inflation. 
How serious is this concern in the Swedish case? Wikström and Wikström (2005), 
who compare the final grades from upper secondary school in 1997 to the SweSAT 
national test scores, find no evidence that competition from private schools, as 
measured on the municipality level, leads to grade inflation. However, they find that the 
difference between a standardised test and grades at the end of upper secondary school 
is much larger in independent schools. Vlachos (2010), who uses data on grades and 
national standardised test scores, finds no indication of different rates of grade inflation 
between private and public schools overall but finds some evidence of higher grade 
inflation in private for-profit schools.  
The potential link between school competition and grade inflation should still be 
taken seriously, and in this study we have addressed this by considering also outcomes 
determined outside of the school, like the cognitive score in the military test and labour 
market outcomes. However, it could still be that inflated grades permit admission to 
better high schools which in turn also improves these “real” outcomes. For that reason, 
we provide another robustness check by using data on student grades from mandatory 
standardised national tests in English, Swedish and Maths, taken at the end of grade 9, 
that we have available for the years 2003-2008130. We use these data to test if our school 
choice measures can predict grades even when we control for the test results, something 
which would indicate that grade inflation is present. However, it is to be kept in mind 
that this approach has a potential pitfall: if grades measure something different than just 
performance in tests, then any additional explanatory power of school choice over and 
above tests could result from choice positively affecting other skills that are necessary 
to obtain a good grade.131  
                                                 
130 Previously, these tests were voluntary for the schools, and are not centrally available, which is why we cannot use 
them for all cohorts. 
131 In Sweden, teachers form grades by assessing the class room performance of students. Noncognitive skills, such as 
pro-social behaviour, patience and the ability to control ones temperament, might be of higher importance in 
receiving a good grade in the class room than in performing well in a standardised test. 
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Since we are interested in whether the effects that we capture with our choice 
measures are driven by grade inflation, we use the exactly same measures as in the main 
estimations to test for grade inflation here. As we only observe the test scores for 9th 
graders in the years 2003-2008, we only use cohorts from our sample that were 16 in 
these years, i.e. cohorts 1987-1990. 
We estimate Equation (16), using the percentile rank in GPA in grade 9 as outcome 
(  irank GPA ) and controlling for all three test results that we have information on 
(Swedish, English, Maths) at the same time. The subject-specific grades are given on an 
ordinal 1–4 scale (no pass, pass, pass with distinction and pass with special distinction). 
The test grades are included as dummies for each of the k=4 pass-categories. We 
include the same covariates as we did in the main estimation, including the municipality 
dummies, and our choice measure. 
 
(16) rank GPAi = α · ci + βkm · math9ik + βks · swedish9ik + βke · english9ik + γcohort  + δ ·Xi + ui  
 
The idea is that even though these test results only account for some of the grades 
that make up the grade point average, finding no effects of our choice measure when we 
include them could be seen as an indication that grade inflation is probably not 
correlated with our choice-measure.  
Table 28 shows the results for the choice measures counting the number of schools 
within the median commuting distance and 2km around a student’s home in columns 
one and two respectively. We find small statistically significant effects of choice on the 
grades.132 However, the coefficients are smaller than the marginal effects from our 
baseline estimation in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. We can thus conclude that, even if there 
is some grade inflation related to having more schools to choose from, its effect on our 
estimates is probably small. 
                                                 
132 Note for the interpretation of the coefficients that student test score grades are measured at an ordinal 1–4 scale, 
while our dependent variable for 9th grade GPA is in terms of percentile rank. 
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3.8.1.6 The military score 
As mentioned in Section 3.4, the share of men going through the drafting process 
declined significantly starting from the late 1990s. This means that for the younger 
cohorts in our sample, no longer all Swedish men took part in the military test. Figure 9 
shows that the share of men not taking part in the draft test rose from around 7 per cent 
for the cohort born in 1972 to around 43 per cent for cohort 1987. The sharp increase 
started with men born in the years 1980 and 1981. 
Figure 9: Share of men in each cohort for which we do not observe the military test 
 
 
This raises concerns about potential selection into taking the test and being ready to 
possibly serve in the military. In order to test whether such selection is likely to bias our 
results, we run our treatment effect analysis with the same covariates we use for the 
main estimations on the outcome “not taking part in the test”. Results of this analysis 
are presented in Table 29.  
We find that having one more school offering grade 7-9 within the median 
commuting distance of a student’s place of residence in or before 1991 decreases the 
probability of missing the test by 0.44 percentage points for the cohorts that are most 
affected by the reform. We find similar results using the number of schools within a 
2km radius; however, the placebo-test fails for this specification. Even though this 
effect is mostly statistically significant, it is relatively small compared to the share of 
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men not taking part in the test in these youngest cohorts, which is 30 to 43 per cent. We 
thus do not believe that our results on the cognitive skills test score are biased in a 
quantitatively relevant way.  
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3.8.2 Tables 
The tables are presented in the following order: First, Section 3.8.2.1 presents tables 
on descriptive statistics and estimation results from main analyses. Second, Section 
3.8.2.2 presents tables on additional analyses that are included in Section 3.8.1 in the 
appendix. Lastly, Section 3.8.2.3 shows, for reporting purpose, more detailed estimation 
results relating to the analyses in Section 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. 
 
3.8.2.1 Tables from main analyses 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for outcome variables 
 
PRE-REFORM COHORTS 
(cohorts 1972-1976 are not 
affected) 
POST-REFORM COHORTS 
(cohorts 1977-1990 are 
affected) 
  Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs. 
Percentile rank GPA 9 48.21 28.58 437 953 49.40 28.60 1 277 468 
Cognitive score 5.06 1.93 213 145 5.04 1.94 403 161 
University degree (at age 25) 0.35 0.48 445 295 0.41 0.49 692 729 
Employed (at age 25) 0.71 0.45 446 509 0.69 0.46 698 068 
Entry in criminal record (until age 22) 0.16 0.36 449 802 0.14 0.35 990 157 
Health problem (at age 22) 0.07 0.26 448 043 0.08 0.27 985 478 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 16. 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics for pre-reform choice measures 
 
PRE-REFORM COHORTS 
(cohorts 1972-1976 are not affected) 
POST-REFORM COHORTS 
(cohorts 1977-1990 are affected) 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median Obs. 
School choice         
Number of schools 
within median 
commuting 
distance 
3.45 4.66 2 449 802 5.91 9.35 2 1 306 879 
        
Number of schools 
within 2km 
1.24 1.50 1 449 802 1.35 1.69 1 1 306 879 
Note: The table displays pre-reform measures on grade level 7-9. Sample contains only observations with 
full information on all covariates X given below Table 16. 
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Table 15: Descriptive statistics on covariates in the estimation 
 Mean Std. Dev. Median 
    
Municipality level variables       
Population density 392.35 876.36 64.00 
Average taxable income in year t-2 in 100 SEK, deflated to 
2006 
1 079.05 153.39 1 067.89 
Urban municipality 0.54 0.50  
Parish level variables    
Share of 16-64 year olds born in Sweden 0.89 0.08 0.92 
Average yearly earnings of 20-64 year olds in 100 SEK 1 140.46 224.25 1 150.94 
Share of 20-64 year olds with university degree 0.20 0.09 0.18 
Share of 20-64 year olds that are employed 0.83 0.04 0.84 
Population density of 7-15-year-olds in lower quartile of 
distribution 
0.09 0.28  
Population density of 7-15-year-olds in highest quartile of 
distribution 
0.64 0.48  
Individual level variables    
Household income in 1000 SEK, deflated to 2006 373.77 382.38 350.00 
Household received welfare 0.06 0.24  
Age of mother at birth 27.78 5.05 27.00 
Single parent household 0.22 0.42  
Number of children 2.23 1.01 2.00 
Only child 0.23 0.42  
Child born in Sweden 0.96 0.19  
Mother born in Sweden 0.89 0.32  
Mother born in Scandinavia, outside of Sweden 0.05 0.21  
Mother born in western Europe, North America or Australia 0.01 0.10  
Father born in Sweden 0.88 0.32  
Father born in Scandinavia, outside of Sweden 0.04 0.19  
Father born in western Europe, North America or Australia 0.02 0.13  
Mother has university degree 0.31 0.46  
Mother's highest degree is from secondary education 0.49 0.50  
Father has university degree 0.27 0.44  
Father's highest degree is from secondary education 0.46 0.50  
     
Number of observations: 1 756 681       
Notes: summary statistics are on individual level, thus, statistics on municipal and parish level variables are weighted with 
the share of inhabitants. E.g.: this says that 55% per cent of the sample lives in an urban municipality, it does not mean 
that 55% of municipalities are urban. 
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Table 16: Results from main estimation for percentile rank in marks in grade 9 
Outcome: PercentilePercentile rank GPA Grade 9 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within median commuting distance  
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
Constant treatment effect Piecewise constant treatment effect 
Choice × Cohorts 1988-1990 
 0.130*** 
 (0.0183) 
Choice × Cohorts 1985-1987  
 0.0772*** 
 (0.0186) 
Choice × Cohorts 1982-1984  
 0.0100 
 (0.0183) 
Choice × Cohorts 1979-1981  
 0.0231 
 (0.0195) 
Choice × Cohorts 1977-1978  
 -0.0139 
 (0.0227) 
Choice × Cohorts 1977-1990 0.0607*** 
 
(0.0168)  
Choice 
-0.0195 -0.0334* 
(0.0172) (0.0173) 
Constant 25.33*** 26.95*** 
(5.099) (5.055) 
   
Observations 1,715,421 1,715,421 
R-squared 0.186 0.186 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, 
*. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1. The following control variables are included in 
the estimation:  
On the municipality level: population density, taxable income and taxable income squared 
On the parish level: share of Swedish citizens among the 16-64-year-old, mean earnings of the 20-64-year-olds, 
share of university graduates among the 20-64-year-olds, share of employed persons among the 20-64-year-olds, 
indicator variables for whether the population density of 7-15-year-olds is in the lowest or highest quartile across 
Sweden 
On the individual level: household income and household income squared, whether the household received 
welfare, age of the mother at birth, whether living in a single parent household, number of children in the 
household, whether child was only child, whether child has Swedish citizenship, indicator variables on mothers 
and fathers citizenship separately (Swedish, Nordic (=Norwegian, Finnish, Danish), from other western 
country(=Western Europe, North America, Australia), rest of the world is base category), indicator variables on 
whether mother and/or father graduated from university or secondary education 
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Table 17: Results for later outcomes 
Choice Measure: Number of schools in median commuting distance  
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
Percentile
Percentile 
Rank 
Grade 9 
 
Cognitive 
Draft 
Score  
(Men only) 
 
University 
Degree 
at Age 25✝ 
 
Employed 
Age 25 
 
Any Crime 
until Age 22 
 
Health 
Age 22 
Cohorts 1988-1990 
rel. to untreated  
0.130***      
(0.0183)      
Cohorts 1985-1987 
rel. to untreated  
0.0772*** 0.00203   -0.000560*** 0.000262** 
(0.0186) (0.00154)   (0.000190) (0.000118) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 
rel. to untreated  
0.0100 0.000503 0.00138*** 0.00072*** -0.000680*** 0.000131 
(0.0183) (0.00155) (0.000292) (0.000258) (0.000195) (0.000120) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 
rel. to untreated  
0.0231 -0.000367 0.000183 0.000621** -0.000577*** 0.000252* 
(0.0195) (0.00162) (0.000308) (0.000282) (0.000209) (0.000129) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 
rel. to untreated  
-0.0139 0.00267 -0.000581 0.000012 -0.000022 0.000201 
(0.0227) (0.00213) (0.000395) (0.000328) (0.000278) (0.000165) 
Untreated Cohorts 
(1972-1976) 
-0.0334* 0.000143 -0.000191 -0.00121*** 0.000744*** -0.000333*** 
(0.0173) (0.00155) (0.000290) (0.000265) (0.000195) (0.000117) 
       
Placebo test:  Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass Pass 
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
       
Observations 1,715,421 610,182 1,120,459 1,120,845 1,409,092 1,402,829 
R-squared ‡ 0.186 0.146 0.126 0.0300 0.0382 0.0290 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a 
complete list of included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1. The mean of 
the cognitive score is 5, the standard deviation 1.9. 
✝For the outcome university degree at age 25, we had to leave out household income and its squared term to achieve 
convergence. The results are qualitatively the same when leaving the variables in and stopping the estimation after 25 
iterations, and when comparing OLS results including the variables to those that do not. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 18: Estimation results using number of schools within 2 km as distance measure 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within 2 km  
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
 
Percentile 
Rank 
Grade 9 
 
Cognitive 
Score 
(Men Only) 
 
University 
Degree 
at Age 25✝ 
 
 
Employed 
Age 25 
 
Any Crime 
until Age 22 
 
Health  
Age 22 
Cohorts 1988-1990 rel. 
to untreated  
0.298***      
(0.0570)      
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. 
to untreated  
0.0722 0.0193***   0.000351 0.000690* 
(0.0614) (0.00507)   (0.000592) (0.000413) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.115* 0.0103** 0.00565*** 0.00229*** 0.0000935 -0.000034 
(0.0602) (0.00519) (0.00103) (0.000827) (0.000628) (0.000435) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.0729 0.0110** 0.00257** 0.00129 -0.000174 0.000283 
(0.0638) (0.00534) (0.00103) (0.000875) (0.000658) (0.000441) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.106 0.0138** 0.000383 0.00141 0.00117 0.000456 
(0.0653) (0.00615) (0.00119) (0.00101) (0.000784) (0.000475) 
Untreated Cohorts  
(1972-1976) 
0.138*** -0.0122*** 0.000259 -0.00549*** 0.000524 -0.000465* 
(0.0411) (0.00371) (0.000721) (0.000656) (0.000464) (0.000282) 
       
Placebo test Pass Pass Pass ✝ Fail Pass Pass 
Specification Treatment Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
       
Observations 1,715,421 610,182 1,120,459 1,120,845 1,409,092 1,402,829 
R-squared ‡ 0.186 0.146 0.126 0.0301 0.0382 0.0290 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete list 
of included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1. The mean of the cognitive score 
is 5, the standard deviation 1.9. 
✝For the outcome university degree at age 25, we had to leave out household income and its squared term to achieve convergence. 
The results are qualitatively almost the same when leaving the variables in and stopping the estimation after 25 iterations, and when 
comparing OLS results including the variables to those that do not. The only difference is that the Placebo test does not pass in these 
cases. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 19: Correlation between competition and choice measure on grade level 7-9 
Choice Measures: Number of schools within radius… 
 
Radius: Median Commuting 
Distance Radius: 2km 
Competition Measures     
No. of schools, weighted by 
distance and size of student 
body 
0.6898 0.5277 
No. of schools within 
median commuting distance 
0.9462 0.5016 
No. of schools within 2km 0.4482 0.7594 
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Table 20: Results disentangling effects of choice and competition 
Outcome: Percentile rank GPA in Grade 9 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within certain radius around students' home 
Competition Measure: Number of other schools within certain radius around school 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 RADIUS: MEDIAN COMMUTING DISTANCE RADIUS: 2KM 
 
 
Weighted 
by Distance 
and Student 
Body Size 
 
Radius: 
Median 
Commuting 
Distance 
 
Radius: 
2km 
 
Radius: 
Median 
Commuting 
Distance 
 
Radius: 
2km 
Choice      
Cohorts 1988-1990 rel. to 
untreated  
0.116*** 0.237*** 0.157*** 0.114* 0.236*** 
(0.0200) (0.0330) (0.0204) (0.0631) (0.0751) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. to 
untreated  
0.0865*** 0.212*** 0.112*** 0.0159 0.106 
(0.0204) (0.0325) (0.0208) (0.0665) (0.0749) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to 
untreated  
0.0315 0.167*** 0.0459** -0.0514 -0.0265 
(0.0200) (0.0328) (0.0205) (0.0667) (0.0762) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to 
untreated  
0.0611*** 0.216*** 0.0695*** 0.0817 0.133* 
(0.0208) (0.0353) (0.0212) (0.0697) (0.0754) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to 
untreated  
0.0343 0.236*** 0.0377 0.130* 0.116 
(0.0249) (0.0416) (0.0264) (0.0767) (0.0819) 
Untreated Cohorts (1972-1976) -0.0492*** -0.179*** -0.0742*** 0.112** 0.0342 
(0.0182) (0.0299) (0.0196) (0.0461) (0.0523) 
Competition      
Cohorts 1989-1990 rel. to 
untreated  
0.00928 -0.126*** -0.0486 0.0584** 0.0531 
(0.00966) (0.0388) (0.0883) (0.0268) (0.104) 
Cohorts 1986-1988 rel. to 
untreated  
-0.0152* -0.162*** -0.233*** 0.0121 -0.135 
(0.00892) (0.0372) (0.0876) (0.0259) (0.0985) 
Cohorts 1983-1985 rel. to 
untreated  
-0.0221** -0.178*** -0.181** -0.0350 -0.132 
(0.00922) (0.0375) (0.0877) (0.0261) (0.0993) 
Cohorts 1980-1982 rel. to 
untreated  
-0.0377*** -0.217*** -0.352*** -0.0676** -0.373*** 
(0.00897) (0.0387) (0.0875) (0.0263) (0.0980) 
Cohorts 1977-1979 rel. to 
untreated  
-0.0413*** -0.290*** -0.336*** -0.126*** -0.407*** 
(0.00897) (0.0430) (0.0904) (0.0285) (0.0981) 
Untreated Cohorts (1972-1976) 0.0269*** 0.179*** 0.338*** 0.0412 0.250*** 
(0.00760) (0.0352) (0.0737) (0.0253) (0.0804) 
      
Placebo test Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
      
Observations 1,688,234 1,688,234 1,688,234 1,688,234 1,688,234 
R-squared 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. The 
combination (choice 2km, competition 100km) not shown because of very different geographical range. For a complete 
list of included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1.  
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Table 21: Relation between pre-reform and post-reform number of schools 
Outcome: Difference between number of schools before and after the reform 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within median commuting distance 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
 
 
All 
Schools 
All 
Schools 
Public 
Schools 
Public 
Schools 
Private 
Schools 
Private 
Schools 
Coefficients       
Pre-reform No. of schools -0.534*** -0.638*** -0.161*** -0.217*** -0.373*** -0.420*** 
(0.0423) (0.0318) (0.0245) (0.0333) (0.0261) (0.0203) 
Pre-reform No. of schools 
  ×Linear Trend (cohort-1972) 
0.0600*** 0.0565*** 0.0174*** 0.0132*** 0.0427*** 0.0433*** 
(0.00432) (0.00255) (0.00282) (0.00214) (0.00218) (0.00145) 
Pre-reform parish average 
percentile rank GPA 9 
 -0.00587  -0.00424*  -0.00164 
 (0.00363)  (0.00234)  (0.00394) 
Constant 0.893*** 13.60 0.754*** -4.383 0.139** 17.99 
 (0.172) (10.32) (0.134) (14.03) (0.0552) (13.32) 
Marginal Effects✝       
Cohorts 1988-1990 0.486*** 0.323*** 0.134*** 0.00757 0.353*** 0.316*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0410) (0.0267) (0.0171) (0.0158) (0.0096) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.306*** 0.154*** 0.0815*** -0.0321** 0.225*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0153) (0.0189) (0.0156) (0.0112) (0.0078) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.126*** -0.0160 0.0294** -0.072*** 0.0967*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0121) (0.0167) (0.00940) (0.00812) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.054*** -0.186*** -0.0226** -0.112*** -0.031*** -0.074*** 
  (0.0129) (0.0160) (0.00893) (0.0198) (0.0117) (0.0150) 
Cohort dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Municipality dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
Full set of covariates  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
        
Observations 1,214,130 1,117,774 1,214,130 1,117,774 1,214,130 1,117,774 
R-squared 0.207 0.245 0.035 0.083 0.524 0.554 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a list 
on the full set of covariates see Table 16.  
✝ The marginal effects are averages of the cohort specific marginal effects of all cohorts in the respective treatment window. 
A cohort specific marginal effect is computed by adding the base coefficient to the product of the interaction coefficient and 
the value of the trend variable for the specific cohort. 
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Table 22: Effects of actual choice measures on percentile rank in GPA 9 
Outcome: Percentile rank Grades 9 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within radius... 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
RADIUS: MEDIAN COMMUTING 
DISTANCE RADIUS: 2KM 
  
 
All Schools 
 
Public And Private 
Separate 
 
All Schools 
 
Public And Private 
Separate 
     
Cohorts 1988-1990 rel. 
to untreated  
0.0137  -0.0431  
(0.0185)  (0.0489)  
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.00643  -0.0916*  
(0.0187)  (0.0519)  
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.0387**  -0.124**  
(0.0185)  (0.0533)  
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.0145  -0.0417  
(0.0188)  (0.0584)  
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.0184  -0.0596  
(0.0215)  (0.0624)  
Untreated Cohorts 
 (1972-1976) 
0.0190  0.205***  
(0.0180)  (0.0406)  
Public choice     
Cohorts 1988-1990 rel. 
to untreated  
 -0.0127  -0.192*** 
 (0.0264)  (0.0613) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. 
to untreated  
 -0.0230  -0.212*** 
 (0.0263)  (0.0633) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. 
to untreated  
 -0.0456*  -0.160** 
 (0.0252)  (0.0657) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. 
to untreated  
 0.0388  -0.0129 
 (0.0245)  (0.0636) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. 
to untreated  
 -0.0255  -0.0661 
 (0.0310)  (0.0736) 
Untreated Cohorts (1972-
1976) 
 -0.0243  0.197*** 
 (0.0230)  (0.0442) 
Private choice     
Cohorts 1988-1990 rel. 
to untreated  
 0.0303  0.273 
 (0.0700)  (0.175) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. 
to untreated  
 0.0746  0.291 
 (0.0753)  (0.189) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. 
to untreated  
 0.0634  0.0200 
 (0.0784)  (0.200) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. 
to untreated  
 -0.206**  -0.151 
 (0.0881)  (0.236) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. 
to untreated  
 0.0328  -0.0284 
 (0.102)  (0.245) 
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Outcome: Percentile rank Grades 9 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within radius... 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
RADIUS: MEDIAN COMMUTING 
DISTANCE RADIUS: 2KM 
  
 
All Schools 
 
Public And Private 
Separate 
 
All Schools 
 
Public And Private 
Separate 
Untreated Cohorts  
(1972-1976) 
 0.138**  0.171 
 (0.0653)  (0.162) 
     
Constant 
  
19.86*** 20.63*** 19.04*** 20.47*** 
(3.176) (3.134) (3.157) (3.148) 
Placebo test Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Pre-reform trend No No No No 
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Observations 1,743,753 1,743,753 1,743,753 1,743,753 
R-squared 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
3.5.1. 
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Table 23: Effects of actual choice measures on cognitive score 
Outcome: Cognitive skills 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within radius... 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
RADIUS: MEDIAN COMMUTING 
DISTANCE RADIUS: 2KM 
  
All 
Schools 
Public And Private 
Separate 
All 
Schools 
Public And Private 
Separate 
     
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. to 
untreated  
-0.000212  0.00878*  
(0.00160)  (0.00478)  
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to 
untreated  
-0.000881  0.00563  
(0.00159)  (0.00489)  
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to 
untreated  
-0.00148  0.00814  
(0.00158)  (0.00514)  
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to 
untreated  
0.00262  0.0128**  
(0.00205)  (0.00609)  
Untreated Cohorts (1972-1976) 0.00109  -0.0116***  
(0.00159)  (0.00375)  
Public choice     
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. to 
untreated  
 0.00325  0.0157*** 
 (0.00228)  (0.00573) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to 
untreated  
 0.00449**  0.0192*** 
 (0.00221)  (0.00585) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to 
untreated  
 0.00191  0.0162*** 
 (0.00220)  (0.00605) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to 
untreated  
 0.00281  0.0158** 
 (0.00292)  (0.00708) 
Untreated Cohorts (1972-1976)  -0.00207  -0.0187*** 
 (0.00208)  (0.00420) 
Private choice     
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. to 
untreated  
 -0.0130**  -0.0497*** 
 (0.00590)  (0.0164) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to 
untreated  
 -0.0224***  -0.0704*** 
 (0.00610)  (0.0174) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to 
untreated  
 -0.0144**  -0.0488** 
 (0.00668)  (0.0196) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to 
untreated  
 0.00230  -0.0140 
 (0.00839)  (0.0239) 
Untreated Cohorts (1972-1976)  0.0133***  0.0462*** 
 (0.00493)  (0.0147) 
Constant 
  
2.518*** 2.457*** 2.449*** 2.360*** 
(0.267) (0.269) (0.267) (0.269) 
Placebo test Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Pre-reform trend No Yes✝ No No 
Observations 615,225 615,225 615,225 615,225 
R-squared 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a 
complete list of included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1. The 
mean of the cognitive score is 5, the standard deviation 1.9. 
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3.8.2.2 Tables relating to analyses presented in the appendix 
This section presents tables on additional analyses conducted in Section 3.8.1 in the 
appendix. 
 
Table 24: Heterogeneity of effects with respect to urban vs. non-urban municipalities and 
outcome percentile rank GPA 9 
Outcome: Percentile rank Grades 9 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within radius… 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
RADIUS: MEDIAN COMMUTING DISTANCE RADIUS: 2KM 
Non-Urban Area Urban Area Non-Urban Area 
Urban 
Area 
Marginal effects 
     
Cohorts 1988-1990 
rel. to untreated  
-0.235** 0.807 0.147*** -0.494*** 0.349*** 
(0.0914) (0.682) (0.0201) (0.122) (0.0646) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 
rel. to untreated  
-0.0715 0.763 0.102*** -0.419*** 0.165** 
(0.0942) (0.549) (0.0205) (0.131) (0.0702) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 
rel. to untreated  
-0.198** 0.426 0.0409** -0.369*** 0.0325 
(0.0942) (0.414) (0.0200) (0.138) (0.0681) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 
rel. to untreated  
-0.107 0.291 0.0497** -0.153 0.0130 
(0.0929) (0.284) (0.0216) (0.126) (0.0747) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 
rel. to untreated  
-0.0604 0.182 0.00708 -0.193 -0.0118 
(0.115) (0.196) (0.0248) (0.144) (0.0739) 
Untreated Cohorts  
(1972-1976) 
0.250***  -0.0632*** 0.385*** 0.0562 
(0.0695)  (0.0189) (0.0843) (0.0470) 
Coefficients      
Choice  0.392***    
 (0.115)    
Trend×Choice 
(pre-reform trend) 
 -0.0699    
 (0.0453)    
Constant 15.93** 16.95** 30.33*** 17.31** 24.40*** 
(6.959) (6.996) (6.216) (6.960) (6.471) 
       
Placebo test  Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Specification Treatment Windows 
Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
      
Observations 784,494 784,494 930,927 784,494 930,927 
R-squared 0.164 0.164 0.199 0.164 0.199 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
3.5.1. 
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Table 25: Heterogeneity of effects with respect to urban vs. non-urban municipalities and 
outcome cognitive skills 
Outcome: Cognitive skills 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within radius… 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
RADIUS: MEDIAN COMMUTING 
DISTANCE RADIUS: 2KM 
 
Non-Urban 
Area Urban Area
Non-Urban 
Area Urban Area 
     
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. to 
untreated  
0.0194** 0.00146 0.0114 0.0223*** 
 (0.00954) (0.00172) (0.0135) (0.00589) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to 
untreated  
0.0121 0.000786 0.0243* 0.0145** 
 (0.00885) (0.00174) (0.0135) (0.00612) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to 
untreated  
0.00757 -0.000396 0.00816 0.0154** 
 (0.00946) (0.00183) (0.0127) (0.00637) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to 
untreated  
0.00583 0.000771 0.0125 0.0118* 
 (0.0115) (0.00239) (0.0146) (0.00710) 
Untreated Cohorts (1972-1976) -0.0146** 0.000842 -0.0270*** -0.0110*** 
 (0.00675) (0.00170) (0.00840) (0.00426) 
     
Constant 0.927 2.566*** 0.968 2.229*** 
 (0.639) (0.473) (0.639) (0.471) 
      
Placebo test Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
     
Observations 281,734 328,448 281,734 328,448 
R-squared 0.124 0.161 0.124 0.161 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, 
*. For a complete list of included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in 
Section 3.5.1. The mean of the cognitive score is 5, the standard deviation 1.9. 
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Table 26: Heterogeneity of effects within Stockholm county and outcome percentile rank 
GPA 9 
Outcome: Percentile rank Grades 9 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within…  
Sample: early vs. late adopters within Stockholm 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
RADIUS: MEDIAN 
COMMUTING DISTANCE 
RADIUS: 2KM 
 
Late 
Adopter 
Early 
Adopter 
Late 
Adopter 
Early 
Adopter 
Cohorts 1988-1990 rel. to untreated  -0.130 0.129*** 0.577* 0.557*** 
(0.0948) (0.0432) (0.316) (0.123) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. to untreated  -0.158* 0.0866* 0.0931 0.437*** 
(0.0951) (0.0457) (0.332) (0.142) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to untreated  -0.194** 0.0382 0.458 0.178 
(0.0946) (0.0462) (0.345) (0.141) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to untreated  -0.156 0.0238 1.027*** -0.0572 
(0.0952) (0.0463) (0.330) (0.155) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to untreated  -0.0285 -0.00243 0.663 0.0281 
(0.137) (0.0426) (0.411) (0.142) 
Untreated Cohorts (1972-1976) 0.216** -0.0823** -0.242 -0.149 
(0.0979) (0.0348) (0.243) (0.0944) 
     
Constant -37.56 29.27*** -4.459 27.36*** 
(68.16) (8.584) (67.65) (8.379) 
      
Placebo test Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
     
Observations 83,024 144,247 83,024 144,247 
R-squared 0.176 0.205 0.176 0.205 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, 
*. For a complete list of included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in 
Section 3.5.1. 
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Table 27: Heterogeneity of effects within Stockholm county and outcome cognitive skills 
Outcome: Cognitive skills 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within radius… 
Sample: early vs. late adopters in Stockholm 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
RADIUS: MEDIAN 
COMMUTING DISTANCE RADIUS: 2KM 
     
 Late 
Adopter 
Early 
Adopter 
Late 
Adopter 
Early 
Adopter 
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. to untreated  -0.0233*** -0.00101 0.0519* -0.000437 
 (0.00832) (0.00357) (0.0313) (0.0116) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to untreated  -0.0292*** -0.000454 0.0209 -0.0216* 
 (0.00834) (0.00375) (0.0319) (0.0120) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to untreated  -0.0298*** -0.000499 0.0256 -0.00473 
 (0.00840) (0.00371) (0.0327) (0.0123) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to untreated  -0.0178 -0.00617 0.00655 0.000848 
 (0.0117) (0.00456) (0.0367) (0.0148) 
Untreated Cohorts (1972-1976) 0.0301*** 0.00320 0.00244 -0.0138 
 (0.00873) (0.00285) (0.0225) (0.00878) 
     
Constant 3.349 1.871** 5.119 2.201*** 
 (6.795) (0.783) (6.636) (0.792) 
      
Placebo test Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
Treatment 
Windows 
     
Observations 28,684 48,433 28,684 48,433 
R-squared 0.167 0.166 0.166 0.167 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, 
*. For a complete list of included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in 
Section 3.5.1. The mean of the cognitive score is 5, the standard deviation 1.9. 
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Table 28: Grade inflation 
Outcome: Percentile rank GPA 9 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within radius…  
Grade Level: 7-9 
 Radius: median commuting 
distance radius: 2km 
Maths:   
   Pass 11.17*** 11.17*** 
 (0.152) (0.152) 
   Pass with distinction 27.20*** 27.20*** 
 (0.189) (0.189) 
   Pass with special distinction 35.31*** 35.31*** 
 (0.208) (0.208) 
English:   
   Pass 6.297*** 6.299*** 
 (0.210) (0.210) 
   Pass with distinction 12.18*** 12.18*** 
 (0.236) (0.236) 
   Pass with special distinction 16.34*** 16.34*** 
 (0.263) (0.263) 
Swedish:   
   Pass 8.577*** 8.575*** 
 (0.214) (0.214) 
   Pass with distinction 25.92*** 25.91*** 
 (0.257) (0.257) 
   Pass with special distinction 36.25*** 36.25*** 
 
(0.289) (0.289) 
Choice  0.0320** 0.0737* 
 (0.0126) (0.0433) 
Constant 213.3** 214.0** 
 (102.8) (102.9) 
Observations 173,284 173,284 
R-squared 0.666 0.666 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, 
*. For a complete list of included covariates see Table 16. 
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Table 29: Selection into taking the military test 
Outcome: Not taking the military test 
Choice measure: Number of schools within radius.. 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
Radius: Median 
 Commuting Distance Radius: 2 km 
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. to untreated  -0.00440*** -0.00651*** 
(0.000239) (0.00103) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to untreated  -0.00381*** -0.00619*** 
(0.000226) (0.00110) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to untreated  -0.00178*** 0.00138* 
(0.000210) (0.000742) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to untreated  -0.000639*** 0.000904 
(0.000247) (0.000777) 
Untreated Cohorts (=1972-1976) 0.00186*** 0.00286*** 
(0.000175) (0.000411) 
Placebo test Pass Fail 
Specification Treatment Windows Treatment Windows 
Observations 723,147 723,147 
Pseudo R-squared 0.134 0.134 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, 
*.  For a complete list of included covariates see Table 16.
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3.8.2.3 Tables presenting additional specifications related to main analyses 
The tables in this section show the coefficients and marginal effects from different 
specifications for the regression analyses in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 for reporting 
purpose. 
 
Table 30: Different specifications, choice measure with radius "median commuting distance", 
outcomes marks and cognitive skills 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within median commuting distance  
Grade Level: 7-9 
 Percentile Rank GPA 9 Cognitive Score (Men only) 
Coefficients       
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1988-1990  
  0.0266**    
  (0.0132)    
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1985-1987  
  0.0168   0.00178 
  (0.0138)   (0.00113) 
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1982-1984  
  0.0273**   -0.000591 
  (0.0135)   (0.00112) 
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1979-1981  
  0.0408**   -0.00162 
  (0.0164)   (0.00146) 
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1977-1978  
  -0.0329   -0.00593* 
  (0.0340)   (0.00340) 
Trend×Choice (Pre-reform 
trend) 
  -0.00647   -0.000227 
  (0.00910)   (0.000813) 
Choice × Cohorts 1988-
1990 
0.130*** 0.125*** -0.228    
(0.0183) (0.0228) (0.165)    
Choice × Cohorts 1985-
1987  
0.0772*** 0.0717*** -0.0831 0.00203 0.00154 -0.0205* 
(0.0186) (0.0229) (0.149) (0.00154) (0.00187) (0.0113) 
Choice × Cohorts 1982-
1984  
0.0100 0.00444 -0.234** 0.000503 0.000015 0.00873 
(0.0183) (0.0227) (0.115) (0.00155) (0.00187) (0.00900) 
Choice × Cohorts 1979-
1981  
0.0231 0.0175 -0.283** -0.000367 -0.000859 0.0146 
(0.0195) (0.0236) (0.120) (0.00162) (0.00195) (0.0104) 
Choice × Cohorts 1977-
1978  
-0.0139 -0.0195 0.187 0.00267 0.00217 0.0361* 
(0.0227) (0.0266) (0.184) (0.00213) (0.00237) (0.0187) 
Choice -0.0334* -0.0280 -0.0204 0.000143 0.000610 0.00106 
(0.0173) (0.0219) (0.0276) (0.00155) (0.00185) (0.00237) 
Placebo: Choice×Cohorts 
1975-176 
 -0.0113   -0.000948  
 (0.0267)   (0.00227)  
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Choice Measure: Number of schools within median commuting distance  
Grade Level: 7-9 
 Percentile Rank GPA 9 Cognitive Score (Men only) 
Marginal effects       
cohorts 1988-1990 rel. to 
untreated  
see 
coefficients 
see 
coefficients 
0.225* 
(0.134) 
see 
coefficients 
see 
coefficients 
 
 
cohorts 1985-1987 rel. to 
untreated  
0.153 
(0.108) 
0.00446 
(0.00964) 
cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to 
untreated  
0.0662 
(0.0805) 
0.00222 
(0.00727) 
cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to 
untreated  
0.0428 
(0.0552) 
0.00160 
(0.00492) 
cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to 
untreated  
0.00569 
(0.0361) 
0.00349 
(0.00337) 
Untreated cohorts ✝✝   
  
       
Constant 26.95*** 27.01*** 26.68*** 2.412*** 2.412*** 2.352*** 
(5.055) (5.055) (5.107) (0.398) (0.398) (0.398) 
       
Specification Treatment Windows 
Placebo test Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo test Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
Observations 1,715,421 1,715,421 1,715,421 610,182 610,182 610,182 
R-squared‡ 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.146 0.146 0.146 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete list of included 
covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1. 
✝✝This refers to cohorts 1972-1976 in all specifications except the placebo-test-specifications, where it refers to cohorts 1972-1974. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 31: Different specifications, choice measure with radius "median commuting distance", outcomes 
university degree at age 25 and employed at age 25 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within median commuting distance 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 University Degree At Age 25✝ Employed Age 25 
Coefficients       
Trend×Choice×Cohorts 
1982-1984  
  0.00160***   -0.000511 
  (0.000548)   (0.000510) 
Trend×Choice×Cohorts 
1979-1981  
  0.00161**   0.000203 
  (0.000725)   (0.000683) 
Trend×Choice×Cohorts 
1977-1978  
  -0.00229   0.000342 
  (0.00162)   (0.00140) 
Trend×Choice  
(Pre-reform trend) 
  -0.000724*   0.000963*** 
  (0.000403)   (0.000362) 
Choice×Cohorts 1982-
1984  
0.00365*** 0.00191* -0.00774* 0.00187** 0.00344*** -0.000657 
(0.000777) (0.000987) (0.00426) (0.000731) (0.000912) (0.00416) 
Choice×Cohorts 1979-
1981  
0.000489 -0.00127 -0.00885* 0.00163** 0.00322*** -0.00581 
(0.000817) (0.00102) (0.00519) (0.000802) (0.000965) (0.00491) 
Choice×Cohorts 1977-
1978  
-0.00151 -0.00330*** 0.0132 -0.00006 0.00156 -0.00493 
(0.00104) (0.00121) (0.00870) (0.000932) (0.00108) (0.00761) 
Choice -0.000509 0.00115 0.00114 -0.00340*** -0.00490*** -0.00587*** 
(0.000774) (0.000971) (0.00123) (0.000742) (0.000896) (0.00113) 
Placebo: 
Choice×Cohorts 1975-
1976 
 -0.00326***   0.00304***  
 (0.00116)   (0.00103)  
Marginal Effects       
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to 
untreated  
0.00138*** 0.000737** 0.00126*** 0.000724*** 0.00134*** 0.000911*** 
(0.000292) (0.000364) (0.000301) (0.000258) (0.000332) (0.000265) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to 
untreated  
0.000183 -0.000469 -0.000125 0.000621** 0.00124*** 0.000619** 
(0.000308) (0.000376) (0.000336) (0.000282) (0.000348) (0.000293) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to 
untreated  
-0.000581 -0.00125*** -0.000727* 0.000012 0.000641* 0.000149 
(0.000395) (0.000455) (0.000397) (0.000328) (0.000386) (0.000332) 
Untreated Cohorts✝✝ -0.000191 0.000424 -0.000114 -0.00121*** -0.00180*** -0.00141*** 
(0.000290) (0.000357) (0.000297) (0.000265) (0.000330) (0.000270) 
Choice×Trend: Cohorts 
1972-1976 (Pre-reform 
trend) 
  -0.000271*   0.000347*** 
  (0.000151)   (0.000131) 
Placebo Cohorts  -0.00123***   0.00117***  
 (0.000436)   (0.000365)  
Constant -1.463*** -1.453*** -1.494*** 0.382* 0.375* 0.407** 
(0.235) (0.233) (0.235) (0.203) (0.203) (0.204) 
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo Test Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo Test Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
Observations 1,120,459 1,120,459 1,120,459 1,120,845 1,120,845 1,120,845 
R-squared‡ 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.0300 0.0300 0.0300 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete list of included 
covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1. 
✝For the outcome university degree at age 25, we had to leave out household income and its squared term to achieve convergence. The results are 
qualitatively the same when leaving the variables in and stopping the estimation after 25 iterations, and when comparing OLS results including the 
variables to those that don't.✝✝This refers to cohorts 1972-1976 in all specifications except the placebo-test-specifications, where it refers to cohorts 
1972-1974. Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 32: Different specifications, choice measure with radius "median commuting distance", outcomes 
crime until age 22 and health at age 22 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within median commuting distance 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
Any Crime until Age 22 Health Age 22 
Coefficients       
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1985-1987  
  0.00105*   0.00238*** 
  (0.000609)   (0.000741) 
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1982-1984  
  0.00189***   0.000487 
  (0.000620)   (0.000742) 
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1979-1981  
  -0.000411   0.000712 
  (0.000839)   (0.000897) 
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1977-1978  
  0.00296   0.00473** 
  (0.00193)   (0.00230) 
Trend×Choice (Pre-
reform trend) 
  -0.000603   -0.00137** 
  (0.000439)   (0.000542) 
Choice × Cohorts 1985-
1987  
-0.00228*** -0.00272*** -0.0101* 0.00240** 0.00104 -0.0147** 
(0.000824) (0.00105) (0.00599) (0.00104) (0.00125) (0.00715) 
Choice × Cohorts 1982-
1984  
-0.00287*** -0.00331*** -0.0185*** 0.00141 0.000047 0.00821 
(0.000847) (0.00106) (0.00494) (0.00105) (0.00125) (0.00576) 
Choice × Cohorts 1979-
1981  
-0.00243*** -0.00286*** 0.00471 0.00241** 0.00103 0.00507 
(0.000908) (0.00111) (0.00605) (0.00108) (0.00128) (0.00615) 
Choice × Cohorts 1977-
1978  
0.00003 -0.000420 -0.0144 0.00184 0.000427 -0.0198 
(0.00122) (0.00138) (0.0104) (0.00144) (0.00160) (0.0127) 
Choice 0.00318*** 0.00360*** 0.00466*** -0.00297*** -0.00167 -7.79e-05 
(0.000835) (0.00104) (0.00131) (0.00105) (0.00123) (0.00151) 
Placebo: Choice×Cohorts 
1975-176 
 -0.000839   -0.00317*  
 (0.00121)   (0.00162)  
Marginal effects       
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.000560*** -0.000672*** -0.000626*** 0.000262** 0.000140 0.000236** 
(0.000190) (0.000246) (0.000195) (0.000118) (0.000162) (0.000118) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.000680*** -0.000792*** -0.000742*** 0.000131 0.000008 0.000105 
(0.000195) (0.000248) (0.000199) (0.000120) (0.000163) (0.000120) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.000577*** -0.000690*** -0.000529** 0.000252* 0.000126 0.000272** 
(0.000209) (0.000259) (0.000221) (0.000129) (0.000170) (0.000136) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.000022 -0.000137 -0.000087 0.000201 0.000074 0.000155 
(0.000278) (0.000319) (0.000279) (0.000165) (0.000197) (0.000166) 
Untreated Cohorts ✝✝ 0.000744*** 0.000852*** 0.000809*** -0.000333*** -0.000218 -0.000316*** 
(0.000195) (0.000246) (0.000199) (0.000117) (0.000161) (0.000118) 
Trend: Cohorts 1972-
1976 (Pre-reform trend) 
  -0.000144   -0.000150** 
  (0.000105)   (5.93e-05) 
Placebo Cohorts  -0.000218   -0.000206  
 (0.000283)   (0.000176)  
Constant -0.237 -0.232 -0.216 -0.844*** -0.820*** -0.803*** 
(0.249) (0.250) (0.250) (0.306) (0.304) (0.304) 
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Choice Measure: Number of schools within median commuting distance 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
Any Crime until Age 22 Health Age 22 
       
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo Test Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo Test Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
       
Observations 1,409,092 1,409,092 1,409,092 1,402,829 1,402,829 1,402,829 
R-squared ‡ 0.0382 0.0382 0.0382 0.0290 0.0290 0.0290 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete list of included 
covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1. 
✝✝This refers to cohorts 1972-1976 in all specifications except the placebo-test-specifications, where it refers to cohorts 1972-1974 
‡ Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes 
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Table 33: Different specifications, choice measure with radius 2km, outcomes marks grade 9 and 
cognitive skills 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within 2km 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
Percentile Rank GPA 9 Cognitive Score (Men only) 
Coefficients       
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1988-1990  
  0.135**    
  (0.0566)    
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1985-1987  
  0.00413   0.00432 
  (0.0632)   (0.00507) 
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1982-1984  
  0.185***   -0.00385 
  (0.0583)   (0.00513) 
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1979-1981  
  0.109*   -0.00615 
  (0.0628)   (0.00553) 
Trend×Choice × Cohorts 
1977-1978  
  -0.0601   -0.0156 
  (0.103)   (0.0100) 
Trend×Choice  
(Pre-reform trend) 
  -0.0344   0.00121 
  (0.0245)   (0.00230) 
Choice×Cohorts 1988-
1990 
0.298*** 0.264*** -1.494*    
(0.0570) (0.0663) (0.877)    
Choice×Cohorts 1985-
1987  
0.0722 0.0387 0.421 0.0193*** 0.0212*** -0.0554 
(0.0614) (0.0691) (0.823) (0.00507) (0.00587) (0.0639) 
Choice×Cohorts 1982-
1984  
-0.115* -0.148** -1.855*** 0.0103** 0.0122** 0.0418 
(0.0602) (0.0695) (0.596) (0.00519) (0.00594) (0.0508) 
Choice×Cohorts 1979-
1981  
-0.0729 -0.106 -0.744 0.0110** 0.0129** 0.0530 
(0.0638) (0.0726) (0.471) (0.00534) (0.00613) (0.0404) 
Choice×Cohorts 1977-
1978  
-0.106 -0.139* 0.339 0.0138** 0.0157** 0.0955* 
(0.0653) (0.0736) (0.555) (0.00615) (0.00684) (0.0548) 
Choice 0.138*** 0.170*** 0.212*** -0.0122*** -0.0140*** -0.0147** 
 (0.0411) (0.0526) (0.0659) (0.00371) (0.00458) (0.00604) 
Placebo: Choice×Cohorts 
1975-1976 
 -0.0740   0.00426  
 (0.0724)   (0.00647)  
Marginal effects       
Cohorts 1988-1990 rel. to 
untreated  
see 
coefficients 
see 
coefficients 
0.801** see 
coefficients 
see 
coefficients 
 
(0.368)  
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. to 
untreated  
0.479 0.00501 
(0.298) (0.0277) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to 
untreated  
0.185 -0.000495 
(0.224) (0.0211) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to 
untreated  
0.124 0.00381 
(0.156) (0.0144) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to 
untreated  
0.00856 0.00977 
(0.104) (0.00979) 
Untreated Cohorts ✝✝   
  
Constant 22.25*** 22.38*** 22.24*** 2.330*** 2.322*** 2.310*** 
(5.241) (5.245) (5.261) (0.397) (0.398) (0.398) 
       
3 The Short- and Long-term Effects of School Choice on Student Outcomes - 
Evidence from a School Choice Reform in Sweden 125 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within 2km 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
Percentile Rank GPA 9 Cognitive Score (Men only) 
       
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo 
Test 
Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo Test Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
       
Observations 1,715,421 1,715,421 1,715,421 610,182 610,182 610,182 
R-squared‡ 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.146 0.146 0.146 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *.  For a complete list of included 
covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1.✝✝This refers to cohorts 1972-1976 in all specifications 
except the placebo-test-specifications, where it refers to cohorts 1972-1974.  
‡ Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 34: Different specifications, choice measure with radius 2km, outcomes university degree at 
age 25 and employed at age 25 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within 2km 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 University Degree at Age 25
✝ Employed Age 25 
Coefficients       
Trend×Choice×Cohorts 
1982-1984  
  0.00399   -0.00315 
  (0.00268)   (0.00237) 
Trend×Choice×Cohorts 
1979-1981  
  0.00510*   -0.00406* 
  (0.00276)   (0.00238) 
Trend×Choice×Cohorts 
1977-1978  
  -0.00489   -0.00105 
  (0.00518)   (0.00469) 
Trend×Choice  
(Pre-reform trend) 
  -0.000607   0.00386*** 
  (0.00121)   (0.00111) 
Choice×Cohorts 1982-
1984  
0.0149*** 0.0124*** -0.0238 0.00542** 0.0102*** 0.00604 
(0.00272) (0.00317) (0.0265) (0.00245) (0.00278) (0.0234) 
Choice×Cohorts 1979-
1981  
0.00667** 0.00416 -0.0308 0.00287 0.00766*** 0.0129 
(0.00271) (0.00314) (0.0201) (0.00253) (0.00286) (0.0171) 
Choice×Cohorts 1977-
1978  
0.000994 -0.00151 0.0299 0.00361 0.00840*** -0.00346 
(0.00314) (0.00351) (0.0275) (0.00288) (0.00315) (0.0254) 
Choice 0.000690 0.00306 0.00202 -0.0154*** -0.0199*** -0.0235*** 
(0.00192) (0.00243) (0.00322) (0.00184) (0.00223) (0.00301) 
Placebo: Choice×Cohorts 
1975-176 
 -0.00534   0.0106***  
 (0.00346)   (0.00299)  
Marginal effects       
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. to 
untreated  
0.00565*** 0.00473*** 0.00555*** 0.00229*** 0.00421*** 0.00253*** 
(0.00103) (0.00118) (0.00103) (0.000827) (0.000968) (0.000829) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. to 
untreated  
0.00257** 0.00165 0.00243** 0.00129 0.00320*** 0.00153* 
(0.00103) (0.00118) (0.00103) (0.000875) (0.00101) (0.000876) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. to 
untreated  
0.000383 -0.000542 0.000332 0.00141 0.00333*** 0.00164 
(0.00119) (0.00132) (0.00119) (0.00101) (0.00112) (0.00101) 
Untreated Cohorts ✝✝ 0.000259 0.00113 0.000302 -0.00549*** -0.00732*** -0.00562*** 
(0.000721) (0.000900) (0.000725) (0.000656) (0.000819) (0.000658) 
Choice×Trend: Cohorts 
1972-1976 (Pre-reform 
trend) 
  -0.000228   0.00139*** 
  (0.000455)   (0.000399) 
Placebo Cohorts  -0.00201   0.00418***  
 (0.00131)   (0.00105)  
Constant -1.697*** -1.690*** -1.702*** 0.483** 0.469** 0.485** 
(0.233) (0.232) (0.233) (0.201) (0.200) (0.201) 
       
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo Test Treatment 
Windows 
×Trend 
Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo Test Treatment 
Windows 
×Trend 
Observations 1,120,459 1,120,459 1,120,459 1,120,845 1,120,845 1,120,845 
R-squared‡ 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete list of 
included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1.✝✝This refers to cohorts 1972-1976 in 
all specifications except the placebo-test-specifications, where it refers to cohorts 1972-1974.‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 35: Different specifications, choice measure with radius 2km, outcomes crime until age 22 and health 
at age 22 
Choice Measure: Number of schools within 2km 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 
Any Crime until Age 22 Health Age 22 
Coefficients       
Trend×Choice×Cohorts 
1985-1987  
  0.00475*   0.00724** 
  (0.00270)   (0.00336) 
Trend×Choice×Cohorts 
1982-1984  
  0.00611**   -0.00295 
  (0.00286)   (0.00340) 
Trend×Choice×Cohorts 
1979-1981  
  -0.00612**   -6.64e-05 
  (0.00295)   (0.00316) 
Trend×Choice×Cohorts 
1977-1978  
  0.00637   0.0183*** 
  (0.00576)   (0.00681) 
Trend×Choice  
(Pre-reform trend) 
  -0.000452   -0.00438*** 
  (0.00124)   (0.00153) 
Choice×Cohorts 1985-
1987  
0.00203 0.00269 -0.0592* 0.00596* 0.00362 -0.0425 
(0.00272) (0.00314) (0.0335) (0.00348) (0.00391) (0.0426) 
Choice×Cohorts 1982-
1984  
0.000759 0.00142 -0.0624** 0.000286 -0.00206 0.0725** 
(0.00288) (0.00327) (0.0284) (0.00355) (0.00397) (0.0335) 
Choice×Cohorts 1979-
1981  
-0.000667 -1.01e-05 0.0510** 0.00287 0.000532 0.0301 
(0.00291) (0.00335) (0.0217) (0.00340) (0.00384) (0.0227) 
Choice×Cohorts 1977-
1978  
0.00533 0.00599 -0.0282 0.00407 0.00171 -0.0815** 
(0.00346) (0.00382) (0.0309) (0.00411) (0.00447) (0.0369) 
Choice 0.00224 0.00162 0.00316 -0.00414* -0.00191 0.00403 
(0.00199) (0.00252) (0.00335) (0.00251) (0.00306) (0.00392) 
Placebo: Choice×Cohorts 
1975-176 
 0.00145   -0.00623  
 (0.00341)   (0.00447)  
Marginal effects       
Cohorts 1985-1987 rel. 
to untreated  
0.000351 0.000498 0.000313 0.000690* 0.000460 0.000727* 
(0.000592) (0.000704) (0.000595) (0.000413) (0.000497) (0.000413) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 rel. 
to untreated  
0.000097 0.000244 0.000091 -0.000034 -0.000264 0.000003 
(0.000628) (0.000730) (0.000627) (0.000435) (0.000514) (0.000433) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 rel. 
to untreated  
-0.000174 -0.000027 -0.000164 0.000283 0.000051 0.000326 
(0.000658) (0.000770) (0.000656) (0.000441) (0.000522) (0.000441) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 rel. 
to untreated  
0.00117 0.00132 0.00115 0.000456 0.000226 0.000426 
(0.000784) (0.000875) (0.000785) (0.000475) (0.000547) (0.000473) 
Untreated Cohorts ✝✝ 0.000524 0.000383 0.000527 -0.000465* -0.000249 -0.000530* 
(0.000464) (0.000596) (0.000466) (0.000282) (0.000398) (0.000281) 
Choice×Trend: Cohorts 
1972-1976 (Pre-reform 
trend) 
  -0.000106   -0.000485*** 
  (0.000290)   (0.000170) 
Placebo Cohorts  0.000317   -0.000474  
 (0.000792)   (0.000480)  
Constant -0.289 -0.291 -0.282 -0.806*** -0.793*** -0.774** 
(0.253) (0.253) (0.253) (0.307) (0.306) (0.306) 
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Choice Measure: Number of schools within 2km 
Grade Level: 7-9 
 Any Crime until Age 22 Health Age 22 
       
Specification Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo 
Test 
Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
Treatment 
Windows 
Placebo Test Treatment 
Windows×Trend 
       
Observations 1,409,092 1,409,092 1,409,092 1,402,829 1,402,829 1,402,829 
R-squared‡ 0.0382 0.0382 0.0382 0.0290 0.0290 0.0290 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete list of 
included covariates see Table 16. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 3.5.1.✝✝This refers to cohorts 1972-1976 in all 
specifications except the placebo-test-specifications, where it refers to cohorts 1972-1974. ‡ Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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4 Sweden’s School Choice Reform and Equality of 
Opportunity133 
4.1 Introduction 
The school choice reform that was introduced in Sweden in the early 1990s has 
dramatically changed the possibilities of choosing a school within the Swedish 
education system. Since the reform, the possibilities for students in compulsory 
education to choose their school of attendance have increased dramatically. In addition 
to new choice options among public schools, a voucher system for private schools was 
introduced such that students could attend private schools without having to pay 
additional tuition fees. Due to this reform, the system has gone from one where students 
with few exceptions attended the public school of their catchment area, to one where 
many students opt for another school than the default school, and where there exist 
privately run but publicly funded alternatives alongside the traditional public schools. 
In Chapter 3, we investigated the average effects of school choice as introduced by 
the 1992 reform, and found them to be rather modest. In particular, we found that more 
choice had a positive but small effect on final grades from compulsory school, and non-
existent or very small effects on long-term outcomes. However, given the importance of 
the principle of “equivalent quality” 134 in the Swedish school system, not only the 
average effect on the whole population is of interest, but also whether the school choice 
reform has affected students of different background differently. This is also an 
important issue in the context of the Swedish policy debate, where the fear that children 
from a socio-economically disadvantaged background would be harmed in absolute or 
relative terms has been one of the main arguments against the reform.135  
                                                 
133 This chapter is based on joint work with Karin Edmark and Markus Frölich. 
134 Chapter 1, §9 of the Swedish school law (Law 2010:800) states that all students shall have access to education of 
equivalent quality. In Swedish: ”Utbildningen inom skolväsendet ska vara likvärdig inom varje skolform och inom 
fritidshemmet oavsett var i landet den anordnas.” 
135 The National Board of Education (2003), p. 45, points to the risk of increased ethnical and social segregation as 
one of the most common arguments against the choice reforms in the political debate. In the appendix we show that 
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Whether school choice is “a rising tide that lifts all boats”, to quote from the title of 
Hoxby (2003), or rather a policy that is beneficial only for a subset of students, is also a 
topic of interest in the international policy discussion and research literature. For 
example, Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2006) report positive effects of gaining access to 
the most preferred schools on test scores among white students and students of higher-
income families in the U.S., while there are no statistically significant effects among 
African Americans and children of lower-income families. Hoxby (2000b) finds a 
similar pattern in the effects of competition between U.S. public school districts on 
student educational attainment: white non-Hispanics, males and those whose parents 
have at least a high school degree are the ones who gain from more competition, but no 
group seems to lose. Deming (2011), on the other hand, finds that gaining access to a 
first-choice school through a randomised lottery decreases the crime rates, but that the 
effect is concentrated among African-American male students who are defined as high 
risk based on ex ante characteristics. Previous studies of the Swedish school choice 
reform have focused exclusively on the expansion of privately run but publicly funded 
schools. The results of these studies (see Ahlin (2003), Sandström and Bergström 
(2005), Björklund, Clark, Edin, Fredriksson and Krueger (2004)) suggest that students 
from a better-off socio-economic background gain a bit more, but importantly, no 
groups seem to be negatively affected by the choice reforms. Overall, however, there 
are no large differences between students of different socio-economic background.136 
To date there has been no study that evaluates the effects of the full Swedish 1992 
choice reform, including the increased possibilities to choose between public schools, 
on outcomes of different groups of students. Our study serves to fill this gap. As the 
Swedish reform changed the institutional setting for the complete population and not 
just for certain target subgroups, it is especially suited to study the effects of school 
choice on different subpopulations. Moreover, given the long time since the 
introduction of the reform, we are able to evaluate long-run effects over and above mere 
short-run outcomes. We will focus our analysis on the following issues:  
                                                                                                                                               
we do not find evidence for an overall increase in school segregation in lower secondary education in the period after 
the reform, compared to before the reform. 
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First, we will investigate Quantile Treatment Effects of the reform, that is whether 
the degree of school choice affected different parts of the distribution of outcomes 
differently. We will centre our analysis on distributional effects on marks at the end of 
9th grade. To this end, we focus on two thresholds which are of special interest when 
looking at marks: the probability of receiving a passing grade and the probability of 
receiving a high grade. Second, we will analyse whether the reform has had 
heterogeneous effects on student outcomes with respect to the socio-economic 
background, based on parents’ education, income and immigrant status as well as the 
crime rate of the residential area. 
The dataset that we use for our analysis comprises detailed administrative data for 
the complete Swedish population born between 1972 and 1990. As the first five of these 
cohorts had already left compulsory education when the reform was introduced in 
autumn 1992, we observe both students that have and that have not been affected by the 
reform.  
We use very detailed geographical information about students’ and schools’ 
locations to construct measures of the potential degree of school choice that is available 
to each student, based on the number of schools near the students’ home. Our 
identification strategy to deal with the potential endogeneity of choice options available 
to students after the reform (due to mobility of students and schools) is to measure the 
potential degree of school choice just before the reform, that is before parents and 
schools potentially reacted to the school choice reforms with a decision on where to live 
or open a school. This means that, for a student who chooses a school after the 
introduction of the reform, we will measure choice by counting the number of schools 
near her home in 1991. For cohorts that make their choice before 1992, we will use the 
actual year in which they choose a school, as the rules of the new school choice regime 
cannot have affected the place of residence of these cohorts. 
Nevertheless, even for these unaffected cohorts, that is for students in a situation 
without free school choice, the number of schools nearby may be correlated with 
                                                                                                                                               
136 Böhlmark and Lindahl (2012) also find positive overall effects of the private school expansion, but do not test for 
heterogeneous effects with respect to student background. 
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student outcomes via observable and unobservable factors137. For this reason, we 
include regional- and individual-level covariates in the estimations. Moreover, we use 
the five student cohorts that left compulsory education before the reform was enacted to 
control for the effect of having many schools nearby before the reform. This allows us 
to net out all time constant correlation – due to both observable and, most importantly, 
unobservable factors – between outcomes and having many schools close-by in a 
situation without free school choice. The identifying assumption is thus that the cohorts 
that are unaffected by the reform are a good control group for later cohorts, and that the 
correlation between the number of schools nearby and student outcomes would have 
stayed constant over time if there had been no reform. We provide suggestive evidence 
on the validity of this assumption by testing for placebo treatment effects. 
Applying this empirical strategy, we identify the differential effect of more school 
choice, measured at the time of the introduction of the reform, on student outcomes. 
Since the results are based on a pre-reform measure of school choice, the estimated 
effect will include all dynamic processes, like the opening or closing of schools, which 
are a direct result of the degree of school choice that was present at the outset of the 
reform138.  
As a result of students’ choice options, and budgets of schools being tied to the 
number of students in one way or the other139, the reform simultaneously led to choice 
for students and competition among schools in many areas140. These two concepts, as 
well as indicators measuring competition and choice, are naturally closely linked, as 
                                                 
137 For example, it may be that areas with a higher school density have different employment opportunities which 
result in different educational levels in the neighbourhood and thus different schooling outcomes of children, 
independently of the educational quality of schools. Also, it may be that Tiebout choice moves before the reform, 
where parents move into catchment areas of good schools, have affected school density in the long run. 
138 In Section 4.8.1.2 in the appendix we show that the degree of school choice in 1991 and at the time when the 
children make an active school choice is closely related. 
139 Due to the voucher that private schools get for each student, the school budget of private schools has a direct 
connection to the number of students. For public schools, the way in which the budget is tied to the number of 
students is specified at the municipal level. The corresponding rules have varied over time and across Sweden, from 
systems where the idea of vouchers has also been used for public schools to systems that have specified only broadly 
that the number of students should be taken into account when deciding about schools’ budgets. 
140 The degree to which schools compete against each other depends on several factors, such as the specific way that 
school finances are tied to the number of students, which is specified on the municipal level, the degree to which 
students actually choose other than the default schools, which is likely to be related to the amount of free capacity of 
school slots in an area, and other factors. Moreover, a qualitative study conducting interviews in a central area of 
Stockholm for example reports that some head masters of public schools have agreed to not actively compete for 
students from each other’s catchment area schools (Waslander, Pater and van der Weide (2010)). 
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there would be no competition without student choice. We will not attempt to separate 
between these two in this chapter but focus on measuring choice on the student level. 
The estimated effects will thus comprise both choice and related competition effects.141 
The results of our analysis suggest that children from a socio-economically 
disadvantaged or an immigrant background did not benefit less than other students from 
school choice. On the contrary, we sometimes find slightly larger effects for these 
groups, especially with respect to household income. Overall, however, the effects are 
rather small, as are the differences between the subgroups. As some placebo tests fail, 
especially for the adult outcomes, we do not overinterpret such results but focus on the 
more robust estimates.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 gives an overview of 
the Swedish compulsory school system and the 1992 school choice reform, and Section 
4.3 discusses why the effects of the reform may differ across groups of students. Section 
4.4 describes the data and explores how different subgroups behaved in terms of their 
school choice behaviour before and after the reform. Section 4.5 explains and discusses 
our empirical strategy. Section 4.6 then presents the results, and Section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2 Swedish compulsory school and the 1992 school choice reform 
Before we turn to the empirical analysis of the paper, this section will give a short 
overview of the Swedish compulsory school system and the 1992 school choice 
reform142. Swedish compulsory schooling comprises grades 1–9, with students starting 
grade one the year they turn seven.143 Since elementary school (grades 1–6) and lower 
secondary school (grades 7–9) are often organised in different schools, it is common to 
change the school when starting grade 7, at the age of 13. Following previous studies on 
the Swedish school choice reform, we will focus on grades 7-9. After compulsory 
school, which has a comprehensive curriculum with some choice options like studying a 
                                                 
141 In Chapter 3, we attempted to disentangle the choice effect, i.e. the individual matching effect, from the 
competition effect. While our estimates gave some indications of positive choice effects and negative competition 
effects especially shortly after the reform, the close relation between the two indicators of choice opportunities faced 
by students and competition from other schools faced by schools made it difficult to empirically separate estimates of 
the two effects. 
142 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed description. 
143 From the year 1997 on, the vast majority of children also attend a voluntary 1-year school preparatory year, which 
is usually offered at the compulsory school. 
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second language, most students go on to upper secondary school, which is voluntary 
and is organised in several educational tracks. 
Since 1990, the municipalities are the responsible administrative entities for 
organising compulsory education. The main sources of finance are the local income 
taxes and central government grants.144 The central government, however, steers 
compulsory schooling through providing rules and regulation.  
Following the election of a right-wing coalition in the fall of 1991, the large 
compulsory school choice reform that is studied in this paper was implemented in 
autumn 1992. The reform had two parts: first it opened up for attending another public 
school than the one in the catchment area, and second, it allowed for privately run but 
publicly funded schools to operate alongside the ordinary public schools. In 1994, the 
law was amended by also allowing for choice among public schools outside of the home 
municipality, which was previously only possible in very special cases.145 If the demand 
for a given public school exceeded the number of available slots, priority was given to 
students living in the catchment area. Private schools were not allowed to select their 
students on the basis of ability or other characteristics but only on a first-come-first-
served basis. 
The reform has had substantial effects on the workings of the educational sector, at 
least in more urban areas. Before the reform, students were, with few exceptions, 
referred to the school of their catchment area. Some alternative schools existed, such as 
Waldorf schools or schools with a special profile like music, but they were rare. After 
the 1992 reform, as more and more private schools were established and as choice 
between the already existing schools became more and more common, this gradually 
changed, and now, 20 years after the reform, school choice is a normal phenomenon in 
many parts of the country. According to the National Board of Education146, almost 13 
                                                 
144 The central government grants have been completely general since 1993, i.e. not tied to specific sectors, and they 
are set so as to compensate for differences in tax base as well as in structural costs, in order to ensure that all 
municipalities have roughly equal economic conditions. Between 1991and 1993, a sector specific grants system was 
in place, and before that, when the central government was responsible for the provision of education, central 
government grants were classified for different purposes. The largest among these, the “basic resource”, consisted 
mainly of teacher salaries (see pp. 67f von Greiff (2009)).  
145 See Law 1985:100  Chapter 4 §8a. 
146 See information at the webpage of the National Board of Education: http://www.skolverket.se/statistik-och-
analys/2.1862/2.4290/2.4292.  
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per cent of all students in compulsory school attended an independent school in the 
school year 2011/12. For the public schools, there is no comprehensive information 
available on how common it is to choose another school than the catchment area school, 
but survey information from school year 2000/01 suggests that choosing another public 
school is at least as common as choosing a private school (The National Board of 
Education (2003)). 
For the sake of the empirical analysis, it is worth to point out that the expansion of 
choice both in terms of private schools, and in terms of choice between the public 
schools, has been gradual: in the mid 1990s, a couple of years after the reform, choosing 
another school than the default school was still rare (see the National Board of 
Education (1996)). This means that we expect the choice reform to have more and more 
of an impact over time, something that we will take into account in the empirical 
analysis. 
4.3 Why may effects differ across groups of students? 
This section will discuss theoretical arguments for why there might be heterogeneous 
effects for children with different socio-economic or migration backgrounds. We choose 
to focus especially on groups that may be considered more vulnerable or disadvantaged 
since the effects of school choice policies on these groups are often of particular interest 
in the public debate. In particular, we will focus on students with low-educated parents, 
defined as both parents having at most a compulsory education degree, students living 
in a low income household, defined as disposable household income being in the lowest 
quartile of the income distribution, students with both parents having been born outside 
of Sweden, and students living in high-crime areas, defined as living in a municipality 
in the upper decile of the municipality crime distribution in 1991, and their respective 
counterparts. 
Before we turn to why the effects of school choice would be expected to differ across 
groups of students, we briefly outline the channels through which free school choice 
might affect educational outcomes in general.147 First, being able to choose a school that 
suits one’s preferences and character may result in a better match between students and 
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schools, which would improve learning among those who actively make a choice. 
Second, more choice for students, and schools budgets being tied in some way to the 
number of students, may introduce competitive pressure and lead head masters and 
teachers to increase teaching quality in order to attract students to their school148. This 
may lead to good schools attracting more students, and bad schools either improving or 
having to close down. Thereby, the overall quality of the education system may increase 
in the long-run, which would then be beneficial also for students who do not make an 
active school choice. Third, when students are free to attend another school than the one 
of the catchment area, the composition of students within a school may change, which 
results in different peer effects149. 
However, to what extent these channels work in reality is not clear, as they are 
related to a number of issues. One of them is the informational asymmetry between 
parents and schools, as the former may not always be able to observe educational 
quality or base their choices solely on this. Moreover, transportation costs to different 
schools and capacity limits of schools may decrease the forces of the above explained 
channels. Also, parents with different characteristics may react differently to the choice 
reform, both in their propensity to make an active school choice and the characteristics 
on which they base their choice. As a result, children with different background may be 
affected differently by the choice reform. In the following, we will discuss potential 
reasons for such differences for the subgroups that we analyse in this study.  
We organise our thoughts on this matter by asking: how do we expect that students 
reacted to and were affected by the expanding possibilities to choose school after the 
Swedish choice reform of 1992? 
First of all, we expect that some students reacted by choosing another school than the 
default school. Some may have chosen to attend another public school than the one of 
their catchment area, while others may have chosen a private school.150 Survey 
information from the National Board of Education (2003) suggests that making an 
                                                                                                                                               
147 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion. 
148 See for example Hoxby (2003) on the relation between school choice and school productivity. 
149 See for example Epple and Romano (1998) on this issue, who model peer effects of sorting as a results of school 
choice.   
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active school choice (in Sweden in school year 2000/01) was more common among 
students whose parents had higher education or were immigrants. One can also 
speculate that the possibility of choosing another than the closest school might be more 
interesting for students of low-income background, as these may be financially 
restricted from getting into a good school by moving near it, i.e. from exerting Tiebout 
choice. Students from high-income families, on the other hand, have always had better 
economic means to move near the desired school, and might thus not have been as 
restricted in their school choice by the assignment system that was in place before the 
reform. A related hypothesis is that students living in more disadvantaged areas may be 
more likely to choose another school than the neighbourhood school, for example to get 
access to a school with less social problems. Students of different socio-economic or 
immigrant background, or students living in areas with more or less social problems, 
may hence differ in the likelihood of choosing another school than the default school. 
Second, those who make use of the option to attend another school than the default 
one, will naturally be subject to another school environment, including other teachers 
and peers, than would otherwise have been the case.151 How the new school differs from 
the old one in turn depends on the factors that determined the choice of school. Burgess 
et al. (2009) show that families in Britain do not only value academic performance 
when they choose schools, but also other factors such as the student composition and 
travel distance. The results of Hastings et al. (2006), who study U.S. families, 
furthermore suggest that getting access to the most desired school has positive effects 
on student outcomes only for those who named academic quality as an important choice 
factor. In addition, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) find that the likelihood of choosing a 
high-performing school was increased when low-income families were given 
information about school test scores. This suggests that, at least in the U.S., parents 
from low- and middle-income families did not have sufficient information on the 
quality of the school, since providing such information changed their choice of school 
                                                                                                                                               
150 See for example Nechyba (2006) for an overview of the literature on the mechanisms of sorting of students with 
respect to income and peer quality. 
151 See Sacerdote (2011) for a recent survey of the empirical literature on peer effects. 
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towards educationally better schools. Hastings and Weinstein (2008) also find a positive 
effect on student test scores of attending a higher-scoring school.  
The results of these studies illustrate that, in order to benefit from the option to 
choose a school, it is important to have and use information about factors that actually 
are important for students’ school results, such as academic quality. This means that 
even though all students may make an active school choice, the factors influencing this 
choice may be very different, which may in turn lead to heterogeneous effects of school 
choice. For the Swedish case, Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007) provide some evidence that 
parents with higher education and those born in another country were more likely to 
send their children to a private school, while they find no such difference with regard to 
parental income. This might in turn lead to different effects for the corresponding 
subgroups if attending a private school is on average more or less beneficial than 
attending a public school152. 
Third, not only the students who make an active school choice may be affected by 
increased choice possibilities, but also the students who remain in the default school. 
That is, they may be affected by the other students’ choices if the characteristics of the 
peer group change and, in relative terms, by possibly staying at a not so good school 
that other students opted to leave. In their study, Östh, Andersson and Malmberg (2010) 
suggest that school choice in Sweden has led to increased between-school dispersion in 
9th grade marks, on top of the dispersion that stems from residential segregation. 
Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007), who also study the 1992 choice reforms but focus on the 
introduction of private schools, find that a higher share of private school students within 
a municipality is related to higher segregation in terms of parental education and 
immigrant status between public and private schools. However, comparing schools 
offering grades 7-9 in the years before and after the reform, we do not find any 
indication for an overall increase in segregation, measured in terms of the between-
school variation in the share of students with disadvantaged socio-economic 
background or immigrant background (see Section 4.8.1.1 in the appendix). 
                                                 
152 Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007) find some evidence for a beneficial effect of attending a private school, though they 
also show that most of their estimated positive effects of higher private school shares stems from the competition 
effects that affect all pupils, not just those in private schools. 
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In sum, given that previous studies have indicated systematic differences in the way 
that students of different background react to reforms that expand school choice, and 
given the many channels through which school choice may affect student outcomes, it is 
important to test empirically whether the effect of the Swedish 1992 school choice 
reform differs across groups of students, and in particular, whether some groups were 
harmed by school choice as it evolved after the reform. 
4.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
Before we turn to the econometric analysis, we will check, in this section, if there is 
any indication in our data that students of different background reacted differently to the 
choice reform. To this end, we look at descriptive statistics for student outcomes as well 
as at indicators of actual school choices made, namely travel distance to school and 
attending a private versus public school. First however, the subsection below gives a 
short overview of the data sources. 
4.4.1 Data 
The analyses in this chapter are mostly based on the same data set as the ones in 
Chapter 3. The following section will thus briefly summarize the more detailed 
information presented in Section 3.4. We use data from Statistics Sweden, the Swedish 
National Council for Crime Prevention, the Military Archives and the Swedish Defence 
Recruitment Agency. The data set contains information on final grades from 
compulsory school for all individuals in Sweden born in 1972–1990, and on the longer 
term outcomes “criminal convictions by age 22”, “university education at age 25” and 
“employment at age 25” for those who had achieved the corresponding age by 2009. 
For men, we also observe the cognitive score from the military draft test153154. The data 
furthermore includes a broad set of individual level background variables, including 
detailed parental background information on education and income level, country of 
birth and family structure. In addition, we have access to geographical information on 
                                                 
153 See also Lindqvist and Vestman (2011) for a detailed description of this test. Note that the share of men taking the 
military test drops significantly for the younger cohorts. See Chapter 3 for an analysis showing that the selection 
effects are only mildly related to our choice measure and outcomes, on average. 
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the location of schools (for years 1988–2006) and students’ residences (for years 1985–
2006), measured as 100*100 square meter boxes. This data allows us to construct 
detailed measures of the choice options available to each student. 
Moreover, we have information on a set of municipality level characteristics like the 
population density and income tax base which we collected from the webpage of 
Statistics Sweden (www.scb.se) and from the webpage of the Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities and Regions (www.skl.se). On a finer regional level, we constructed a 
set of parish level characteristics from individual register data that we were generously 
given access to by the Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU), including 
population density, education and income level and immigrant share. A full list of these 
variables, used as covariates in the estimations, is given below Table 40. Table 15 
displays the corresponding descriptive statistics. 
4.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 36 shows average student outcomes separately for the pre- and post-reform 
cohorts, that is for cohorts born between 1972 and 1976, and between 1977 and 1990, 
respectively, and separately for the different subgroups155. We can see that the higher 
the household income and parental education, the better is the average value of most 
outcomes, that is of the percentile rank in marks, cognitive skills, the share receiving a 
passing or a high grade in math or holding a university degree at age 25, and having 
been convicted for a crime until age 22. A similar pattern holds when comparing 
children whose parents have both been born abroad with those who have at least one 
native Swedish parent. Comparing these numbers pre- and post-reform, the most 
remarkable changes are the increase in the percentage receiving a passing grade in all 
subgroups156 and the increase in the share of those having obtained a university degree 
                                                                                                                                               
154 The cognitive score and information on whether the individual has been convicted for a crime are available only 
for cohorts born in 1972 to 1987, while the information on university education and employment, measured at age 25, 
is only available for individuals born between 1972 and 1984. 
155 The corresponding standard deviation and number of observations are reported in tables in Section 4.8.2.3.1. 
156 This is in line with Vlachos (2010) who finds that the final average grade point averages from Swedish lower as 
well as upper secondary school increased between 1998 and 2008. Vlachos’ analysis contributes only a small share of 
this increase to competition effects, and suggests that a large share can rather be attributed to other factors such as the 
introduction of a new grading system in 1997, based on absolute knowledge goals, instead of the previous more 
relative grading system. In Chapter 3, we find that there is, on average, a modest increase in the percentile rank of 9th 
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at age 25. Both of these changes are more pronounced among children with high 
compared to low-educated parents and immigrants as compared to native Swedes. The 
change in obtaining a university degree at age 25 is with 10 percentage points twice as 
large for children of high-income as compared to low-income families. Apart from this, 
students from middle and high income households have similar or improved outcomes 
in all dimensions except for the share of those being employed at age 25, while students 
from low-income families have similar outcomes and a slight decrease in the probability 
of receiving a high grade in math at the end of 9th grade. Children from parents who 
both have at most a compulsory education experience a decrease in the percentile rank 
in marks by 2 percentage points and an increase in the share having committed a crime 
until age 22 by 1.5 percentage points. 
Lastly, we split the sample according to the municipal crime rate in 1991. We think 
that this is an interesting additional characteristic since, as commented in Section 4.3, 
school choice gives students of areas with social problems the possibility of leaving 
their neighbourhood for the time they are at school and to get in touch with other peers. 
If, for some reason, their families were stuck in a neighbourhood with high crime and 
potentially bad influences while growing up, being given the opportunity of going to a 
school outside of this neighbourhood might be especially beneficial.  
In order to analyse empirically whether this is the case, we split the sample according 
to whether the student’s home municipality had a crime rate in the upper 10th percentile 
in the distribution of all municipal crime rates in 1991, or not. We use the crime rate 
among 16-19-year-olds, as this is likely to be more important in terms of influences on 
adolescents than the adult crime rate.  
Table 37 displays which kinds of crimes are most commonly committed in high vs. 
low or medium crime areas in 1991. Listing only those crimes that make up more than 3 
per cent of all crimes, we can see that the composition of crimes in low/medium and 
high-crime areas is very similar, so it is mostly the quantity that varies: the average 
crime rate in the high crime municipalities is 5.6 per cent, while it is only 3.5 per cent in 
the low and medium level crime areas. 
                                                                                                                                               
grade GPA as a result of having more school choice. We further present suggestive evidence that this is not explained 
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The last rows in Table 36 display that there are no strong differences in outcomes of 
students living in the different areas, except that the share of those having committed a 
crime until age 22 is higher in high crime areas and that the share holding a university 
degree at age 25 and those receiving a passing or a high grade is slightly lower for pre-
reform cohorts in these areas. However, after the reform, students in high crime areas 
perform slightly better in terms of marks compared to students in low or medium crime 
areas. 
These descriptive comparisons of subpopulations and cohorts that have been affected 
and not affected by the reform show that children from low-income and less educated 
households experienced, for some outcomes, a small relative drop after the reform 
compared to more advantaged students. Before we turn to an econometric assessment of 
whether these differences are related to the school choice reform, we first investigate in 
the next section whether there is any indication in the data that students from different 
subgroups changed their school choice behaviour in different ways after the reform. 
4.4.3 Indicators on how choice behaviour changed after the reform 
In this section we investigate whether students of a different socio-economic or 
immigrant background reacted differently to the choice reform in terms of making an 
active school choice. As we lack information on whether students choose to attend 
another public school than the assigned one, we instead make use of indirect 
information in terms of distance to school of attendance and whether students attend a 
private or public school, to get an idea of how the choice reform affected school choice-
related behaviour.  
The travel distance to school can be seen as an approximate indicator of school 
choice in general – to public as well as private schools, since students that opt out of the 
school of their catchment area are likely to increase their travel distance, as the 
catchment area school is in general the nearest one. With new schools opening up and 
old ones possibly closing down, an increased travel distance is not a perfect measure of 
choosing another than the default school but only an approximation. Moreover, any 
changes in travel distance over time may of course be related to other factors and 
                                                                                                                                               
by grade inflation only. 
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general trends too. On the contrary, attending a private school is clear evidence for 
active school choice, as opting out of the public school system requires parents to act. 
Columns 1-4 in Table 38 show the mean of the travel distance to school for the 
different subgroups, separately for the pre- and post-reform cohorts.157 The first two 
columns show the unconditional mean while the last two columns show the mean 
conditional on all covariates included in the estimation158, i.e. net of all differences in 
covariates. The numbers for the cohorts not affected by the reform indicate that the 
unconditional mean travel distance to school was larger among low-income than among 
mid- and high-income households, and was larger among households with Swedish-
born parents or households living in high-crime areas. However, conditioning on 
covariates (Columns 3 and 4) almost completely eliminates these differences except for 
households with different incomes. When we compare the conditional pre- and post-
reform means, we see that the distance to school increases over time for all groups, but 
the increase is largest, both for the unconditional and the conditional means, for low-
income households. We furthermore see that the conditional travel distance increases a 
bit more between the pre- and post-reform cohorts if both parents are Swedish-born 
parents or if the child lives in a high crime area.  
Columns 5–6 in Table 38 show the unconditional and conditional share of students 
attending a private school in 9th grade. Here, we only report the shares for post-reform 
cohorts, as it was extremely uncommon to attend a private school before the reform. 
The unconditional means in the fifth column of Table 38 show that children of 
immigrant, higher-education and higher-income background, as well as children from 
high crime areas, are more likely to attend a private school. When conditioning on all 
covariates that we use in the main estimations (see note to Table 40 for a list), the 
differences with respect to household income are negligible, while the qualitative results 
for the other subgroups stay the same. 
                                                 
157 Note that we measure travel distance “as the crow flies”, i.e. by computing the distance between the mid points of 
the coordinate for the students home and the students’ school of attendance in 9th grade. 
158 This is calculated using coefficient estimates from an OLS regression with distance to school as the outcome and 
all covariates, an indicator for „affected by the reform“, an indicator for the subgroup and an interaction of the two 
included as right hand side variables. 
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In sum, the descriptive statistics suggest that travel distances have increased for all 
groups after the choice reform, but the increase is larger for students whose parents have 
lower income, who live in high crime municipalities or have Swedish-born parents, 
which in turn could suggest that choosing another school than the catchment area school 
after the reform was more common among these groups of students. Of course, when 
interpreting these purely descriptive statistics it has to be kept in mind that other factors 
like trends in living in different residential areas and not school choice itself may be 
behind these results. Our data on private school attendance furthermore shows that 
private school attendance was more common among students of immigrant background, 
students in high-crime areas or students with high-educated parents.  
As outlined in Section 4.3, there are several channels through which the reform may 
affect both those students who make active choices and those who do not; however, a 
reasonable hypothesis is that the former group will be more affected. Different choice 
patterns between groups of students could therefore lead us to think that the reform 
effect may differ across groups. Böhlmark and Lindahl (2012), who study the expansion 
of private school attendance, present evidence that one advantage of competition by 
private schools is an increase in the outcomes of students attending private schools, 
although they show that most of the benefits affect all students, that is also those 
attending a public school.  
With these patterns in mind, we turn to the main empirical analysis of the study. 
4.5 Empirical strategy 
4.5.1 Identification 
We follow the identification strategy used in Chapter 3, where we identify the 
average effects of the reform. Identifying the effect of more school choice as introduced 
by the reform in 1992 mainly faces two empirical challenges.  
The first is the endogenous choice of residence and location of families and schools 
following the choice reform. After the reform was introduced, many new private 
schools opened up, and it is highly plausible that neither the for-profit nor the non-for-
profit private schools chose their location of business at random. Both cream-skimming 
arguments as well as motives to help especially disadvantaged children might have 
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influenced the decision where to open a new school. At the same time, if more choice 
and competition leads to an improved quality of education, parents that are very 
concerned about their children’s education will try to move close to such competitive 
areas in order to have a higher likelihood to get into one of these schools and in order to 
face short travel distances.  
Not taking these arguments into account in the estimation might lead to either a 
positive or a negative bias of the effect of having more schools nearby, depending on 
which of the mechanisms is more important empirically. We solve this issue by using 
the location of families’ residences and the location of schools in 1991, that is right 
before the reform, to calculate our choice measure for those students who choose a 
school after 1992, i.e. those who are affected by the reform. Since the reform came as a 
surprise, in the sense that it was introduced by the new governing coalition that won the 
tight 1991 parliamentary election159, we can take the pre-reform locations to be 
exogenous to the reform. To illustrate this approach, take a student born in the year 
1983 who, correspondingly, chose a school to start seventh grade in 1996. As this was 
after the reform, the number of schools around the students’ home could be related to 
her underlying ability, due to the endogenous location of both schools and students after 
the choice reform. As discussed above, in order to avoid this, we count the number of 
schools close to the students’ residential location in the year 1991. For a student born in 
1973, who started seventh grade a decade earlier and left compulsory schooling in 1989, 
the number of schools close-by cannot have been related to her underlying ability via 
free school choice as this did not yet exist160. Hence, without risking an endogeneity 
bias caused by reactions to the reform, we count the number of schools around the 
students’ home in 1986, the year in which the student actually chooses a school.  
An additional advantage of using measures that were predetermined is that we have a 
natural starting point from where dynamic competition effects started to evolve. To 
                                                 
159 The right wing coalition (Moderaterna; Folkpartiet; Centerpartiet; and Kristdemokraterna) obtained 46.6% of 
votes, and the socialist block (The Social Democrats and the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet)) 42.2%. New Democracy, 
which has since then disappeared from politics, obtained 6.7% of the votes, and The greens, Miljöpartiet, received 
3.7% of the votes and were hence only 0.3% from parliamentary representation. 
160 It may have been related to ability because of other factors, like Tiebout migration or the correlation between 
average educational level and density of schools in an area. This is what we refer to as the second challenge to 
identification and will be described later on in this section. 
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illuminate this, suppose a child lives close to very many schools right before the 
introduction of the reform. Once the new rules are in place, the schools start competing 
for students, new schools may open up and old, bad schools may close down. If the 
competitive process is strong enough, we might see more and more schools closing 
down and the best one attracting more and more students. Some years later, we would 
then see a rather monopsonistic situation, with few schools, but possibly very good 
outcomes, if only the best schools have sustained in the competition. Relating the 
number of schools to student outcomes at that later time would then show no, weak, or 
even a negative relationship between choice opportunities and student performance. It is 
thus difficult to compare contemporaneous choice measures to student outcomes when 
it is not clear at which stage of a dynamic process this is observed. Using predetermined 
measures of school choice as they are observed at the start of the competitive process, in 
contrast, will incorporate the dynamic changes, like opening or closing of schools, that 
are a direct result of the initial choice setting. Needless to say, the pre-reform situation 
will not remain a relevant measure forever – eventually other changes will take place so 
that the pre-reform situation does no longer measure the relevant conditions forming 
choice and competition. However, we believe that the 12-year period that we study 
constitutes a reasonable time frame for this type of analysis. Moreover, we observe in 
the data that there is a fairly close correlation between the choice index as measured just 
before the reform and the one measured at the time the individuals make their decision 
among all subgroups (see Section 4.8.1.2 in the appendix). 
The second challenge to identification is that having more schools nearby to choose 
from will be correlated with several other factors that might be related to student 
outcomes, such as living in a more urban neighbourhood, populated, for example, by 
people with different education backgrounds than people living in rural areas. Even 
though we observe a broad set of individual, municipality level and parish level 
characteristics, it is hard to argue that every possible confounding factor is captured by 
these variables. Therefore, in addition to controlling for these variables in our 
estimation, we will also control for the effect that having many schools close-by has had 
before the reform. We achieve this by including cohorts that are not affected by the 
reform in our analysis and estimating only the differential effect of choice for affected 
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as compared to non-affected cohorts. We will thus net out any potential effect, or 
spurious correlation, that is related to having many schools in the neighbourhood in a 
situation where parents cannot choose the school they send their child to. Consequently, 
our analysis will capture the additional effect of being able to choose more freely 
among schools, as it was introduced by the Swedish school choice reform. 
Our identifying assumption is thus that, if the reform had not been implemented, the 
relationship between our choice measure and students’ outcomes would have been the 
same as it was in the years before the reform. Even though this assumption cannot be 
tested empirically, we can test its credibility by performing placebo estimates. To this 
end, we artificially change the date of the reform to having been enacted two years 
earlier and test whether we find any treatment effect of this non-existent reform. If that 
is the case, it shows us that the relation between our choice measure and student 
outcomes, given our covariates, has already changed before the reform, making an 
identification of the reform effect difficult.  
 
4.5.2 Measuring the degree of choice  
As the analyses in this chapter will use the same measure for school choice as was 
used for the analyses in Chapter 3, the following section is based on Section 3.5.2. 
In order to be able to benefit from the introduction of school choice, it is essential for 
students to have access to schools close to their home. We thus measure school choice 
by counting the number of schools that students can potentially choose from161 within 
the proximity of their homes, using the median commuting distance of the home 
municipality in 1991162 as radius and, alternatively, a radius of 2km163. The median 
value of the median commuting distances is about 5km. Using the commuting distance 
of the home municipality in 1991 as radius around students’ homes has the advantage of 
flexibly taking into account the large geographical diversity of Sweden. Nevertheless, 
we also use a radius of 2km around a student’s home to examine the robustness of the 
                                                 
161 See Section 4.2 for more detailed information on which schools a student could choose from. 
162 We are grateful to John Östh for providing information on municipality commuting distances, which are measured 
“as the crow flies”, and do not take into account the directions of roads and the like.” 
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results. It shall be noted that these two measures will have a different bite in measuring 
the number of available schools in different regions: while there are often no schools 
within 2km in rural areas, and this measure therefore does not capture much of the 
variation in the number of accessible schools there, there will be very many schools in 
this radius in the big cities such as Stockholm.  
In line with previous studies on the Swedish choice reform, we focus on analysing 
choice opportunities for children when they start 7th grade. This is an important stage of 
compulsory education as grades at the end of 9th grade are important for admission into 
upper secondary school. Thus, this is a point in time when parents are likely to be 
interested in choosing a good school. It is also a time when making a school choice is 
likely to be relevant, since it marks the start of lower secondary school, which is often 
organised in a separate school from lower education. When calculating our choice 
measure, we thus use the location of residence of students when they are 13 years old 
and count the number of schools that offer grades 7-9 close to their home164. As 
explained in the last section, for students born in cohorts 1979-1990, that is those who 
chose a school for grades 7-9 after the 1992 reform, we use the place of residence in 
1991 and the schools that were present at that time in order to calculate the pre-reform 
choice measures. Moreover, as we only have geographical information on schools 
starting from year 1988, we use the 1988 location of schools also for students who 
started grade 7 before that. 
Table 39 shows the mean and standard deviation for the pre-reform choice measures 
which count the number of schools within the median commuting distance, and within 
2km, separately for the different subgroups and for pre- and post-reform cohorts. The 
number of schools within the median commuting and 2km radius is similar for students 
in the lowest and highest income quartile, but is smaller for those living in households 
with an income between the 25th and 75th percentile of the distribution. For the post-
reform cohorts, the choice measures are somewhat larger for the highest income 
households, also when compared to those with the lowest income. Note though, that this 
                                                                                                                                               
163 See also Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2008), Himmler (2009) and Noailly, Vujic and Aouragh (2009) for other 
studies using the distance between a student’s home and schools. 
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does not show an increase in the number of schools, since the value is measured in 
1991, but rather a possible change in residence patterns already before 1991, or the 
consequences of the law change in 1994 that opened up for choice to public schools in 
other municipalities165. Dividing the sample along the educational background of the 
parents, we see that low educated households have slightly less schools within the 
municipalities’ median commuting distance around their home, but very similar 
numbers when counting schools within 2km around the home. Furthermore, children 
with parents that were both born outside of Sweden have more schools nearby on 
average than children with at least one Swedish-born parent. Lastly, when dividing the 
sample according to the municipal crime rate in 1991, we can see that students in pre- as 
well as post-reform cohorts living in high crime areas in 1991 had more schools nearby 
on average. 
 
4.5.3 Estimation 
The estimation strategy used in this chapter follows the one applied in Chapter 3. In 
order to investigate whether students of different background were differently affected 
by the 1991 choice reform, we run regressions separately for the different 
subpopulations. Moreover, to estimate the differential effect of school choice and how it 
evolves over time for cohorts affected by the reform, as compared to the effect of 
having many schools nearby for unaffected cohorts, we pool all cohorts and define the 
following treatment window dummy variables: 
(17) 
1
2
3
4
5
1 1977 1978;
1 1979 1980 1981;
1 1982 1983 1984;
1 1985 1986 1987;
1 1988 1989 1990;
i
i
i
i
i
D if born in or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero otherwise
D if born in or or zero




 otherwise
         
 
                                                                                                                                               
164 Measures calculated for the choice options at first and fourth grade are highly correlated with the choice measure 
for grades 7-9. 
165 See Law 1985:100, Chapter 4 §8a. 
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For the pre-reform cohorts, all these treatment dummies are zero. The choice of these 
windows follows the degree to which students born in the different cohorts were 
potentially affected by the reform (see also Figure 10): Those born in 1977 started 9th 
grade in 1992 and could in theory be affected by the choice-reform either through 
increased competitive pressure on schools, or through the option of switching school, 
during their last year of compulsory schooling. Although we would not expect any large 
effects after such a short time period, we allocate them into a separate group as they are 
not a clear control group. Cohorts 1979-1981 started 7th grade in or after 1992, when the 
choice reform was in place, and could hence in principle choose the school they wanted 
to attend for the final stage in compulsory education. The next treatment window 
dummy, 3iD , captures all cohorts that were affected by the reform, and could hence in 
principle make a school choice already for classes 4-6 and 7-9. Finally, for cohorts 
included in treatment windows 4iD  and 
5
iD , the choice reform was in place throughout 
their educational career, meaning that they could benefit from more choice in general, 
but also that the reform had already been in place some years when they entered grade 
7, and thus, that competition had already had time to evolve. 
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By interacting these dummies with our choice measure, the coefficient corresponding to 
each “ choicewindowtreatment   ” interaction term will measure the differential effect of 
having many schools nearby after the reform, for students in the respective windows. 
We thus estimate the following equation, separately for each subpopulation of interest: 
(18) 1 2 3 4 51 2 3 4 5i i i i i i i i i i i i cohort municipality i iY D c D c D c D c D c c X u                     
where cohort  and municipality  are cohort and municipality fixed-effects and X is a vector of 
covariates including a wide range of individual, municipal and parish level 
characteristics (a full list is given below Table 40). We use OLS for continuous 
outcomes and Probit for binary outcomes, and cluster standard errors at the school-
cohort level.166 
The  -coefficients measure the differential impact of having many schools nearby 
for cohorts in the respective treatment windows, compared to cohorts that were 
unaffected by the reform. Thus, they measure the effect of school choice as introduced 
by the reform. On the other hand, the coefficient   captures any relation between living 
                                                 
166 We cannot link schools over time in our dataset; therefore, we cluster standard errors on the school level within 
each cohort. 
year of birth 
1973               1977     1979            1982           1985           1988 
start grade 7 after reform 
start grade 4 after reform
start grade 1 after reform 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D
5
Figure 10: Treated cohorts 
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near many schools and the outcome variable that existed already before the reform. By 
including ic , we therefore control for the correlation between our choice-measure and 
the outcomes of the pre-reform cohorts.167 
As we use students’ and schools’ locations from 1991 for cohorts 1979-1990, we will 
also measure all municipal and parish- level covariates in 1991. For cohorts 1972-1978, 
we use the information from the year in which they start 7th grade or, if this is not 
available due to data limitations, from the closest available date. 
 
4.6 Results 
In Chapter 3, we found only small effects of more school choice as introduced by the 
1992 choice reform on the average percentile rank in marks. In this section, we will test 
for whether the small average effects mask heterogeneous effects; first with respect to 
the distribution of marks, and then with respect to student background. 
4.6.1 Effects on the distribution of marks 
We start by analysing if the school choice reform affected the distribution of marks, 
more specifically, whether the effects differed at the important thresholds “receiving a 
passing grade” and “receiving a high grade”.168 For this analysis, we will focus on 
marks in mathematics at the end of 9th grade, as we think that this subject is more suited 
for a comparison over time and between immigrants and Swedes than English and 
Swedish would be.  
Table 40 displays the marginal effects of an additional school nearby in 1991 on the 
probability of receiving a passing or high grade. The first two columns show results 
using the radius median commuting distance while the third and fourth display those 
using a 2km radius around a students’ home to count the number of schools. We can see 
that there is no effect on the probability of receiving a passing grade when using the 
                                                 
167 The estimate of   potentially includes effects of Tiebout school choice, or yardstick-type effects, due to it being 
easier to make comparisons of school performance, and hence put pressure on the own school to improve, if there are 
many schools around. Note, however, that we do not assume a causal interpretation of  . 
168 The other outcomes that we have analysed in Chapter 3 are binary variables and, as such, are not interesting for a 
distributional analysis. The only exception to this is the cognitive score in the military test, which, however, only 
takes 9 values, making it less suitable for a distributional analysis. Moreover, it does not have such clear thresholds of 
interest as do grades. 
4 Sweden’s School Choice Reform and Equality of Opportunity 153 
median commuting distance. However, this result is not robust to using a radius of 2km. 
At the same time, we see an increase in the probability of achieving a high grade in 
math by around 0.3 percentage points per additional school within the median 
commuting distance around a students’ home. A qualitatively similar pattern is found 
using the 2km radius. However, when performing a placebo test pretending the reform 
had happened two years earlier, we find a negative effect of the placebo-reform that is 
statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level, indicating that this result 
should not be overinterpreted as the identification is weak. Overall, we thus find some 
suggestive, though somewhat unstable, evidence that the distribution of marks spread 
out a little in response to the reform. We will further investigate these distributional 
effects in the next section, where we analyse whether students from a different social 
background were differently affected by the choice reform. 
 
4.6.2 Are students from a socio-economically disadvantaged or migration 
background harmed by the reform? 
 
Heterogeneity with respect to parental household income 
 
For the reasons explained in Section 4.3, theoretically it might be that children from 
low-income families benefit more – or less – than children from high-income families 
from the school choice reform.  
The first three columns of Table 41 display the effect on the percentile rank in 9th 
grade marks, estimated separately for low-, medium- and high-income households. In 
all household groups, the general pattern is that effects are first negative, even though 
mostly not statistically significantly different from zero, and then increase over time. 
This is in accordance with the results for the average effects in Chapter 3, as well as 
with the hypothesis that competitive pressure and realising choice options took some 
time to fully come into effect. The point estimates for the youngest cohorts are slightly 
larger for students from families with a lower household income. One additional school 
in the median commuting distance raises the percentile rank in 9th grade marks by 0.2 
points for students from the lowest income households, while the corresponding figure 
for medium and high income households is 0.13 and 0.1 respectively. The differences 
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between the lowest and the two other income groups are mostly statistically 
significant169. As the standard deviation of the percentile rank is around 28, these effects 
are rather small, as are the differences between the groups in absolute terms. When 
multiplying the effect by one standard deviation in the choice measure, which is 9.2 for 
the affected cohorts in the lowest income group, this implies an increase in the 
percentile rank by roughly 1.8 points. This is similar to the effect of an increase in the 
municipal private school share by 10%, found by Böhlmark and Lindahl (2012). 
However, the average number of schools within median commuting distance around the 
home for students affected by the reform and in the lowest income group is 6.1, an 
increase by 9 schools would thus be very large.  
The effect of more school choice on cognitive skills (see Columns 4-6 in Table 41) is 
similar for the low and medium income households, but with an increase of around 
0.005 points for each additional school, and the cognitive score varying between 0 and 
9, it is very small. Children from high income households display an equally small, but 
negative effect. Looking at the distribution of 9th grade math marks, we find no effect 
for any income group on the probability of receiving a passing grade, and similar effects 
of an around 0.3 percentage points increase in the likelihood of achieving a high grade 
per additional school in the commuting distance for all three groups (see Table 42). 
However, the identification of the result is weak for the high income group as the 
placebo test fails. Concerning the probability of having committed a crime until age 22, 
we almost only find significant effects in the lowest income group, where an increase in 
choice leads to a small reduction of about 0.1 percentage points in the probability (see 
Table 43)170.  
Overall, the effects are small as well as the differences between the subgroups. We 
thus find no evidence that would support the claim that disadvantaged children had been 
harmed by the reform. On the contrary, we find slightly higher point estimates for low-
income households, suggesting that low income households benefited more from the 
potential choice options, although this difference is very small.  
                                                 
169 We test statistical significance between point estimates from separate regressions by running a fully interacted 
estimation of the model; results are available from the others upon request. 
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Heterogeneity with respect to educational background of parents 
 
Next, we explore whether children whose parents have a lower education were 
differently affected by the choice reform compared to children with higher educated 
parents. Table 44 and Table 45 show that there is no indication that children with low 
educated parents, defined as both parents having no more than compulsory education, 
have benefited less from school choice in terms of grades at the end of 9th grade. On the 
contrary, most point estimates are even slightly larger for children from households with 
a lower education. Concerning the cognitive score in the military draft, one school more 
increases the score by 0.015 for the youngest cohorts of students with low educated 
parents (see Column 4 in Table 44). The corresponding coefficient for children from 
higher educated parents is statistically insignificant and significantly smaller. This result 
is robust to using the alternative radius of 2km, where the point estimates differ even 
more171. 
 
Heterogeneity with respect to migrant background 
 
Now we turn to analysing whether children whose parents were both born outside of 
Sweden were differently affected by the choice reform. Again, we find that the point 
estimates for the effect of school choice on marks and the cognitive score are very 
similar in size for children with at least one Swedish parent and those whose parents 
were both born outside of Sweden (see Table 46). However, when we instead use the 
choice measure counting the number of schools within 2km around a student’s home, 
the results are more mixed172 and indicate larger effects for children of Swedish parents 
on 9th grade marks but smaller effects on cognitive scores in the youngest cohort group. 
Most of these differences are however not, or only at the 90% confidence level, 
statistically significantly different. Moreover, we find that, for children whose parents 
were both born outside of Sweden in the youngest cohorts, having one more school 
                                                                                                                                               
170Note that the average probability of ever having been committed for a crime at age 22, as reported in Table 36, was 
around 20 per cent for the low-income group. 
171 See Table 69 and Table 70. 
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within 2km increases the likelihood of having a university degree by 1.15 percentage 
points, while this number is smaller and only weakly identified, as indicated by 
significant Placebo tests, for children with Swedish parents173. Overall, the results for 
the subpopulations of children with or without at least one native Swedish parent are 
less robust than the results for the other subpopulations. One conclusion that can be 
drawn is, however, that there is no clear pattern indicating that children from 
immigrants have been harmed by more choice at the outset of the reform compared to 
children with at least one Swedish-born parent. 
 
Heterogeneity with respect to high crime vs. low crime area 
 
Lastly, we investigate whether children living in high crime areas benefit more or 
less from school choice than children living in low or medium crime areas. In this 
section, we hence explore if the effects differ with respect to the area characteristics of 
the student instead of with respect to the parental background.  
When we stratify the sample according to living in a high or low crime area in 1991, 
we find that students in high crime areas have often benefitted more from school choice, 
in terms of short-run outcomes, than those in low or medium level crime areas (see 
Section 4.8.1.4 in the appendix). An important fact to point out, however, is that the 
high crime municipalities are mostly urban municipalities, and we found in Chapter 3 
that the effects on marks are mostly driven by individuals living in urban areas. In order 
to not confuse heterogeneous effects between areas with different crime rates with 
heterogeneity arising from living in an urban or rural municipality, we run four separate 
regressions for all combinations of living in high crime vs. medium level crime and 
urban vs. non-urban municipalities. 
Table 48 shows the results for the percentile rank in 9th grade marks and the 
cognitive score, and Table 49 shows results on the distribution of 9th grade math marks. 
To begin with, it should be noted that most of the estimated effects are very small, and 
often not significantly different from zero. Table 48 shows that the small positive results 
                                                                                                                                               
172 See Table 72. 
173 See Table 74. 
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on the average percentile rank in marks are mostly driven by individuals living in high 
crime urban areas, while results in other areas are even sometimes statistically 
significantly negative. However, the identification for the results for the non-urban low 
and medium level crime areas is rather weak, indicated by the failing placebo test. A 
similar pattern arises also when using the 2km radius to construct the choice measure174. 
For the cognitive score at the age of around 18, we find almost no statistically 
significant effect (see Table 48). The probability of achieving a high grade in math is 
positively affected in high crime urban areas, while effects are mostly insignificant for 
the other subgroups (see Table 49). Correspondingly, the probability of receiving a 
passing grade is negatively affected by more choice for some cohorts in all but the high 
crime municipal regions, where the point estimates are positive and sometimes 
significant (see Table 49). Taken together, there is no indication that children living in 
high crime areas were harmed by the school choice as introduced by the reform. Though 
the evidence is sometimes weak, it rather seems to be the case that those living in urban 
high crime areas benefited relatively more than others from increased choice options. 
For all of the above subgroups, we also ran further estimations for the probability of 
committing a crime until age 22, receiving a university degree until age 25, and being 
employed at age 25175. Especially for the latter two, we often ran into identification 
problems in the sense that the placebo test failed. Estimated effects were small but the 
placebo estimates were often of the same size, which is why results on these later 
outcomes should not be overinterpreted. However, as for the above presented results, 
there was almost never an indication for students from more disadvantaged backgrounds 
benefiting less from having more schools nearby before the choice reform. 
Qualitatively, the same is true when estimating the effect of choice using the number of 
schools within a 2 km radius instead of the median commuting distance176. 
4.7 Conclusion 
We can conclude that our analyses show no evidence indicating that children from a 
socio-economically disadvantaged or immigration background have been harmed by 
                                                 
174 See Table 77 and Table 78. 
175 See tables in Section 4.8.2.3.2. 
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school choice as it evolved after the introduction of the 1992 reform. The effects are 
small and similar for different subgroups and rather indicate slightly more positive 
effects on some outcomes for socio-economically disadvantaged children than for socio-
economically more advantaged children. In order to avoid endogenous sorting of 
schools and parents into different areas after the reform, we measure school choice right 
before the introduction of the reform, which is, as we show, still closely related to the 
school choice at the time of decision making. Our estimates thus capture the effect of 
more school choice as is present right at the outset of the reform, including the dynamic 
processes that are a direct result of it, like the opening or closing of public and private 
schools and moves by parents in response to the changed system. Moreover, as we can 
test for, and sometimes find, placebo effects, especially concerning adult outcomes, we 
focus our interpretation on the most reliable results.  
Previous studies analysing the Swedish 1992 choice reforms find that children from a 
lower-educated or migrant background are not hurt by an increased private school share, 
but that they benefit relatively less (Sandström and Bergström (2005), Björklund et al. 
(2004), Ahlin (2003)). These results are, however, no contradiction to the ones found in 
this study, as they focus on a different phenomenon of the choice reform. While 
previous studies have focused on studying the effects of competition by private schools, 
this study evaluates the overall dynamic effects that work through having more choice 
at the outset of the reform, that is also among public schools.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
176 See tables in Section 4.8.2.3.2. 
4 Sweden’s School Choice Reform and Equality of Opportunity 159 
 
4.8 Appendix 
 
4.8.1 Additional analysis 
This section presents additional analyses that are not included in the main body of 
the paper. 
 
4.8.1.1 Segregation between schools 
As the school choice reform has allowed all students to choose the school that they 
would like to attend, it may be that the composition of students at individual schools 
across Sweden has changed after as compared to before the reform. In particular, one 
argument against free school choice often mentioned in the political debate was the 
concern that segregation between schools along the socio-economic or migration 
background of the parents may increase with free school choice (see National Board of 
Education (2003), p.45). At the same time, one could argue that school choice mitigates 
existing residential segregation as the composition of schools is no longer necessarily 
identical to that of the residential area. Böhlmark and Lindahl (2007) have found that 
segregation between public and private schools along parental education and migration 
background increases with an increasing share of students attending private schools in a 
municipality. As this result focuses on the growth of private schools, it does not take 
into account the effects of choice among public schools, which is of high relevance for 
the present study.  
In order to explore whether segregation among students in grades 7-9 has changed 
after the reform, we compute the standard deviation in the share of students from a 
different socio-economic background across schools in Sweden for each cohort of 
students born between 1972 and 1990. We then compare the average of this value for 
cohorts that were affected by the reform to the average for those that were not, that is 
we compare the standard deviation in student characteristics across schools between 
cohorts 1972-1976 and 1977-1990. Note that this exercise does not show effects of 
school choice on student segregation in schools as residential segregation might have 
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changed over time as well, impacting also the composition of students at different 
schools. It is merely a way to describe whether Sweden has seen an increase in student 
segregation across schools after the 1992 school choice reform. 
Table 50 presents the results of this exercise for the socio-economic characteristics 
considered in this study, being parental education, income and immigration background. 
We can see from this table that there is no change in the degree of overall student 
segregation between Swedish schools offering grades 7-9 after the choice reform177. 
 
4.8.1.2 Relation between degree of choice measured before and after the reform 
In this section, we explore the relation between the degree of school choice as 
measured before the introduction of the reform, in 1991, and as measured at the actual 
time the child chooses a school for grades 7-9, at age 13. We conduct this analysis for 
cohorts that started grade 7 in or after 1992, i.e. for students born in or after 1979, as 
these are the cohorts for which we use the pre-reform measure instead of the actual 
measure of school choice in the main estimations that are presented in Section 4.6. In 
order for these main analyses to be meaningful, it is important that pre-reform and 
actual choice measures are related for all subgroups.  
Similar to the corresponding analysis in Chapter 3, we regress the actual choice 
measure, that is the number of schools within the median commuting distance of the 
municipality measured at age 13, on the number of schools within the child’s median 
commuting distance around her 1991 place of residence, i.e. the pre-reform choice 
measure that we use in the main analysis. In order to capture changes in the 
development of the number of schools over time, we interact the choice measure with a 
linear time trend. Since the variation that we use in the main estimations in Section 4.6 
is conditional on covariates and cohort and municipality dummies, we include these 
covariates here as well and cluster on the municipality level178. 
                                                 
177 This result also holds when distinguishing further between individual cohorts instead of just comparing pre- and 
post-reform cohorts. 
178 In accordance with main analyses, the covariates and municipality dummies are measured in 1991, that is at the 
pre-reform location of residence. 
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Table 51 and Table 52 present the marginal effects of an additional school within the 
median commuting distance as measured before the reform on the number of schools 
nearby when the child is 13 years old for the different subgroups. The correlation 
between the pre-reform and the post-reform measure is increasing over time, suggesting 
an increase in the number of schools, and is mostly close to or larger than one. 
Moreover, the relation is similar for the different subgroups and only slightly smaller 
for children from a disadvantaged or migration background.  
The results thus suggest that the choice measures taken in 1991 are closely related to 
the post-reform measures taken at the time when children start grade 7 for all 
subgroups.  
4.8.1.3 Linking the probability of attending a private school to choice measures 
In this section, we link the degree of school choice as present at the outset of the 
reform to the probability of attending a private school. Since attending a private school 
was extremely rare before the 1992 reform, when estimating the effect of having more 
schools to choose from, we cannot follow a before-after comparison strategy as we did 
in Section 4.6. Nevertheless, since the private school share increased only gradually as 
it took some time for private schools to open up, it is also informative to analyse the 
development of the likelihood to attend a private school for the different subgroups over 
time.  
Our results show that the effect of an additional school nearby on the probability of 
attending a private school is small and very similar across all groups (see Table 53 and 
Table 54). The point estimates for children from migrants is slightly larger, but when 
using the choice measure counting the number of schools within a 2km radius instead of 
within the commuting distance, this result reverses. 
4.8.1.4 Heterogeneity with respect to crime level in the municipality 
As we present the results for different subgroups of students living in high versus 
low or medium crime areas in Section 4.6.2 separately for urban and non-urban 
municipalities, this section shows the results when not making the latter distinction. 
Looking first at the outcome percentile rank in 9th grade marks in Table 55, we find that 
the point estimates are always positive and mostly significant in the high crime areas, 
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and always negative and mostly significant in the low and medium crime areas179. 
Though the magnitude of the estimates is still very small, it thus seems that effects in 
the higher crime areas drive the positive pooled results. As outlined in Section 4.6.2, 
this is also related to the fact that municipalities with a higher crime rate are more often 
urban areas.  
With respect to the cognitive score (see Columns 3 and 4 in Table 55) and the 
probability of receiving a high grade in math (see Table 56), we find no sizable 
differences in the size of the effects. Even though we find very small negative effects on 
the probability of receiving a passing grade (of around 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points) for 
those living in low crime areas, there is also a negative Placebo-effect, which makes the 
identification for this outcome difficult. Qualitatively, the results are similar when using 
the 2km radius (see Table 75 and Table 76). We can thus conclude again that we do not 
find any evidence for children in high crime areas having benefited less or having been 
harmed by the reform; if anything, they seem to have benefited a bit more. 
 
4.8.1.5 Further robustness analysis 
In cases where the placebo test fails, that is where we find that the effect of the 
number of schools nearby has changed already for cohorts born in 1975 and 1976 
compared to cohorts born in 1972 to 1974, i.e. cohorts that have not been affected by 
the reform, we modelled and estimated a pre-reform trend to control for these changes. 
To this end, we included both linear and quadratic time trends in the effect of the 
number of schools in the estimation and allowed the corresponding coefficients to differ 
between treatment windows. Then, we repeated the placebo test, that is we tested 
whether this trend captured all time-variation in the effect among cohorts before the 
reform. However, as this was mostly not the case, meaning that the identification 
                                                 
179 One interesting pattern to note is that these differential results between the high- and low/medium crime 
municipalities are due to differences in the estimates for the pre-reform (control group) cohorts, rather than 
differences in the post-reform choice estimates. That is, the estimates for the untreated cohorts 1972-76 suggest that 
having more schools nearby is negatively correlated with students’ outcomes in the high-crime areas, but 
significantly positively correlated with students’ outcomes in the low crime areas. For the post-reform cohorts, effects 
for both subgroups are almost always positive, but since we estimate the differential impact of choice over time, 
taking the pre-reform cohorts 1972-76 as the baseline, we find negative coefficients for the low/medium crime areas, 
and positive coefficients for the high-crime areas. 
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problem could almost never be mitigated by controlling for a pre-reform trend, we do 
not show corresponding estimates. 
 
4.8.2 Tables 
The tables are presented according to the following structure: Section 4.8.2.1 
presents tables from the main descriptive and regression analyses. The next subsection, 
Section 4.8.2.2, includes tables from additional analysis presented in Section 4.8.1 in 
the appendix. Finally, Section 4.8.2.3 presents, for reporting purposes, tables that 
include more detailed descriptive statistics and additional estimation results that we 
performed in relation to the main estimations in this study. 
4.8.2.1 Tables on main descriptive statistics and analyses 
This section presents tables on the main descriptive and regression results. 
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Table 36: Pre- and post-reform averages of student outcomes for different subgroups 
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household income is… 
low income pre 40.87 0.713 0.308 4.72 0.204 0.244 0.678 
post 40.55 0.835 0.294 4.64 0.203 0.292 0.671 
medium income pre 47.59 0.773 0.356 4.98 0.147 0.331 0.729 
post 48.11 0.885 0.370 4.92 0.134 0.389 0.714 
high income pre 55.92 0.821 0.429 5.50 0.129 0.472 0.695 
post 59.82 0.929 0.511 5.60 0.104 0.576 0.654 
parents highest educational degree is … education 
compulsory pre 36.37 0.684 0.275 4.14 0.186 0.159 0.740 
post 34.01 0.763 0.220 4.00 0.201 0.191 0.728 
more than 
compulsory 
pre 50.34 0.788 0.380 5.22 0.150 0.381 0.702 
post 50.68 0.895 0.403 5.14 0.137 0.440 0.684 
parents are… 
both immigrants pre 43.00 0.686 0.276 4.20 0.242 0.249 0.631 
post 44.42 0.824 0.304 4.20 0.226 0.346 0.607 
at least one 
Swedish  
pre 48.52 0.777 0.369 5.10 0.150 0.353 0.713 
post 49.78 0.889 0.396 5.10 0.136 0.420 0.695 
home municipality is 1991… 
high crime pre 48.62 0.753 0.349 5.03 0.185 0.330 0.684 
post 51.34 0.882 0.404 5.04 0.159 0.410 0.662 
low/ medium  pre 48.12 0.776 0.367 5.06 0.149 0.351 0.714 
crime post 48.92 0.885 0.385 5.04 0.139 0.415 0.695 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 40. 
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Table 37: High crime municipalities based on criminal convictions of individuals aged 16-
19 years in year 1991. 
 type of crime high crime low or medium crime 
assault 6.68 5.9 
illegal driving 14.23 15.63 
drunk driving <3% 4.09 
reckless driving <3% 4.68 
damage 4.91 5.56 
petty theft /pilfering 13.9 13.05 
theft 16.9 17.14 
car/ bike theft 7.11 5.9 
   
average crime rate 5.60% 3.50% 
number 29 257 
Note: High crime refers to municipalities that have a criminal conviction rate among 16-19-year-olds that 
is above the 90th percentile in the distribution of all municipalities. “Low or medium crime” refers to the 
complementary group. 
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Table 38: Mean travel distance and the share attending a private school for different 
subgroups 
DISTANCE TO SCHOOL ATTENDING A PRIVATE SCHOOL 
 unconditional 
conditional on 
all covariates unconditional 
conditional on 
all covariates 
  
pre-
reform 
cohorts 
post-
reform 
cohorts 
pre-
reform 
cohorts 
post-
reform 
cohorts 
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
household income: 
low income mean 8.27 8.74 6.54 7.61 0.035 0.038 
sd 39.71 41.07 0.184 
medium income mean 5.99 6.07 5.62 6.26 0.029 0.036 
sd 26.79 26.18 0.168 
high income mean 6.11 5.86 6.65 7.06 0.054 0.039 
sd 32.60 30.48 0.226 
parents highest educational degree is … schooling 
compulsory  mean 6.51 6.78 5.58 6.48 0.017 0.020 
sd 26.36 29.04 0.128 
more than  mean 6.55 6.63 6.18 6.81 0.039 0.038 
 compulsory sd 32.56 31.55 0.193 
parents are...         
both Immigrants mean 5.64 5.37 6.36 6.53 0.059 0.053 
sd 40.52 35.16 0.236 
at least one  mean 6.60 6.74 6.10 6.80 0.035 0.036 
 Swedish sd 31.10 31.05 0.185 
home municipality in 1991       
high crime mean 5.39 5.54 6.49 7.14 0.069 0.053 
sd 34.52 33.11 0.253 
low or medium  mean 6.81 6.91 6.43 6.55 0.029 0.033 
crime sd 31.01 30.91 0.168 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 40 
and for whom we observe at least one outcome. 
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Table 39: Descriptive statistics on choice measures for different subgroups 
      
  
           NUMBER OF SCHOOLS WITHIN.. 
 
  ..median commuting distance ..2km 
    
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform
cohorts 
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform
cohorts 
household income:      
low income mean 3.847 6.112 1,43 1.503 
 sd 5.169 9.273 1.662 1.783 
medium income mean 2.930 4.879 1.118 1.198 
 sd 4.187 8.440 1.400 1.565 
high income mean 4.136 7.754 1.328 1.510 
  sd 4.941 10.73 1.514 1.805 
parents highest educational degree is ... schooling    
compulsory mean 2.850 5.172 1.138 1.333 
 sd 4.076 8.374 1.443 1.610 
more than compulsory mean 3.565 5.976 1.264 1.352 
  sd 4.753 9.430 1.509 1.696 
parents are…      
both Immigrants mean 6.008 10.11 2.169 2.405 
 sd 5.239 10.27 1.734 1.814 
at least one Swedish mean 3.299 5.582 1.188 1.267 
  sd 4.579 9.197 1.466 1.651 
home municipality in 1991     
high crime mean 8.399 11.94 2.466 2.911 
 sd 7.484 9.802 2.150 2.400 
low or medium crime mean 2.322 4.407 0.964 0.961 
  sd 2.645 8.602 1.134 1.169 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 40 
and for whom we observe at least one outcome. 
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Table 40: Effect on distribution of marks in 9th grade math 
CHOICE MEASURE: 
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS WITHIN RADIUS... 
.. MEDIAN COMMUTING 
DISTANCE .. 2KM 
Independent Variable 
receiving a 
passing 
grade 
receiving a 
high grade✝ 
receiving a 
passing  
grade 
receiving a    
high grade✝ 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for: 
Cohorts 1988--1990  0.000342 0.00312*** -0.00118* 0.00778*** 
(0.000278) (0.000350) (0.000695) (0.00106) 
Cohorts 1985--1987  0.000117 0.00248*** -0.0023*** 0.00486*** 
(0.000280) (0.000347) (0.000692) (0.00107) 
Cohorts 1982--1984  -4.84e-05 0.00163*** -0.00184*** 0.00120 
(0.000280) (0.000352) (0.000689) (0.00113) 
Cohorts 1979--1981  0.000503* 0.000618* 0.00198** -0.00254** 
(0.000300) (0.000366) (0.000951) (0.00113) 
Cohorts 1977--1978  -0.000268 -0.000195 -0.000726 -0.00221* 
(0.000388) (0.000440) (0.00113) (0.00132) 
Untreated Cohorts (1972--1976) -0.000156 -0.00132*** 0.00140** 0.000363 
(0.000282) (0.000338) (0.000651) (0.000798) 
     
Placebo test pass pass pass fail 
Observations 1,712,116 1,712,116 1,712,116 1,712,116 
R-squared ‡ 0.134 0.0602 0.134 0.0601 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. The 
definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
✝For the outcome “receiving a high grade”, we left out household income and its squared term to achieve convergence.  
The following control variables are included in the estimation:  
On the municipality level: population density, taxable income and taxable income squared 
On the parish level: share of Swedish citizens among the 16-64-year-olds, mean earnings of the 20-64-year-olds, share of 
university graduates among the 20-64-year-olds, share of employed persons among the 20-64-year-olds, indicator variables 
for whether the population density of 7-15-year-olds is in the lowest or highest quartile across Sweden 
On the individual level: household income and household income squared, whether the household received welfare, age of 
the mother at birth, indicator for living in a single parent household, number of children in the household, indicator for only 
child, whether child was born in Sweden, indicator variables on mothers and fathers country of birth separately (Swedish, 
Nordic (=Norwegian, Finnish, Danish), from other western country(=Western Europe, North America, Australia), rest of 
the world is base category), indicator variables on whether mother and/or father graduated from university or secondary 
education 
 
4 Sweden’s School Choice Reform and Equality of Opportunity 169 
 
Table 41: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
household income subgroups; choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Household income: low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
low 
income 
medium 
income high income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.197*** 0.127*** 0.102*** 
(0.0294) (0.0236) (0.0265) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.154*** 0.0553** 0.0568** 0.00480* 0.00539*** -0.00420* 
(0.0297) (0.0245) (0.0266) (0.00275) (0.00206) (0.00249) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0765** 0.000588 -0.0205 0.00271 0.00419** -0.00544** 
(0.0298) (0.0243) (0.0269) (0.00286) (0.00209) (0.00247) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.0908*** 0.0262 -0.0202 0.00484* 0.00172 -0.00708*** 
(0.0322) (0.0248) (0.0288) (0.00294) (0.00218) (0.00261) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0115 0.00376 -0.0337 0.00636* 0.00100 0.000935 
(0.0363) (0.0316) (0.0358) (0.00354) (0.00302) (0.00326) 
Untreated cohorts -0.106*** -0.0301 -0.00249 -0.00318 -0.00184 0.00537** 
(1972-1976) (0.0286) (0.0231) (0.0259) (0.00275) (0.00207) (0.00250) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass pass pass 
Observations 396,923 873,180 445,318 135,210 312,206 162,766 
R-squared ‡ 0.138 0.131 0.182 0.113 0.113 0.154 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes.  
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Table 42: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different household income subgroups; choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE RECEIVING A HIGH GRADE IN MATH 
RECEIVING A PASSING GRADE IN 
MATH 
Household income: low income medium income 
high 
income 
low 
income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.0037*** 0.0031*** 0.0021*** 0.0007 0.0006* 0.0002 
(0.00049) (0.00044) (0.00057) (0.00048) (0.00037) (0.00038) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0032*** 0.0024*** 0.0014** 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 
(0.00049) (0.00044) (0.00056) (0.00049) (0.00037) (0.00038) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0024*** 0.0016*** 0.0004 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 
(0.00050) (0.00045) (0.00057) (0.00049) (0.00037) (0.00039) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.0013** 0.0009* -0.0000 0.0007 0.0010** 0.0001 
(0.00054) (0.00047) (0.00059) (0.00054) (0.00040) (0.00041) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0000 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0003 
(0.00064) (0.00058) (0.00073) (0.00066) (0.00052) (0.00049) 
Untreated cohorts -0.0021*** -0.0016*** -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 
(1972-1976) (0.00049) (0.00043) (0.00056) (0.00050) (0.00037) (0.00039) 
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass pass pass 
Observations 395,334 871,845 444,937 395,334 871,845 444,937 
R-squared ‡ 0.0425 0.0411 0.0661 0.105 0.124 0.163 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 43: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 for different 
household income subgroups; choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CRIME UNTIL AGE 22 
Household income: low income medium income high income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.00143*** -0.000447 -0.000331 
(0.000381) (0.000284) (0.000287) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.00169*** -0.000606** -0.000283 
(0.000390) (0.000288) (0.000291) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.00165*** -0.000364 -0.000211 
(0.000422) (0.000303) (0.000310) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000609 0.000157 8.49e-05 
(0.000545) (0.000379) (0.000387) 
Untreated cohorts 0.00156*** 0.000679** 0.000453 
(1972-1976) (0.000380) (0.000290) (0.000296) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass 
Observations 326,904 717,262 364,926 
R-squared ‡ 0.0315 0.0304 0.0269 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 44: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
parental education levels; choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Parental education is… more than compulsory compulsory 
more than 
compulsory compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.133*** 0.148*** 
(0.0191) (0.0436) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0806*** 0.0911** 0.00110 0.0144*** 
(0.0194) (0.0430) (0.00159) (0.00448) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0118 0.0358 -0.000499 0.0141*** 
(0.0189) (0.0429) (0.00159) (0.00438) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.0167 0.129*** -0.00157 0.0154*** 
(0.0204) (0.0441) (0.00167) (0.00461) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0165 0.0382 0.00239 0.00557 
(0.0236) (0.0559) (0.00218) (0.00594) 
Untreated cohorts -0.0351* -0.0686* 0.00130 -0.0131*** 
(1972-1976) (0.0181) (0.0406) (0.00160) (0.00431) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,550,081 165,340 544,573 65,609 
R-squared ‡ 0.175 0.060 0.129 0.050 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 45: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different parental education levels; choice radius “median commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE MATH 
Parental education is… more than compulsory compulsory 
more than 
compulsory compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00311*** 0.00242*** 0.000435 0.000221 
(0.000365) (0.000706) (0.000284) (0.000771) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00244*** 0.00232*** 0.000260 -0.000871 
(0.000361) (0.000670) (0.000286) (0.000747) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00155*** 0.00123* 0.000107 -0.00124 
(0.000366) (0.000683) (0.000286) (0.000754) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000499 0.00138* 0.000448 0.00141* 
(0.000379) (0.000749) (0.000306) (0.000832) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000319 0.000983 -0.000307 0.000361 
(0.000458) (0.000934) (0.000390) (0.00110) 
Untreated cohorts -0.00132*** -0.00101 -0.000267 0.000439 
(1972-1976) (0.000351) (0.000657) (0.000289) (0.000759) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,547,652 164,464 1,547,652 164,464 
R-squared ‡ 0.0575 0.0206 0.133 0.0609 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 46: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
parental migration backgrounds; choice radius “median commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Parental migration background at least one Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.142*** 0.161*** 
(0.0186) (0.0547) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0892*** 0.0810 0.00118 0.00972* 
(0.0190) (0.0537) (0.00156) (0.00542) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0172 -0.00374 -0.000621 0.00739 
(0.0186) (0.0542) (0.00157) (0.00539) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.0180 0.0767 -0.00212 0.00790 
(0.0200) (0.0561) (0.00167) (0.00562) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0185 0.00110 0.00270 0.00242 
(0.0237) (0.0664) (0.00216) (0.00712) 
Untreated cohorts -0.0361** -0.0871 0.00160 -0.00990* 
(1972-1976) (0.0177) (0.0534) (0.00158) (0.00545) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,599,471 115,950 575,487 34,695 
R-squared ‡ 0.191 0.139 0.139 0.150 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
4 Sweden’s School Choice Reform and Equality of Opportunity 175 
 
Table 47: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different parental migration backgrounds; choice radius “median commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE MATH 
Parental education is… at least one Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00330*** 0.00282*** 0.000471* 0.000697 
(0.000362) (0.000859) (0.000281) (0.000978) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00261*** 0.00249*** 0.000270 -1.15e-05 
(0.000359) (0.000849) (0.000283) (0.000969) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00171*** 0.00161* 8.60e-05 -0.000396 
(0.000363) (0.000868) (0.000283) (0.000977) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000554 0.000581 0.000347 0.00141 
(0.000379) (0.000908) (0.000309) (0.00101) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000141 -0.00134 -0.000330 -0.000129 
(0.000456) (0.00104) (0.000399) (0.00124) 
Untreated cohorts -0.00141*** -0.000966 -0.000230 -0.000292 
(1972-1976) (0.000348) (0.000846) (0.000287) (0.000988) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,596,671 115,445 1,596,671 115,414 
R-squared ‡ 0.0606 0.0527 0.135 0.121 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1. 
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 48: Effect of choice on the percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different types of home 
municipalities in 1991; choice radius “median commuting distance"  
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
municipality 
characteristics 1991 
low/medium crime high crime low/medium crime high crime 
non-
urban urban 
non-
urban urban 
non-
urban urban 
non-
urban urban 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  -0.229** -0.034 -0.252 0.260*** 
(0.095) (0.034) (0.445) (0.030) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.054 -0.066* -0.603 0.186*** 0.021** 0.001 -0.035 -0.004 
(0.096) (0.034) (0.430) (0.032) (0.010) (0.003) (0.041) (0.003) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.197** -0.114*** -0.250 0.084*** 0.011 0.000 0.011 -0.004 
(0.096) (0.034) (0.435) (0.032) (0.009) (0.003) (0.044) (0.003) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.097 -0.085** -0.532 0.103*** 0.009 -0.001 -0.038 -0.001 
(0.096) (0.034) (0.397) (0.034) (0.010) (0.003) (0.040) (0.003) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.081 -0.084* 0.175 0.034 0.005 0.002 0.0052 0.001 
(0.119) (0.050) (0.421) (0.035) (0.012) (0.004) (0.040) (0.003) 
Untreated cohorts 0.267*** 0.102*** 0.093 -0.131*** -0.014** 0.002 -0.005 0.003 
(1972-1976) (0.072) (0.034) (0.282) (0.027) (0.007) (0.003) (0.026) (0.002) 
Placebo Test fail pass pass pass pass pass pass pass 
Observations 714,999 666,671 69,495 264,256 257,026 239,529 24,708 88,919 
R-squared ‡ 0.164 0.196 0.167 0.205 0.124 0.155 0.129 0.179 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete list of 
included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 49 : Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for different 
types of home municipalities in 1991; choice radius “median commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE 
municipality 
characteristics 1991 
low/medium crime high crime low/medium crime high crime 
non-
urban urban 
non-
urban urban 
non-
urban urban 
non-
urban urban 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  -0.001 0.002** 0.009 0.004*** -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 0.001* 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.002 0.001* -0.001 0.003*** -0.002 -0.001* -0.009 0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.002*** -0.003** -0.001** -0.004 0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.001 0.000 -0.007 0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 0.001** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.0001) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.001 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) 
Untreated cohorts 0.001 0.000 -0.007 -0.001 0.002* 0.001* 0.003 -0.001 
(1972-1976) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass pass pass pass pass 
Observations 713,727 665,519 69,341 263,529 713,727 665,519 69,341 263,529 
R-squared ‡ 0.0504 0.0630 0.0572 0.0780 0.127 0.135 0.132 0.154 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete 
list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
 
 
4.8.2.2 Tables containing additional analysis presented in the appendix 
This section includes tables relating to additional analysis presented in Section 4.8.1 
in the appendix. 
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Table 50: Average between-school standard deviation of parental characteristics 
  
Mean value of the between school standard 
deviation 
Share in the school with: 
 
pre-reform 
 (cohorts 72-76)  
post-reform 
 (cohorts 77-90) 
Both parents non-Swedish   0.040 0.041 
Both parents only pre-secondary education   0.028 0.029 
Low household income  0.031 0.031 
Medium household income  0.037 0.037 
High household income  0.043 0.044 
Number of observations  5040 18851 
 
Table 51: Relation between pre-reform and post-reform choice measure, separately for 
subgroups according to household income and parental education 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE  ACTUAL NUMBER OF SCHOOLS WITHIN MEDIAN COMMUTING DISTANCE 
Household background low     income 
medium 
income 
high   
income 
higher 
educated 
low 
educated 
Marginal effect of number of schools within median commuting distance in 1991 for: 
      
Cohorts 1988-1990  1.195*** 1.324*** 1.381*** 1.323*** 1.292*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0210) (0.0200) (0.0291) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 1.037*** 1.153*** 1.210*** 1.155*** 1.120*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0211) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.880*** 0.981*** 1.039*** 0.986*** 0.948*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0155) (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0173) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.722*** 0.810*** 0.868*** 0.817*** 0.776*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0189) (0.0145) (0.0163) (0.0203) 
      
Observations 253,127 567,675 296,972 1,035,610 82,164 
R-squared ‡ 0.731 0.784 0.805 0.782 0.784 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
4 Sweden’s School Choice Reform and Equality of Opportunity 179 
 
Table 52: Relation between pre-reform and post-reform choice measure, separately for 
subgroups according to parental migration background and crime rate of municipality in 
1991 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE  ACTUAL NUMBER OF SCHOOLS WITHIN MEDIAN COMMUTING DISTANCE 
Migration background 
and area backgrounds 
at least one 
parent born in 
Sweden 
both parents 
born abroad 
low/medium 
crime 
municipality 
high crime 
municipality 
Marginal effect of number of schools within median commuting distance in 1991 for: 
     
Cohorts 1988-1990  1.328*** 1.221*** 1.369*** 1.279*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0278) (0.0178) (0.0356) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 1.162*** 1.060*** 1.193*** 1.117*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0222) (0.0141) (0.0231) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.996*** 0.899*** 1.016*** 0.956*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0208) (0.0128) (0.0155) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.830*** 0.738*** 0.839*** 0.795*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0242) (0.0144) (0.0199) 
     
Observations 1,035,577 82,197 801,339 204,183 
R-squared ‡ 0.786 0.709 0.807 0.718 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 53: Effect of choice on probability of attending a private school, separately for 
subgroups according to household income and parental education 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE ATTENDING A PRIVATE SCHOOL 
Household 
background:  
low 
income✝ 
medium 
income✝ 
high 
income✝ 
parental 
education 
high✝ 
parental 
education 
low✝ 
Marginal effect of choice for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.000493** 0.000363** 0.000502 0.000425** 0.000633*** 
(0.000219) (0.000179) (0.000316) (0.000216) (0.000182) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.000417*** 0.000326*** 0.000331 0.000324** 0.000516*** 
(0.000135) (0.000111) (0.000226) (0.000139) (0.000135) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000170* 0.0001 (0.0000) (0.0001) 0.000142** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000171) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000146* 0.000111* 0.000271 0.000172* 0.0000 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000180) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Observations 253,076 545,596 280,816 1,003,352 76,136 
R-squared ‡ 0.122 0.137 0.116 0.128 0.140 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, 
**, *. For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained 
in Section 4.5.1. ‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes.✝= left out municipality dummies to achieve 
convergence 
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Table 54: Effect of choice on probability of attending a private school, separately for 
subgroups according to parental migration background and crime level in home 
municipality in 1991 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ATTENDING A PRIVATE SCHOOL 
migration background and area 
backgrounds 
at least 
one parent 
born in 
Sweden✝ 
both parents 
born 
abroad✝ 
low/medium 
crime 
municipality✝ 
high crime 
municipality✝ 
Marginal effect of choice for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.000325 0.00187*** 0.000245 -0.000107 
(0.000207) (0.000421) (0.000200) (0.000611) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.000238* 0.00154*** 0.000140 0.000325 
(0.000131) (0.000318) (0.000116) (0.000473) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0001 0.000533** -0.0001 0.000401 
(0.0001) (0.000215) (0.0001) (0.000326) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000122 0.000724*** -0.0001 0.000669*** 
(0.0001) (0.000185) (0.0001) (0.000203) 
Observations 1,000,823 78,665 860,306 218,735 
R-squared ‡ 0.133 0.123 0.131 0.122 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, 
*. For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in 
Section 4.5.1. ‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes.✝= left out municipality dummies to achieve 
convergence 
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Table 55: Effect of choice on the percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
crime levels in home municipalities in 1991; choice radius “median commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
municipality 
characteristics 1991 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  -0.0376 0.221*** 
(0.0296) (0.0263) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.0758** 0.149*** 0.00279 -0.00235 
(0.0299) (0.0278) (0.00256) (0.00239) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.129*** 0.0447 0.000882 -0.00209 
(0.0297) (0.0273) (0.00255) (0.00252) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.0981*** 0.0733** 0.0001 -0.00137 
(0.0300) (0.0294) (0.00267) (0.00255) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.111*** 0.0398 0.00484 0.00361 
(0.0430) (0.0297) (0.00370) (0.00299) 
Untreated cohorts 0.118*** -0.108*** -0.000163 0.00222 
(1972-1976) (0.0296) (0.0243) (0.00263) (0.00226) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,381,670 333,751 496,555 113,627 
R-squared ‡ 0.182 0.201 0.141 0.169 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 56: Effect of choice on the probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math 
for different crime levels in home municipalities in 1991; choice radius “median 
commuting distance" 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE 
municipality characteristics 
1991 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00194*** 0.00392*** -0.00136*** 0.000784* 
(0.000566) (0.000522) (0.000461) (0.000427) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00151*** 0.00255*** -0.00149*** 0.000362 
(0.000565) (0.000521) (0.000464) (0.000428) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000831 0.00118** -0.00171*** 0.000232 
(0.000572) (0.000540) (0.000465) (0.000433) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000366 0.000315 -0.00117** 0.000963** 
(0.000583) (0.000539) (0.000483) (0.000490) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000905 0.000348 -0.00129* 0.000300 
(0.000828) (0.000618) (0.000711) (0.000564) 
Untreated cohorts -0.000551 -0.000676 0.00151*** -0.000436 
(1972-1976) (0.000567) (0.000480) (0.000467) (0.000441) 
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass 
Observations 1,379,246 332,870 1,379,246 332,870 
R-squared ‡ 0.0571 0.0741 0.131 0.149 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
 
4.8.2.3 Tables reporting additional descriptive statistics and analyses 
This subsection presents, for reporting purposes, tables including more detailed 
descriptive statistics (in Section 4.8.2.3.1) and additional estimation results relating to 
the analyses in the main body of the text (in Section 4.8.2.3.2). 
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4.8.2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The following tables repeat the information discussed in Section 4.4.2, but 
additionally contain the standard deviation and number of observations in the different 
subgroups. 
 
Table 57: Descriptive statistics on outcome variables, separately for different household 
income groups 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
  low income medium income high income 
  
pre-
reform 
cohorts 
post-
reform 
cohorts 
pre-
reform 
cohorts 
post-
reform 
cohorts 
pre-
reform 
cohorts 
post-
reform 
cohorts 
percentile rank    
marks 9 
mean 40.87 40.55 47.59 48.11 55.92 59.82 
sd 28.19 28.12 27.93 27.83 28.28 27.28 
N 100004 296919 224485 648695 113464 331854 
receive passing   
grade in math 
mean 0.713 0.835 0.773 0.885 0.821 0.929 
sd 0.452 0.371 0.419 0.319 0.384 0.258 
N 99240 296094 223856 647989 113259 331678 
receive high        
grade in math 
mean 0.308 0.294 0.356 0.370 0.429 0.511 
sd 0.462 0.455 0.479 0.483 0.495 0.500 
N 99240 296094 223856 647989 113259 331678 
cognitive score 
mean 4.718 4.639 4.978 4.919 5.497 5.600 
sd 1.926 1.928 1.896 1.905 1.914 1.889 
N 47467 90093 109378 205247 56300 107821 
crime until age 22 
mean 0.204 0.203 0.147 0.134 0.129 0.104 
sd 0.403 0.402 0.354 0.341 0.335 0.305 
N 103987 233623 229206 501059 116609 255475 
university degree    
age 25 
mean 0.244 0.292 0.331 0.389 0.472 0.576 
sd 0.429 0.455 0.470 0.487 0.499 0.494 
N 102877 162698 227150 351499 115268 178532 
employed age 25 
mean 0.678 0.671 0.729 0.714 0.695 0.654 
sd 0.467 0.470 0.445 0.452 0.460 0.476 
N 103206 164076 227692 353907 115611 180085 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 40. 
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Table 58: Descriptive statistics on outcome variables, separately for different levels of 
parental education 
  EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF PARENTS 
  compulsory schooling 
more than compulsory 
schooling 
  
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
percentile rank marks 
9 
mean 36.37 34.01 50.34 50.68 
sd 26.55 25.80 28.41 28.44 
N 66721 98619 371232 1.179e+06 
receive passing grade 
in math 
mean 0.684 0.763 0.788 0.895 
sd 0.465 0.426 0.409 0.307 
N 66284 98180 370071 1.178e+06 
receive high grade in 
math 
mean 0.275 0.220 0.380 0.403 
sd 0.447 0.414 0.485 0.491 
N 66284 98180 370071 1.178e+06 
cognitive score 
mean 4.142 3.997 5.218 5.137 
sd 1.818 1.801 1.902 1.922 
N 31801 34827 181344 368334 
crime until age 22 
mean 0.186 0.201 0.150 0.137 
sd 0.389 0.401 0.357 0.344 
N 69070 89864 380732 900293 
university degree age 
25 
mean 0.159 0.191 0.381 0.440 
sd 0.366 0.393 0.486 0.496 
N 68456 71130 376839 621599 
employed age 25 
mean 0.740 0.728 0.702 0.684 
sd 0.439 0.445 0.457 0.465 
N 68738 72153 377771 625915 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 40. 
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Table 59: Descriptive statistics on outcome variables, separately for different parental 
migration backgrounds 
  PARENTAL MIGRATION BACKGROUND 
  both immigrants at least one is Swedish 
    
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
percentile rank        
marks 9 
mean 43.00 44.42 48.52 49.78 
sd 28.63 28.94 28.54 28.53 
N 24390 91560 413563 1.186e+06 
receive passing grade 
in math 
mean 0.686 0.824 0.777 0.889 
sd 0.464 0.381 0.416 0.314 
N 24152 91293 412203 1.184e+06 
receive high grade in 
math 
mean 0.276 0.304 0.369 0.396 
sd 0.447 0.460 0.483 0.489 
N 24152 91293 412203 1.184e+06 
cognitive score 
mean 4.197 4.201 5.100 5.095 
sd 1.966 1.924 1.917 1.927 
N 10017 25427 203128 377734 
crime until age 22 
mean 0.242 0.226 0.150 0.136 
sd 0.428 0.418 0.357 0.343 
N 25883 74372 423919 915785 
university degree age 
25 
mean 0.249 0.346 0.353 0.420 
sd 0.432 0.476 0.478 0.494 
N 25444 51737 419851 640992 
employed age 25 
mean 0.631 0.607 0.713 0.695 
sd 0.482 0.488 0.452 0.460 
N 25577 52375 420932 645693 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 40. 
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Table 60: Descriptive statistics on outcome variables, separately for different levels crime 
in home municipality in 1991 
  MUNICIPALITY CHARACTERISTICS IN 1991 
  high crime low crime 
  
pre-reform 
cohorts 
post-reform 
cohorts 
pre-reform 
cohort 
post-reform 
cohorts 
percentile rank marks 9 
mean 48.62 51.34 48.12 48.92 
sd 29.20 29.35 28.43 28.39 
N 80164 253587 357789 1.024e+06 
receive passing grade in 
math 
mean 0.753 0.882 0.776 0.885 
sd 0.431 0.323 0.417 0.319 
N 79679 253191 356676 1.023e+06 
receive high grade in 
math 
mean 0.349 0.404 0.367 0.385 
sd 0.477 0.491 0.482 0.487 
N 79679 253191 356676 1.023e+06 
cognitive score 
mean 5.029 5.040 5.064 5.038 
sd 1.966 1.957 1.920 1.934 
N 38866 76667 174279 326494 
crime until age 22 
mean 0.185 0.159 0.149 0.139 
sd 0.388 0.365 0.356 0.346 
N 83860 193224 365942 796933 
university degree age 25 
mean 0.330 0.410 0.351 0.415 
sd 0.470 0.492 0.477 0.493 
N 82968 132998 362327 559731 
employed age 25 
mean 0.684 0.662 0.714 0.695 
sd 0.465 0.473 0.452 0.460 
N 83239 134120 363270 563948 
Note: Sample contains only observations with full information on all covariates X given below Table 40. 
 
4.8.2.3.2 Tables on subgroup analysis for later outcomes 
The following section presents additional tables on the results of the effects of more 
school choice through having many schools nearby just before the reform. Thus, as 
regards the structure, the tables are similar to those discussed in Section 4.6.2. The next 
subsection includes results from using the choice measure that counts the number of 
schools within the median commuting distance of the home municipality around a 
student’s home in 1991, the subsequent one presents those using a radius of 2km 
instead.  
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Using the choice measure “number of schools within median commuting distance” 
 
Table 61: Effect of choice on education and employment at age 25 for different household 
income subgroups; choice radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE UNIVERSITY DEGREE AT AGE 25 EMPLOYED AT AGE 25 
Household income: low income medium income 
high 
income low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00174*** 0.00186*** 0.000604 0.00149*** 0.000671* 0.000237 
(0.000454) (0.000404) (0.000507) (0.000476) (0.000375) (0.000465) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000840* 0.000531 -0.000740 0.00114** 0.000716* 0.000138 
(0.000497) (0.000425) (0.000528) (0.000490) (0.000398) (0.000485) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000917 0.000145 -0.00119* 0.000922 -0.000128 -0.000569 
(0.000607) (0.000545) (0.000658) (0.000598) (0.000483) (0.000605) 
Untreated cohorts -0.000758* -0.000301 0.000219 -0.0024*** -0.0012*** -0.000467 
(1972-1976) (0.000451) (0.000405) (0.000517) (0.000487) (0.000387) (0.000473) 
Placebo Test pass fail fail fail fail pass 
Observations 259,062 571,525 289,872 259,226 571,687 289,932 
R-squared ‡ 0.0936 0.0917 0.134 0.0254 0.0271 0.0405 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 62: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 and education 
and employment at age 25 for different parental education levels; choice radius “median 
commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE CRIME AGE 22 UNIVERSITY DEGREE AGE 25 EMPLOYED AGE 25 
Parental education 
is… 
more than 
compulsory compulsory 
more than 
compulsory✝ compulsory 
more than 
compulsory compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.00054*** -0.000811 
(0.000197) (0.000600) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.00063*** -0.00122** 0.00134*** 0.00229*** 0.000416 0.00295*** 
(0.000201) (0.000581) (0.000313) (0.000612) (0.000273) (0.000698) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.000431** -0.0022*** 0.0001 0.00171*** 0.000348 0.00251*** 
(0.000216) (0.000623) (0.000329) (0.000656) (0.000296) (0.000731) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.000129 -0.00159** -0.000708* 0.000949 -0.000179 0.00136 
(0.000287) (0.000745) (0.000414) (0.000848) (0.000343) (0.000909) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000728*** 0.000879 -0.000153 -0.000841 -0.0009*** -0.0033*** 
(1972-1976) (0.000201) (0.000585) (0.000312) (0.000603) (0.000279) (0.000712) 
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass fail pass 
Observations 1,255,800 153,292 984,366 136,093 984,638 136,207 
R-squared ‡ 0.0364 0.0366 0.114 0.0374 0.0293 0.0339 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a 
complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. ✝For the outcome “receiving a high grade”, we left out household income and its 
squared term to achieve convergence.  
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Table 63: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 and education 
and employment at age 25 for different parental migration backgrounds; choice radius 
“median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE CRIME AGE 22 UNIVERSITY DEGREE AGE 25 EMPLOYED AGE 25 
Parental migration 
background 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish✝ 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.000475** -0.00106 
(0.000194) (0.000784) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.000508** -0.00181** 0.000852*** 0.00215*** 0.000520* 0.00124 
(0.000197) (0.000790) (0.000308) (0.000804) (0.000270) (0.000887) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.000372* -0.00208** -0.000251 0.00128 0.000496* 0.000833 
(0.000215) (0.000835) (0.000327) (0.000836) (0.000292) (0.000930) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.000189 -0.00156 -0.000747* 0.000721 -0.000182 0.000888 
(0.000280) (0.00100) (0.000419) (0.00105) (0.000345) (0.00117) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000607*** 0.00142* 0.000252 -0.000779 -0.0011*** -0.00120 
(1972-1976) (0.000199) (0.000787) (0.000309) (0.000812) (0.000276) (0.000899) 
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass fail pass 
Observations 1,313,155 95,925 1,045,998 74,437 1,046,309 74,523 
R-squared ‡ 0.0355 0.0319 0.128 0.103 0.0291 0.0300 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a 
complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1. ‡Pseudo R-
squared for binary outcomes.✝For the outcome “receiving a high grade”, we left out household income and its squared term 
to achieve convergence.  
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Table 64: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 and education 
and employment at age 25 for different crime levels in home municipalities in 1991; choice 
radius “median commuting distance” 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE CRIME AGE 22 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE AGE 
25 EMPLOYED AGE 25 
municipality 
characteristics 
1991 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.000262 -0.0001 
(0.000305) (0.000329) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000189 -0.000279 -0.0016*** 0.00208*** 0.000805* -0.000172 
(0.000311) (0.000325) (0.000515) (0.000434) (0.000460) (0.000401) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000344 -0.000474 -0.0026*** 0.00134*** 0.000803* -0.000255 
(0.000325) (0.000349) (0.000520) (0.000462) (0.000485) (0.000423) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.00125** 0.0000 -0.0026*** 0.000324 -0.000980 -0.000279 
(0.000487) (0.000414) (0.000775) (0.000527) (0.000612) (0.000475) 
Untreated cohorts -0.000198 0.000582* 0.00304*** -0.0015*** -0.00122** -0.000593 
(1972-1976) (0.000313) (0.000328) (0.000524) (0.000406) (0.000476) (0.000390) 
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass pass pass 
Observations 1,140,119 268,973 909,773 210,686 910,050 210,795 
R-squared ‡ 0.0369 0.0400 0.125 0.132 0.0296 0.0299 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For 
a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 65: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
household income subgroups; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Household income: low income medium income 
high 
income low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.536*** 0.294*** 0.199** 
(0.0924) (0.0740) (0.0822) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.403*** -0.0536 0.0289 0.0397*** 0.0216*** -0.00189 
(0.0949) (0.0796) (0.0895) (0.00945) (0.00718) (0.00871) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.0995 -0.157* -0.201** 0.0210** 0.0208*** -0.0144 
(0.0989) (0.0803) (0.0937) (0.00973) (0.00719) (0.00895) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.158 -0.0316 -0.336*** 0.0370*** 0.0132* -0.0195** 
(0.0989) (0.0802) (0.0998) (0.00942) (0.00723) (0.00894) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0974 -0.0213 -0.243** 0.0338*** 0.00823 0.000851 
(0.105) (0.0891) (0.109) (0.0108) (0.00839) (0.00983) 
Untreated cohorts -0.0654 0.104* 0.320*** -0.0259*** -0.0145*** 0.00520 
(1972-1976) (0.0685) (0.0547) (0.0648) (0.00670) (0.00514) (0.00639) 
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass pass pass 
Observations 396,923 873,180 445,318 135,210 312,206 162,766 
R-squared ‡ 0.138 0.131 0.182 0.113 0.113 0.154 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 66: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different household income subgroups; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE RECEIVING A HIGH GRADE IN MATH RECEIVING A PASSING GRADE IN MATH 
Household income: low income medium income 
high 
income low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.0105*** 0.00715*** 0.00693*** 0.000156 -0.000122 -0.00148 
(0.00153) (0.00134) (0.00167) (0.00131) (0.000940) (0.000951) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00784*** 0.00370*** 0.00390** -0.000992 -0.00174* -0.00210** 
(0.00162) (0.00136) (0.00179) (0.00133) (0.000929) (0.000946) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00461*** 0.000515 -0.000916 -0.00108 -0.00141 -0.00114 
(0.00169) (0.00149) (0.00180) (0.00133) (0.000911) (0.000956) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.00159 -0.00223 -0.0056*** 0.00190 0.00340*** 0.000278 
(0.00169) (0.00143) (0.00191) (0.00170) (0.00125) (0.00132) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.0000 -0.00137 -0.00377* -0.00122 -0.0001 -0.000703 
(0.00194) (0.00176) (0.00210) (0.00196) (0.00147) (0.00152) 
Untreated cohorts -0.00250** -0.000675 0.00328** 0.000454 0.000565 0.00166* 
(1972-1976) (0.00122) (0.00101) (0.00134) (0.00119) (0.000872) (0.000931) 
Placebo Test fail fail pass pass pass pass 
Observations 395,334 871,845 444,937 395,334 871,845 444,937 
R-squared ‡ 0.0423 0.0410 0.0661 0.105 0.124 0.163 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For 
a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 67: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 for different 
household income subgroups; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE CRIME UNTIL AGE 22 
Household income: low income medium income high income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.00275** 0.000760 0.00126 
(0.00123) (0.000860) (0.000950) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.00253* 0.000462 0.000729 
(0.00134) (0.000899) (0.000998) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.00287** -0.000281 0.00178* 
(0.00135) (0.000920) (0.00107) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 4.03e-05 0.00129 0.00159 
(0.00161) (0.00105) (0.00119) 
Untreated cohorts 0.00311*** 0.000507 -0.000851 
(1972-1976) (0.000958) (0.000690) (0.000758) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass 
Observations 326,904 717,262 364,926 
R-squared ‡ 0.0315 0.0304 0.0269 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 68: Effect of choice on education and employment at age 25 for different household 
income subgroups; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE UNIVERSITY DEGREE AT AGE 25 EMPLOYED AT AGE 25 
Household income: low income medium income high income low income 
medium 
income 
high 
income 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00868*** 0.00728*** 0.0001 0.00420*** 0.00151 0.00132 
(0.00153) (0.00134) (0.00189) (0.00155) (0.00116) (0.00152) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.00517*** 0.00444*** -0.00376** 0.00144 0.00161 -0.0000 
(0.00160) (0.00137) (0.00188) (0.00153) (0.00121) (0.00165) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.000698 0.00265* -0.00287 0.00299 0.00182 -0.00224 
(0.00178) (0.00156) (0.00212) (0.00183) (0.00139) (0.00192) 
Untreated cohorts -0.00251** -0.000501 0.00392*** -0.006*** -0.0055*** -0.0047*** 
(1972-1976) (0.00111) (0.000960) (0.00132) (0.00121) (0.000898) (0.00125) 
Placebo Test pass fail pass pass fail pass 
Observations 259,062 571,525 289,872 259,226 571,687 289,932 
R-squared ‡ 0.0936 0.0917 0.134 0.0254 0.0271 0.0406 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 69: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
parental education levels; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Parental education is… more than compulsory compulsory 
more than 
compulsory compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.282*** 0.453*** 
(0.0591) (0.166) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.0565 0.230 0.0157*** 0.0525*** 
(0.0634) (0.156) (0.00517) (0.0184) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.155** 0.237 0.00629 0.0511*** 
(0.0627) (0.151) (0.00539) (0.0158) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.131* 0.349** 0.00745 0.0385*** 
(0.0675) (0.140) (0.00555) (0.0147) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.156** 0.232 0.0112* 0.0291* 
(0.0682) (0.152) (0.00642) (0.0161) 
Untreated cohorts 0.166*** -0.207** -0.00820** -0.0424*** 
(1972-1976) (0.0435) (0.0916) (0.00382) (0.00987) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,550,081 165,340 544,573 65,609 
R-squared ‡ 0.175 0.060 0.129 0.051 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 70: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different parental education levels; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE MATH 
Parental education is… more than compulsory compulsory 
more than 
compulsory compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00748*** 0.00949*** -0.000894 -0.000081 
(0.00110) (0.00258) (0.000702) (0.00245) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00450*** 0.00623** -0.00187*** -0.00436* 
(0.00111) (0.00246) (0.000696) (0.00229) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000417 0.00487** -0.00153** -0.00309 
(0.00119) (0.00243) (0.000697) (0.00208) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.00347*** 0.00312 0.00137 0.00623** 
(0.00118) (0.00240) (0.000973) (0.00266) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.00307** 0.00308 -0.00113 0.00179 
(0.00138) (0.00258) (0.00117) (0.00284) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000709 -0.00284* 0.00108 0.00268 
(1972-1976) (0.000838) (0.00158) (0.000665) (0.00175) 
Placebo Test fail pass pass pass 
Observations 1,547,652 164,464 1,547,652 164,464 
R-squared ‡ 0.0574 0.0205 0.133 0.0608 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 71: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 and education 
and employment at age 25 for different parental education levels; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE CRIME AGE 22 UNIVERSITY DEGREE AGE 25 EMPLOYED AGE 25 
Parental education 
is… 
more than 
compulsory compulsory 
more than 
compulsory✝ compulsory 
more than 
compulsory compulsory 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.000466 0.000236 
(0.000605) (0.00218) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000532 -0.00328* 0.00466*** 0.0139*** 0.00107 0.0102*** 
(0.000647) (0.00196) (0.00110) (0.00209) (0.000883) (0.00224) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000552 -0.0055*** 0.00183* 0.00720*** 0.0000 0.00826*** 
(0.000684) (0.00196) (0.00109) (0.00204) (0.000929) (0.00223) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.00165** -0.00168 -0.000402 0.00494** 0.000632 0.00490** 
(0.000820) (0.00204) (0.00127) (0.00222) (0.00106) (0.00240) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000335 0.00135 0.000711 -0.00277** -0.0048*** -0.0078*** 
(1972-1976) (0.000485) (0.00134) (0.000766) (0.00138) (0.000705) (0.00159) 
Placebo Test pass pass fail pass fail pass 
Observations 1,255,800 153,292 984,366 136,093 984,638 136,207 
R-squared ‡ 0.0364 0.0366 0.114 0.0375 0.0293 0.0340 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a 
complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes.✝For the outcome “receiving a high grade”, we left out household income and its 
squared term to achieve convergence.  
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Table 72: Effect of choice on percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
parental migration backgrounds; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
Parental migration background at least one Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.381*** 0.0352 
(0.0572) (0.177) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.104 0.0675 0.0156*** 0.0512*** 
(0.0633) (0.177) (0.00526) (0.0185) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.128** -0.214 0.00507 0.0239 
(0.0629) (0.178) (0.00538) (0.0178) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.118* 0.0501 0.00284 0.0360** 
(0.0656) (0.177) (0.00554) (0.0181) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.147** 0.00338 0.0139** 0.00700 
(0.0677) (0.194) (0.00631) (0.0197) 
Untreated cohorts 0.117*** 0.0868 -0.00834** -0.0369*** 
(1972-1976) (0.0421) (0.138) (0.00378) (0.0135) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass 
Observations 1,599,471 115,950 575,487 34,695 
R-squared ‡ 0.190 0.139 0.139 0.150 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 73: Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for 
different parental migration backgrounds; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE MATH 
Parental education is… at least one Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00877*** 0.00683** -0.000227 -0.00457* 
(0.00108) (0.00288) (0.000701) (0.00270) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.00506*** 0.00725** -0.00179** -0.00336 
(0.00111) (0.00293) (0.000699) (0.00266) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.00108 0.00265 -0.00155** -0.00324 
(0.00118) (0.00298) (0.000695) (0.00272) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.00330*** -0.00161 0.00103 0.00355 
(0.00117) (0.00298) (0.000994) (0.00306) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.00284** 0.000581 -0.00103 -0.00115 
(0.00137) (0.00321) (0.00117) (0.00361) 
Untreated cohorts 0.000360 -0.00178 0.00103 0.00333 
(1972-1976) (0.000820) (0.00226) (0.000660) (0.00250) 
Placebo Test fail pass pass pass 
Observations 1,596,671 115,445 1,596,671 115,414 
R-squared ‡ 0.0605 0.0524 0.135 0.121 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 74: Effect of choice on probability of committing a crime until age 22 and education 
and employment at age 25 for different parental migration backgrounds; choice radius 
2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE CRIME AGE 22 
UNIVERSITY DEGREE AGE 
25 EMPLOYED AGE 25 
Parental migration 
background 
at least one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
at least one 
Swedish✝ 
both 
immigrants 
at least 
one 
Swedish 
both 
immigrants 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.000781 -0.00398 
(0.000613) (0.00251) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000908 -0.00555** 0.00283*** 0.0115*** 0.00134 0.00672** 
(0.000647) (0.00251) (0.00108) (0.00286) (0.000857) (0.00307) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 0.000726 -0.0080*** 0.000992 0.00818*** 0.000822 0.00415 
(0.000682) (0.00257) (0.00108) (0.00296) (0.000905) (0.00309) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 0.00220*** -0.00674** -0.000755 0.00882*** 0.000575 0.00619* 
(0.000804) (0.00280) (0.00127) (0.00313) (0.00108) (0.00335) 
Untreated cohorts 4.68e-05 0.00372* 0.00161** -0.0057*** -0.0052*** -0.00373 
(1972-1976) (0.000475) (0.00200) (0.000759) (0.00211) (0.000679) (0.00240) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass fail pass 
Observations 1,313,155 95,925 1,045,998 74,437 1,046,309 74,523 
R-squared ‡ 0.0355 0.0319 0.128 0.104 0.0291 0.0300 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a 
complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes.✝For the outcome “receiving a high grade”, we left out household income and 
its squared term to achieve convergence.  
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Table 75: Effect of choice on the percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different 
crime levels in home municipalities in 1991; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
municipality characteristics 
1991 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  -0.142** 0.518*** 
(0.0711) (0.0909) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 -0.283*** 0.344*** 0.0155** 0.0143* 
(0.0748) (0.0992) (0.00739) (0.00824) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 -0.173** -0.0149 0.0160** -0.00371 
(0.0819) (0.0955) (0.00728) (0.00866) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.0515 0.0444 0.0213*** 0.00130 
(0.0760) (0.107) (0.00754) (0.00900) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.175** 0.0511 0.0143* 0.0178* 
(0.0892) (0.105) (0.00791) (0.0102) 
Untreated cohorts 0.301*** -0.0476 -0.0150*** -0.00559 
(1972-1976) (0.0504) (0.0690) (0.00483) (0.00638) 
Placebo Test pass fail pass pass 
Observations 1,381,670 333,751 496,555 113,627 
R-squared ‡ 0.181 0.201 0.141 0.169 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 76: Effect of choice on the probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math 
for different crime levels in home municipalities in 1991; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE 
municipality characteristics 
1991 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
low/medium 
crime high crime 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-1990  0.00262* 0.00965*** -0.00338*** -0.00120 
(0.00142) (0.00178) (0.000886) (0.00126) 
Cohorts 1985-1987 0.000982 0.00530*** -0.00399*** -0.00222* 
(0.00138) (0.00181) (0.000896) (0.00125) 
Cohorts 1982-1984 0.000938 -0.00126 -0.00354*** -0.00184 
(0.00152) (0.00186) (0.000901) (0.00126) 
Cohorts 1979-1981 -0.00160 -0.00194 0.00115 0.00196 
(0.00142) (0.00189) (0.00124) (0.00168) 
Cohorts 1977-1978 -0.00216 -0.000428 -0.00160 0.00101 
(0.00163) (0.00221) (0.00140) (0.00197) 
Untreated cohorts 0.00148 0.000991 0.00236*** 0.00181 
(1972-1976) (0.000967) (0.00138) (0.000815) (0.00120) 
Placebo Test fail pass pass pass 
Observations 1,379,246 332,870 1,379,246 332,870 
R-squared ‡ 0.0570 0.0739 0.131 0.149 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. 
For a complete list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 
4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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Table 77: Effect of choice on the percentile rank in marks and cognitive skills for different types of 
home municipalities in 1991; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE PERCENTILE RANK MARKS COGNITIVE SCORE 
municipality 
characteristics 
1991 
low/medium crime high crime low/medium crime high crime 
non-urban urban non-urban urban 
non-
urban urban 
non-
urban urban 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988- -0.501*** -0.113 -0.233 0.539*** 
1990 (0.125) (0.085) (0.526) (0.100) 
Cohorts 1985- -0.423*** -0.247*** -0.386 0.419*** 0.015 0.018* -0.057 0.018* 
1987 (0.136) (0.091) (0.538) (0.111) (0.014) (0.009) (0.057) (0.009) 
Cohorts 1982- -0.387*** 0.009 -0.080 0.107 0.0237* 0.023*** 0.018 -0.008 
1984 (0.143) (0.098) (0.552) (0.110) (0.014) (0.009) (0.058) (0.010) 
Cohorts 1979- -0.18 0.056 0.101 0.102 0.008 0.032*** 0.001 0.005 
1981 (0.131) (0.094) (0.515) (0.120) (0.013) (0.010) (0.049) (0.010) 
Cohorts 1977- -0.213 -0.080 -0.073 0.054 0.010 0.015 0.033 0.010 
1978 (0.149) (0.109) (0.509) (0.121) (0.015) (0.010) (0.052) (0.011) 
Untreated cohorts 0.422*** 0.233*** 0.022 -0.086 -0.027*** -0.014** -0.018 -0.005 
(1972-1976) (0.087) (0.061) (0.315) (0.0753) (0.009) (0.006) (0.030) (0.007) 
Placebo Test pass pass pass pass pass pass pass pass 
Observations 714,999 666,671 69,495 264,256 257,026 239,529 24,708 88,919 
R-squared ‡ 0.164 0.196 0.167 0.205 0.124 0.155 0.129 0.179 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete 
list of included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1.  ‡Pseudo R-squared for 
binary outcomes. 
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Table 78 Effect of choice on probability of receiving a high or passing grade in math for different types of 
home municipalities in 1991; choice radius 2km 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE HIGH GRADE MATH PASSING GRADE 
municipality 
characteristics 
1991 
low/medium crime high crime low/medium crime high crime 
non-urban urban non-urban urban non-urban urban non-urban urban 
Marginal effect of choice, relative to untreated cohorts for:  
Cohorts 1988-  -0.004 0.002 0.003 0.009*** -0.005*** -0.002** -0.006 -0.002 
1990 (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
Cohorts 1985- -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.006*** -0.005*** -0.002** -0.012* -0.002 
1987 (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
Cohorts 1982- -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.004** -0.002* -0.006 -0.001 
1984 (0.003) (0.002) (0.0115) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
Cohorts 1979- 0.000 -0.001 -0.007 0.001 -0.002 0.004*** -0.012 0.004* 
1981 (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Cohorts 1977- -0.002 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.012 0.002 
1978 (0.003) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.002) 
Untreated cohorts 0.003* 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003** 0.001 0.006 0.002 
(1972-1976) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Placebo Test fail pass pass pass pass pass pass pass 
Observations 713,727 665,519 69,341 263,529 713,727 665,519 69,341 263,529 
R-squared ‡ 0.0504 0.0629 0.0571 0.0778 0.127 0.135 0.132 0.154 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, *. For a complete list of 
included covariates see Table 40. The definition of the placebo tests is explained in Section 4.5.1.  
‡Pseudo R-squared for binary outcomes. 
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